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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY  
The European Parliament’s Committee on Industry, Research and Energy (ITRE) called for 
this study in light of the Brexit referendum. The study focuses on the possible effects on EU 
citizens and companies in order to inform the Brexit negotiations from an EU perspective. 
We address eight key issues concerning the potential impact of Brexit on the EU energy 
system. 
On aggregate, the energy system related impact of Brexit on EU citizens and companies 
will be limited. With or without the UK, the EU will be able to complete its market, to 
achieve its climate and energy targets with feasible readjustments, and to maintain supply 
security. In addition, we do not expect that it will be in the UK’s interest to seek a 
competitive advantage for its companies by discriminating against EU energy companies 
active in the UK, or by competing with the EU’s manufacturing industry through lowering 
energy taxes or environmental standards.  
Despite our belief that the negative impact of Brexit on the EU energy system is 
manageable, our analysis demonstrates the immense number and sizable impact of very 
important details that will need to be resolved in a short period of time. Moreover, our 
analysis shows that special attention should be paid to the impact of Brexit on the Irish 
energy system. 
The future of UK access to the European Energy Market 
As a member of the World Trade Organization (WTO), the UK will likely be granted the right 
to import and export energy free of tariffs from and to other WTO members. The EU has 
shown flexibility with respect to the rules governing the usage of electricity and gas 
interconnectors with third parties. Given their mutual interest, the UK and the EU can likely 
find arrangements that will enable continued energy exchanges.  
However, gas and electricity markets are complex service markets, not simple commodities 
markets, and the EU is in the process of streamlining the interface between national market 
designs to create a single energy market. If the UK were no longer bound by complex EU 
rules and institutions, it could essentially opt-out from the joint optimisation of the linked 
systems. This would imply substantial efficiency losses, especially in the long term. The 
impact would disproportionally fall on the UK (and Ireland), because the Continental market 
is both much larger and already better integrated than that of the UK. 
Both the EU27 and the UK have an interest in an increasingly integrated energy market. 
But both face matters of principle that make it difficult to agree on this first-best solution. 
The UK seeks to repeal European rules that infringe on its sovereignty. The EU, on the 
other hand, does not want to allow the UK to ‘cherry-pick’ parts of the existing acquis in 
the negotiations. 
Availability of EU funds for energy projects  
As an EU member, the UK enjoys access to EU-based finance for energy projects from the 
European Investment Bank (EIB), the European Fund for Strategic Investment (EFSI), the 
Connecting Europe Facility (CEF), the EU Horizon 2020 programme (H2020) and the 
European Energy Programme for Recovery (EEPR).  
After the withdrawal, the UK may have more limited access to funding from the EFSI, CEF, 
H2020, and EEPR.  
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As far as the EIB is concerned, in the absence of an agreement to the contrary, the UK 
would presumably cease to be a member when it ceases being an EU Member State. This 
suggests an urgent need to clarify these arrangements in the Brexit negotiation process. 
Participation in regulatory bodies 
Regulatory bodies such as the Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators (ACER) and 
the European Networks of Transmission System Operators for Electricity and Gas (ENTSO-E 
and ENTSOG) play an important role in the functioning of the EU internal energy market. 
After Brexit, the status of any UK representatives in ACER, and the ENTSOs will change. 
Depending on the future arrangements, UK representatives might still remain as observers, 
but current rules would not allow non-EU members to vote on crucial market design issues.  
Revisiting EU energy and climate targets 
If the UK agrees to maintain the EU energy and climate targets (for instance as a condition 
of retaining access to the internal market), it might possibly be required to participate in 
the new Energy Union governance structure. That is, the UK might have to regularly report 
on renewables, energy efficiency, energy infrastructure and greenhouse gas emissions to 
show it is in line with the EU policy goals for 2030 and beyond. In turn, the EU would 
provide guidance to make sure the proposed EU-wide targets on renewables and energy 
efficiency are met. 
If the UK does not commit to the EU energy and climate targets, a political decision in the 
EU will be needed on how to adjust the EU energy and climate targets after Brexit. We 
explore three options for readjusting the national and/or EU targets which keep constant 
either (1) the national ambitions, (2) the EU28 ambition in absolute terms, or (3) the EU28 
ambition in percentage terms. Given that the UK targets were close to the EU average, the 
resulting shifts are not dramatic, but they could still be significant for individual EU 
countries. 
A UK exit from the EU Emission Trading System (ETS) may cause a short-term surplus of 
allowances, because UK installations may sell off the stock of allowances they purchased for 
future compliance when it becomes clear that they will no longer need them. In the longer 
term, Brexit will most likely lead to a tightening of the system. If the UK could stay within 
the system until the end of its third phase in 2020, this could reduce disruption. 
The Swiss model of linking a national emission trading system with the EU trading system 
can be a blueprint for future collaboration. A key political question would then be how the 
UK cap would be determined. 
As the energy efficiency target is defined as a reduction compared to a baseline we suppose 
that each member state is essentially asked to reduce consumption compared to the 
baseline by exactly the same share (e.g., 30%). Hence, Brexit would not imply a change in 
the national contributions to meet the EU-wide energy efficiency target. 
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Rules for security of electricity and gas supplies 
Pooling energy resources among Member States is essential for the EU to build a common 
and truly integrated internal energy market that is able to withstand external shocks. Given 
the UK’s limited energy integration with the Continent, the security of electricity and gas 
supplies on the Continent will not be substantially affected by Brexit.  
Future relation with Euratom 
The UK has indicated its intention to exit Euratom as well as the EU. This requires clear 
arrangements on issues such as equipment safeguards and radioactive waste. 
On equipment safeguards, the EU and the UK seem to agree that the Euratom Community 
should transfer ownership to the UK of equipment and other property located on UK 
territory related to the provision of safeguards. The value of the assets to be transferred 
will represent a key element of the negotiation. 
On radioactive waste, the two parties seem to agree on the principle that responsibility 
should go to the state in which the spent fuel or the radioactive waste was generated. 
However, disagreements are likely to emerge during the negotiations. 
Considering the highly technical nature of these issues, there have been calls for the UK to 
remain in Euratom. However, even if Euratom is legally governed by a separate treaty, its 
functioning depends on EU institutions. For this reason, Euratom should not be considered 
separately from the wider Brexit dossier. 
Impact on energy markets for UK and EU companies 
A large number of European companies are active on the UK gas and electricity markets 
and hold significant market shares there. They are subject to regulatory risks in a post-
Brexit environment if the UK is no longer bound to EU rules. 
London had a leading role in electricity, gas, oil and emission rights trading in Europe. For 
the EU it is important to make sure that UK energy traders active in the EU will have to 
follow at least as rigorous financial market and transparency rules as their EU counterparts. 
London as a legal venue for arbitration cases will most likely not be affected. For place-of-
jurisdiction clauses, companies might decide to abandon London for Continental 
competitors. Although enforceability is not under threat, burdensome procedures could 
increase the cost of enforcement of UK court rulings. 
Impact of the UK withdrawal on Ireland 
The energy system of the Republic of Ireland (ROI) could be significantly affected by Brexit 
because the ROI operates a joint electricity market with Northern Ireland (NI), trades 
electricity with Great Britain (GB) and buys a significant amount of gas from GB. Ensuring 
that the Single Energy Market (SEM) continues to function efficiently and that a level 
playing field is maintained in the SEM will be important following Brexit. 
For the ROI, the first best solution would be for the UK were to remain inside the internal 
energy market; the second-best option would be for NI to remain inside the internal energy 
market; and the worst option would be for only the ROI to remain inside the internal 
energy market. 
It is possible that the ROI might be exempted from certain provisions of EU energy 
regulation, but it seems questionable that the ROI could qualify as an ‘energy island’. 
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The case of the ROI may offer both the EU27 and the UK an opportunity to advocate 
increased energy market integration after Brexit. The EU may argue that accepting full 
internal market membership of the UK is the price to pay for allowing the ROI to fully 
benefit from the EU internal energy market. The UK, on the other hand, might want to 
accept a certain loss of sovereignty from participating in the EU energy market framework - 
besides other benefits also - as the price to pay for energy security in Northern Ireland. 
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INTRODUCTION 
This study, which Bruegel (the Brussels-based European think-tank specializing in 
economics) has conducted on behalf of the Committee on Industry, Research and Energy 
(ITRE) of the European Parliament, provides an assessment of how the UK’s withdrawal 
from the EU (i.e. Brexit) might affect the EU energy system. The ITRE Committee called for 
the study in relation to the UK’s Brexit referendum of 23 June 2016, in order to help 
Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) and the general public understand the critical 
aspects of Brexit from an energy and climate policy perspective. 
As requested by ITRE, the main objective of this study is to offer a balanced picture of the 
issues concerning the impact of Brexit on the EU energy system, providing a descriptive 
analysis based on existing available data, studies and analysis from various sources, 
complemented by Bruegel’s own expertise.  
The study should then provide valuable insights to inform the Brexit negotiations from an 
EU perspective. 
The UK might seek very different ways of collaborating with the EU in the energy sector 
after the withdrawal from the EU. While a UK membership of the European Economic Area 
(like Norway) would imply very limited changes in the energy sector, a model based on bi-
lateral negotiations (like Switzerland) could cause substantial frictions. Somewhere in 
between these two options, it has been suggested that the UK might become a member of 
the Energy Community which would imply that the UK accepts EU energy sector rules, but 
entails limited joint institutions.  
The role of energy and climate policy in the EU 
Coordination of national coal (European Coal and Steel Community, 1952) and nuclear 
(Euratom, 1957) policies were foundation stones of the European integration process. The 
first European Commission of 1967 featured an Energy Commissioner (the Hallstein 
Commission, which preceded it, had no dedicated Energy Commissioner). In 1991, the 
European Community’s Energy Commissioner, Antonio Cardoso e Cunha, proposed two 
Directives aimed at liberalizing the European electricity and gas markets. The Directives 
were enacted five and seven years later respectively. A second major energy market 
package followed in 2003. However, because of the lack of an energy chapter in the 
treaties at the time, the legal basis for these policies was competition rules.  
In this context, the European leaders agreed to establish a truly common EU energy policy 
at the 2005 Hampton Court summit, convened by the British Prime Minister Tony Blair. Two 
years later, the new Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) added energy 
to the EU competences (Art. 194), even if it prevented the EU from interfering with the 
national fuel mixes. As most energy legislation would affect the fuel mix, the treaty 
provision on the energy competence is seen as being deliberately ambiguous. In 2009, a 
third major energy package was issued and a fourth package is currently being proposed.  
As a result of a 60-year development, EU rules have profoundly changed the way in which 
energy sectors are organised in the Member States and how energy policies are 
coordinated between countries. Coordination is largely conducted through markets 
governed by increasingly harmonised and complex rules. 
EU climate policy evolved out of EU environmental policy. The European Economic 
Community was already a party to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change in 
1992 and the European Community committed to joint targets in the Kyoto protocol in 
1997. Accordingly, the EU started the largest greenhouse gas emissions trading system in 
Impact of Brexit on the EU Energy System 
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the world in 2005 and created a dedicated Commissioner and Directorate General (DG) for 
Climate Action in 2009. The TFEU gives the EU the competence for international climate 
negotiations (Art. 191). Given the ambitious international commitments of the EU, 
European climate policy will possibly become an even more important area of EU policy. 
Competition and single market policies remain crucial drivers for energy and climate 
policies. Because energy is an important production factor and climate policies can impact 
the competitiveness of certain industries, distortions between countries could cascade down 
the value chain. Hence, state aid guidelines seek to prevent national energy or 
environmental policies undermining the functioning of the internal market.  
Status quo of the Brexit talks 
Table 1 depicts an overview of events surrounding the UK’s exit from the EU. On 29 March 
2017, the UK invoked Article 50 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU2), officially marking 
the beginning of the two-year negotiation period. The European Council adopted its political 
guidelines3 for the negotiations with the UK at the summit on 29 April 2017. The guidelines 
set out a two-phase approach to the negotiations. In the first phase, the EU will provide 
clarity and legal certainty on the immediate effects of the UK’s departure, and disentangle 
the UK from its commitments to the EU. On 22 May 2017, the European Council appointed 
the European Commission to lead the negotiations on behalf of the EU and expanded the 
framework for the first phase.4 Three key issues5 were identified as particularly pertinent to 
address in the first phase of the negotiations: 
1. The rights of EU (UK) citizens living in the UK (EU); 
2. The settlement of the UK’s financial obligations; and 
3. Ensuring the peace is maintained on the island of Ireland. 
The negotiations commenced on 19 June 2017. Since then, EU and UK negotiators have 
met on a monthly basis. If the European Council ultimately decides that sufficient progress 
has been made on the exit deal, the negotiations will enter a second phase. In this phase, 
preliminary discussions will be held on the framework for the future relationship between 
the EU and the UK, as well as on possible transitional arrangements.6
                                           
2  Treaty of Lisbon Amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty Establishing the European 
Community, 17 December 2007, 2007 O.J. (C 306) 1. 
3  European Council (2017a). 
4  European Council (2017b). 
5  The three issues were initially stipulated in the resolution of the European Parliament on 5 April 2017 
(European Parliament, 2017a). 
6  European Parliament (2017b). 
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Table 1:   Overview of events relating to Brexit 
DATE EVENT 
20 February 2016 The UK Prime Minister announces the date of the referendum according to the European Union Referendum Act 2015 
23 June 2016 The UK holds the referendum on EU membership.7 
2 February 2017 The UK government publishes a White Paper outlining its vision on the Brexit negotiations.8 
29 March 2017 
UK prime minister Theresa May invokes Article 50 of the Treaty 
on European Union (TEU), marking the beginning of the legal 
process for withdrawal.9 
29 April 2017 
The European Council adopts negotiation guidelines, defining the 
EU’s overall positions and principles, as envisioned in Article 50 
of TEU at a summit.10 
19 June 2017 First round of negotiations between the EU and UK11 
October 2017 Fifth round of negotiations.12 
October 2018 Negotiations conclude, ratification process begins in the EU13 
29 March 2019 The UK leaves the EU, unless both the EU and UK agree to extend the deadline14 
Source: Bruegel. 
 
Since mid-2017 the UK has published several papers on its position on the energy system-
related Brexit negotiations (a list of selected publications of policy papers by the 
government of the United Kingdom can be found in Table 2). To date (30 October 2017) it 
remains unclear which type of settlement the UK seeks with respect to most key questions 
addressed in this report. 
                                           
7  BBC (2016a). 
8  UK Government (2017a). 
9  European Commission (2017a). 
10  European Council (2017a). 
11  European Commission (2017b). 
12  European Commission (2017c). 
13  European Commission (2017b). 
14  European Commission (2017b) 
Impact of Brexit on the EU Energy System 
_________________________________________________________________ 
PE 614.181 19  
 
Table 2:   Selected UK policy papers on Brexit 
TITLE OF UK POLICY PAPER TYPE OF PAPER DATE OF PUBLICATION 
Technical note on existing contracts for the supply 
of nuclear material Technical note 28 August 2017 
Enforcement and dispute resolution - a future 
partnership paper 
Future 
partnership paper 23 August 2017 
Northern Ireland and Ireland - position paper Position paper 16 August 2017 
Nuclear materials and safeguards issues - position 
paper Position paper 13 July 2017 
Annex to the Council Decision authorising the 
opening of negotiations 
Annex to Council 
Decisions 15 May 2017 
The Repeal Bill: White Paper White Paper 30 March 2017 
The United Kingdom’s exit from, and new 
partnership with, the European Union White Paper 2 February 2017 
Source: ‘Article 50 and negotiations with the EU’ (UK Government, 2017b). 
 
Structure of this report 
In Chapter 1, the future of the UK’s access to the European Energy Market is discussed. An 
overview of EU funds for UK energy projects and their future availability is provided in 
Chapter 2. In Chapter 3, we review the current role of UK in European regulatory bodies, 
while Chapter 4 focuses on EU energy and climate targets and their future after Brexit. In 
Chapter 5, we assess the EU’s security of supply after the withdrawal of the UK, while 
Chapter 6 gives an overview of the future relation with Euratom. In Chapter 7, we assess 
the impact of Brexit on energy markets for UK and EU companies, while Chapter 8 
examines the impact of the UK’s withdrawal for the energy system of Ireland. Finally, we 
provide an integrated summary of our findings in Chapter 9. 
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CHAPTER 1.  THE FUTURE UK ACCESS TO THE EUROPEAN 
ENERGY MARKET 
KEY FINDINGS 
• The UK serves as a transit country for electricity and gas between the Continent and 
Ireland as well as (less importantly) a transit country for gas between Norway and the 
EU27.  
• The EU27/UK electricity and gas trade was worth about EUR 6 billion in 2015 – more 
than 80 percent of which was in natural gas. In addition, the UK imported natural gas 
worth EUR 10 billion from Norway. 
• Electricity markets are complex service markets, not simple commodity markets, and 
the EU is in the process of streamlining the interfaces between national market designs 
to create a single energy market. 
• In the absence of an agreement in which the UK accepts to adhere to (dynamic) EU 
energy market rules and accepts the power of corresponding EU institutions on UK 
subjects, the UK might only conduct tariff-free export and import of bulk electricity, like 
Russia or Morocco. Hence the UK would opt-out of the joint optimisation of the linked 
systems, which would imply substantial efficiency losses, especially in the long term. The 
negative impact would disproportionally fall on the UK (and Ireland), as the Continental 
market is much larger and already better integrated. 
• Current UK energy taxes appear not to be influenced by EU rules and hence Brexit will 
presumably have no direct impact on them. 
1.1  Current status of EU-UK energy exchanges 
1.1.1  Natural gas (no LNG) 
For a long time, the UK has been a major producer and exporter of natural gas. Since the 
2000s, the UK has increasingly imported natural gas and the import dependency has risen 
from around 0 percent in 2000 to over 50 percent in 2013.15 Between July 2016 and June 
2017, the UK physically imported 33 billion m³ [bcm] from Norway and 6 bcm from the 
EU27 according to data from the International Energy Agency (Figure 1). 
On the export side, the UK has constantly exported natural gas to Ireland (4.5 bcm in 
2015) as well as varying amounts to Belgium. 
 
                                           
15  Le Fevre (2015) 
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Figure 1:  (Gross) UK natural gas imports and exports (gaseous state, in bcm) 
 
Source: Bruegel based on IEA (2017). 
Note: Positive values are gross imports; negative value are gross exports. 
 
The financial in- and outflows are similar to the physical flows. In 2015, (gross) natural gas 
imports had a value of over EUR 10 billion ( 
Figure 2). They have been decreasing markedly since their peak in 2013, when UK 
imported natural gas with a total value of over EUR 20 billion. Financial flows are more 
volatile than physical flows because of price and currency fluctuations. 
 
Figure 2:  (Gross) UK natural gas imports and exports (gaseous state, 
measured in billion EUR) 
 
Source: Bruegel based on Eurostat (2017a). 
Note: Positive values are gross imports; negative value are gross exports. 
 
The UK is an unavoidable transit country for gas imports to Ireland (see Chapter 8), but is 
also used to (implicitly) bring gas from Norway (or Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG)) to 
Belgium. However, existing LNG and pipeline infrastructure would allow circumvention of 
the UK for gas transit to the Continent by increasing the usage levels. 
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1.1.2  LNG 
LNG has become more important for the UK energy mix in the last years. Since 2009, UK 
has dramatically expanded its LNG imports, mainly from Qatar (Figure 3). LNG imports had 
a peak (in physical as well as financial terms) in 2011 with over 20 bcm worth almost EUR 
5 billion. Gas exports to Belgium and Ireland are much smaller than the LNG imports of the 
UK, thus one could argue that on aggregate the UK is an LNG terminal for both countries. 
Belgium could replace pipeline imports from the UK by domestic LNG imports at its 
Zeebrugge terminal (which is located at the same point as the UK interconnector). Its 
capacity of 9 bcm/year so far has been grossly underutilised (2016: 1.1 bcm). 
Ireland currently has no LNG terminal. But the proposed capacity of LNG projects in 
Shannon and Cork would exceed Irelands entire import demand. 
 
Figure 3:  UK LNG (gross) imports from Qatar (in billion m3 and EUR billion) 
 
Source: Bruegel based on IEA (2017) and Eurostat (2017a). 
Note: Positive values are gross imports; negative value gross exports.  
1.1.3  Electricity 
The UK trades electricity with three EU countries: France, Ireland and the Netherlands. As 
shown in Figure 4, the UK has traditionally been a net importer of electricity receiving 
imports mainly from France and in recent years also from the Netherlands. On the other 
hand, Ireland has been a net recipient of UK electricity exports. But in each interconnector, 
we observe flows in both directions, which suggests that in different situations electricity is 
cheaper on one side or the other. 
Imports from France occur mainly in peak periods (when UK prices are higher) while 
exports to France are more likely in situations where UK prices are lower. Trade with the 
Netherlands can on average not be attributed to high/low UK prices. In contrast to trade 
with France, the UK imports electricity from Ireland when prices in the UK are low (this 
might often be situations with high wind generation and low demand on the British Isles) 
and exports when prices are high. This nicely illustrates the complementarity of the Irish, 
UK and Continental systems. 
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Table 3:   Average import and export prices for UK electricity with different 
trading partners 
  TRADE DIRECTION FROM THE UK PERSPECTIVE 
WEIGHTED AVERAGE UK 
PRICE (1H2017) [GBP] 
French 
Interconnector  
import 46.23 
export 41.42 
Dutch 
Interconnector  
import 43.74 
export 42.47 
Irish 
Interconnector  
import 39.82 
export 47.15 
East-West 
Interconnector  
import 41.74 
export 47.41 
Source: Bruegel based on Bloomberg (2017) and Gridwatch (2017). 
 
Figure 4:  UK (gross) electricity imports and exports (in GWh) 
 
Source: Bruegel based on IEA (2017). 
Note: Positive values are gross imports; negative value gross exports. 
 
The financial flows mirror the physical flows. Total electricity imports to the UK in 2015 had 
a value of over EUR 1.2 billion. 
1.2  Energy trading in the internal energy market 
Gas and electricity markets in principle feature the same challenges (increasing 
harmonisation of market designs and sophistication of EU rules) and institutional 
framework, but electricity markets are typically more complex. Actually, the role of 
electricity – and especially the more sophisticated trading-arrangements - is expected to 
increase in the future as decarbonisation is expected to be driven by electrification from 
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variable renewables. Hence, when discussing market design, we will focus on the electricity 
sector. 
1.2.1  Electricity markets are complex service markets – not simple commodities 
markets 
Electricity transmission and distribution networks are natural monopolies and their tariffs 
are hence not determined by markets, but regulated. By contrast, electricity supply is a 
competitive market. Given the complexity of the electricity system that requires that at any 
moment supply needs to equal demand, electricity supply is driven by numerous 
arrangements and markets for different sub-segments. Several of these sub-segments can 
in principle be organised as markets in which foreign players can participate – and hence 
there are European rules governing them. For the UK we can identify several dozen related 
products that can be grouped together in five categories (from most long-term to most 
short-term): 
• Capacity market: The UK has a capacity market that pays power plants (and 
interruptible consumers) for being available some years in the future. In its latest 
auction for 2020/2021, the UK government awarded agreements worth GBP 1.18 
billion to capacity providers.16 
• Renewables support: The UK has several support mechanisms for electricity 
generated from low-carbon sources. For this year it planned to allocate up to GBP 
760 million in terms of Contracts for Difference. 
• Wholesale market: The most important segment remains the wholesale market in 
which producers, traders and consumers trade electricity from one day up to several 
years ahead. Assuming that all delivered electricity on average is at the day-ahead 
wholesale price; the total volume of the physical wholesale market is in the order of 
GBP 1 billion in July 2017 (in financial terms it is much larger as the same MWh of 
electricity might be traded multiple times between different parties). Of this total 
physical trade only, GBP 64 million correspond to imports and GBP 4 million to 
exports – which shows that overall cross-border electricity trade is small compared 
to countries like Germany. 
• Balancing: Because of short-term deviations from the day-ahead schedule (e.g., 
because demand is lower or wind power is higher than expected the day before) 
electricity excess/shortage needs to be balanced by the system operator. A 
corresponding balancing market had a market volume of GBP 10 million in July 
2017. 
• Finally, there are a number of very narrow services commissioned by the system 
operator to make sure the system works in a stable way. These were worth another 
GBP 100 million in July 2017. 
The above figures are neither complete nor fully consistent, but they indicate the orders of 
magnitude of the different segments. Overall, they sum up to a bit less than 1 percent of 
UK GDP, with wholesale electricity still being the largest component. The number and value 
of products other than bulk electricity (wholesale) increased in the past decade.17 This has 
partly to do with the will to design more complex market signals to provide better 
                                           
16  National Grid (2016). 
17  For example, National Grid states: “Over time the number of balancing services procured by National Grid has 
grown to more than 20, ranging from Enhanced Frequency Response, to Demand Turn-Up, Reactive Power, 
and Black Start” (National Grid, 2017). 
Impact of Brexit on the EU Energy System 
_________________________________________________________________ 
PE 614.181 25  
incentives for investment and operation and partly with the increasing share of variable 
renewables that require a more responsive system. Other west European markets show a 
similar trend towards more complex products. Because of significant interactions between 
the individual products, the corresponding markets cannot be treated in isolation. The 
efficiency of the wholesale market depends on the design of the other markets. If for 
example, UK companies would stop exporting to the Continent because they enter into 
obligations on the national capacity market, this would distort EU-UK wholesale trade. Or if 
EU-based power companies have a shortfall of supply for their UK customers, they need 
access to the balancing market. 
1.2.2  The EU is in the process of streamlining the interface between national market 
designs 
In fact, the EU embarked on a process to make national/regional electricity markets more 
compatible with each other to allow also more complex products to be traded across 
borders. This process is continuing to go ahead. Ireland is supposed to be integrated with 
the UK through day-ahead market coupling in 2018; and the UK is supposed to be coupled 
to the Continent through intraday-market coupling in 2018 (day-ahead market coupling 
was already established in 2014).18 
Brexit could stall this process as the underlying rules are set by institutions of the European 
Union. The capacity allocation and congestion management guidelines are a Commission 
Regulation that is being implemented through network codes that were developed by 
ENTSO-E and ACER. So, when the UK is outside the EU it would not naturally be allowed to 
participate in these coupling exercises. This is very clear from the corresponding regulation 
that entails specific provisions for Switzerland and Energy Community countries:19 
Article 1 
… 
4. The Union single day-ahead and intraday coupling may be opened to market 
operators and TSOs [Transmission System Operators] operating in Switzerland on 
the condition that the national law in that country implements the main provisions of 
Union electricity market legislation and that there is an intergovernmental 
agreement on electricity cooperation between the Union and Switzerland. 
5. … participation by Switzerland in day-ahead coupling and single intraday coupling 
shall be decided by the Commission based on an opinion given by the Agency. ... 
1.2.3  Without EU rules and institutions trade partners might only export/import bulk 
electricity 
If the UK cannot stay in the internal electricity markets (the rules of which are determined 
by ENTSO-E, ACER and the European Commission, and ultimately upheld by the European 
Court of Justice) it might have to seek an alternative arrangement for trading electricity. In 
fact, other electricity trading-partners such as Russia and Morocco are not bound by EU 
energy rules (in contrast to Ukraine, which is a member of the Energy Community) and for 
WTO members the EU has no tariff on electricity or gas imports.20 For example, Russia 
                                           
18  ENTSO-E (2016). 
19  Commission Regulation (EU) 2015/1222. 
20  EU has no import tariffs on electricity (HS 2716) and natural gas (HS 2711) for WTO members as stipulated in 
COUNCIL REGULATION (EEC) No 2658/87 of 23 July 1987. 
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exports electricity to Finland which works based on an arrangement of the transmission 
operators in both countries. A company wanting to trade electricity has to buy electricity in 
Russia – which is a relatively well functioning market, book transmission capacity in Russia 
and transmission capacity in Finland21. So, there is no joint order book, i.e., the partner 
has to submit its sell and buy offers to the Finish market and see what would be taken up. 
Consequently, trading is relatively inflexible and not fully predictable. While it contributes to 
lowering the Finish electricity price when power is flowing, it does neither exploit short-
term trade gains nor reliably increase supply security. The same is true for Morocco’s 
electricity imports from Spain - where the Moroccan electricity company essentially acts as 
a large customer to the Spanish market.  
In neither case does the arrangement lead to a joint optimisation of the linked systems. 
This implies different efficiency losses compared to the envisaged EU internal energy 
market: 
Suboptimal dispatch: Without joint optimisation it is possible that relatively cheap 
plants in one country remain unused, even though their output could replace more 
expensive production in the other country. 
Lower market liquidity: A fully integrated energy market (with implicit allocation 
of transmission capacities) can essentially lead to the liquidity in one market area 
being the sum of the liquidity in all participating market areas. In a less 
sophisticated system the liquidity in one market would be closer to the liquidity of 
this market area plus the size of the interconnector. As a result, cost and prices tend 
to be higher. 
Less competitive pressure: As a result of the liquidity consideration above, 
competitive pressure is also much lower when there is no fully integrated energy 
market. As a result, prices tend to be higher. 
Imperfect investment signals: In the long term the most important effect might 
be the distortion to investment signals. When each market area has to individually 
ensure system adequacy (of all products) we will end up with costly overinvestment. 
While the impact of leaving the internal electricity market on the UK would be substantial, it 
will have a relatively muted impact on the Continental market (for Ireland see Chapter 8). 
If the UK wants to maintain a liquid, sophisticated22 and competitive electricity market it 
would need to ensure continued participation in the developing internal energy markets. 
The rules in this market are evolving and will continue to do so. The past shows that there 
is no ultimate market design that will be frozen for several years, but that stakeholders will 
continue to tune the system to provide the right market signals in a quickly changing world 
(e.g., higher Renewable Energy Sources (RES) shares, increasing role of demand side and 
local networks, digitalisation, etc..). Hence, the UK will need to find a way to be credibly 
bound by the changing rules. The difficulty for the UK is that some of these rules might 
deeply infringe into what might be perceived as sovereign rights. For example, the 
proposed regional operation centres (ROCs) would oversee the system operation in a group 
of Member States (the Commission proposal foresaw that the UK has a ROC together with 
Ireland).23 Such deeper integration will improve cross-border cooperation in terms of 
                                           
21  Buying electricity in Russia in specific hours might possibly imply paying an extra charge due to the Russian 
capacity mechanism. 
22  For example, with targeted products that ensure market-driven supply at minimum cost. 
23  Currently, National Grid belongs to one of the Regional Security Coordinators (RSC), Coreso which groups the 
German (50hertz), Belgian (Elia), French (RTE), Spanish (REE), Portuguese (REN) and Italian (Terna) TSOs. As 
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dispatch and investment, but imply a loss of national sovereignty as regards network 
operation. 
1.2.4  Capacity mechanisms 
The Commission proposal for an electricity market design regulation24 currently discussed 
in the European Parliament contains rules on capacity mechanisms. Such mechanisms have 
been developed in various Member States (including the UK) to ensure that adequate 
generation capacities are available at all times. These mechanisms provide pay-outs to 
generators25 that agree to guarantee availability in a certain timeframe. Such mechanisms 
typically require complex rulebooks that define how the product is defined, which are 
eligible and how the procurement is organised (the UK capacity market rules comprise 253 
pages26). To avoid distortions to the internal energy market the European Commission has 
to approve capacity mechanisms27 - which was done in 2014 for the UK capacity market. 
Furthermore, the new electricity market design regulation proposed by the European 
Commission24 entails that national capacity mechanisms shall be open to participation from 
other Member States: 
Article 21 Cross-border participation in capacity mechanisms  
1. Mechanisms other than strategic reserves shall be open to direct participation of 
capacity providers located in another Member State provided there is a network 
connection between that Member State and the bidding zone applying the 
mechanism … 
This might imply that the UK has to accept bidders from the Continent in what has become 
a 52 GW and EUR 1.5 billion per year market.28 Given that capacity is short in the UK and 
long on the Continent that might imply payments from the UK to the Continent for capacity 
outside the UK (a lot will depend on how transmission capacity limitations are ultimately 
considered). In addition, according to the proposed EU rules the capacity need to be 
covered by such mechanisms would be determined on a regional (not national basis). 
Hence, the UK might only be allowed to have a capacity mechanism, when there is an 
                                           
a principal task, they coordinate the actions of TSOs by providing close to real-time recommendations, due to 
a broader vision of the state of the European electricity system. The regulation on the operating of the 
electricity system (System Operation Guideline), adopted in comitology by the Member States in 2016 and 
which should enter into effect before the summer of 2017, already foresees a strengthening of the RSC’s 
missions, particularly in terms of defining network models for coordinated capacity calculation and short and 
medium-term adequacy studies. 
 The Commission's proposal in the context of the ‘Clean Energy for all Europeans’ package, which intervenes 
even though the system will evolve in 2017, goes further by assigning new missions to ROCs and by 
transferring certain responsibilities to the regional level. ROCs would thus participate in the development of 
crisis scenarios and in the calculation of cross-border capacities relative to capacity mechanisms; they may 
also issue binding instructions to TSOs (e.g.: regional dimensioning of reserves). 
24  Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of The Council on the internal market for electricity 
(recast) (COM (2016) 861 final 2016/0379(COD)). 
25  Capacity mechanisms are often also open to providers of demand side response. 
26  It was only 151 pages in 2014. 
27  Europcan Commission Guidelines on State aid for environmental protection and energy 2014-2020, ‘Article 3.9. 
Aid for generation adequacy’ (European Commission, 2014a). 
28  Currently the UK allows the interconnectors to bid into the market which they successfully do. 
Policy Department A: Economic and Scientific Policy 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 28 PE 614.181 
aggregate capacity-shortfall in one of the regions in which the UK is a member (Region 8 
[IU: Ireland and United Kingdom29] or Region 9 [Channel30]). 
If the UK leaves the internal energy market it would also not participate in any cross-border 
exchange of capacity. This would possibly reduce corresponding income for Continental 
capacity providers and lead to increasing capacity investments into the UK (paid for by UK 
consumers). This in turn would result in increasing overcapacities – which might depress 
prices in regional wholesale markets. 
1.3  EU energy taxation 
Current EU rules for taxing energy products and electricity are laid down in the Energy Tax 
Directive 2003/96/EC31, which entered into force on 1 January 2004. This Directive defined 
for the first time a common EU framework for the taxation of fuels, heating fuels and 
electricity, and also set certain minimum rates for energy products (Table 4).32 
In 2011, the EC presented a proposal to revise the Energy Tax Directive with the aim of 
restructuring the taxation of energy products to support the EU's wider environmental 
goals.33 The European Parliament voted on the proposal in 2012, but after unsuccessful 
negotiations between the EU Member States in the Council, the proposal was withdrawn by 
the EC in 2015.34 
The UK’s current taxation rates stand well above the Energy Tax Directive’s minimum 
requirements for gasoline, gas oil, kerosene, heavy fuel oil, Liquefied Petroleum Gas (LPG) 
and natural gas (Table 4). So even when remaining a EU Member State, the UK could lower 
these taxes. 
 
                                           
29  Region 8 includes the bidding zone border between Great Britain and Single Electricity Market in Ireland and 
Northern Ireland attributed to the EirGrid, Moyle Interconnector (Moyle), National Grid Electricity Transmission 
plc (NGET) and SONI. 
30  Region 9 includes the bidding zone borders between France - Great Britain and Netherlands - Great Britain. 
31  Council Directive 2003/96/EC of 27 October 2003 restructuring the Community framework for the taxation of 
energy products and electricity. 
32  Prior to the entry into force of the Energy Tax Directive, the Community framework for energy taxation only 
covered mineral oils. The 2003 Directive widened the scope of the minimum rate system to include to all 
energy products, including coal and coke, natural gas and electricity. 
33  A key feature of the proposal was to tax energy in a way that reflected both its CO2 emissions and its energy 
content. Energy taxes would have been split into these two components to determine the overall rate at which 
the fuel is taxed. 
34  European Commission (n.d.-a). 
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Table 4:   EU’s minimum tax rates for energy products and the UK’s current 
rates 
PRODUCT TAX RATE 
  
Minimum 
EU 
Total UK 
(as of 01.01.2017) 
Gasoline 
(EUR/1000 litres) 
Leaded 421 775 
Unleaded 359 664 
Gas oil 
(EUR/1000 litres) 
Propellant use 330 664 
Heating and process use 21 128 
Kerosene 
(EUR/1000 litres) 
Propellant use 330 664 
Process use 21 128 
Heavy fuel oil 
(EUR/1000 kg) 
Heating 15 123 
LPG - propellant use 
(EUR/1000 kg) 
Propellant use 125 362 
Process use 41 n.a. 
Heating 0 14 
Natural gas 
(EUR/gigajoule) 
Propellant use 2.6 6.5 
Process use and non-
business heating 0.3 0.6 
Business heating 0.15 0.6 
Coal 
(EUR/gigajoule) 
Non-business heating 0.3 0 
Business heating 0.15 0.6* 
Electricity 
(EUR/MWh) 
Business 0.5 6.5* 
Non-business 1 0 
Source: Bruegel based on ‘Excise Duty Tables’ (European Commission, 2017d) and ‘Climate Change Levy: 
application, rates and exemptions’ (UK Government, 2016a). 
Note: * The values correspond to the climate change levy (CCL) rates as of 1 April 2017. The data were converted 
by Bruegel into EUR/gigajoule for business heating of coal and into EUR/MWh for business use of electricity;  
[green=UK above EU minimum rate; red=UK below EU minimum rate] 
 
On the other hand, the UK has no excise duty on electricity and coal for non-business 
consumers and significantly lower excise duties on business-relevant energy products than 
countries like Germany or France (Table 5). Furthermore, the UK is currently applying a 
VAT rate to electricity and natural gas of 5 percent, far below all other EU27 countries 
(Figure 5). 
So, it is unlikely that the UK will be able to attract manufacturing industries currently 
located in the EU-27 by cutting energy taxes below the EU minimum levels. However, it has 
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been discussed that the UK might consider adjusting its carbon price support downward 
post 2020 to improve competitiveness. According to a report35 by Aurora Energy Research 
this could reduce energy bills by GBP 2.6 billion per year. Such a domestic policy shift 
would, however, also be possible if the UK stayed within the EU.  
 
Table 5:   Excise duties for business-relevant energy products in the UK, GER 
and FRA 
 
UK FRANCE GERMANY 
Natural gas - Business heating (EUR/gigajoule) 0.61 1.63 4.12 
Electricity - Business  
(EUR/MWh) 
6.50 22.50 15.37 
Source: Bruegel based on ‘Excise Duty Tables’ (European Commission, 2017d) and ‘Climate Change Levy: 
application, rates and exemptions’ (UK Government, 2016a). 
 
 
Figure 5:  VAT rates on natural gas and electricity 
Source: Bruegel based on ‘VAT rates’ (European Commission, 2017e). 
 
1.4  Critical issues and options 
The key question is whether the UK will remain part of the internal energy market, and 
what arrangement will be negotiated if it does not. As the internal energy market is based 
on a complex and dynamic set of enforceable rules a stable set of institutions is needed to 
make it work. Hence, it is not conceivable that a country can participate in the internal 
energy market when it does not accept the powers of super-national institutions (e.g. 
ACER, ENTSO, ROCs, European Commission) over its own energy system. 
                                           
35  Aurora Energy Research (2017). 
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If the UK were to leave the internal energy market that would not imply a stop of energy 
trading between the EU27 and the UK, but substantially reduce the sophistication of trading 
arrangements. As a result, we expect that the trade gains from an internal market that 
jointly optimises the electricity systems (both in terms of dispatch and investments) in the 
UK and the EU27 will vanish. The effects will be asymmetrical. The UK will require costly 
domestic overcapacities to ensure system adequacy, if it cannot rely on the Continent for 
compensating domestic shortfalls. In addition, wholesale prices will increase and become 
more volatile due to decreasing competition and falling liquidity. On the Continent (for 
Ireland see Chapter 8) we in principle expect the same effect - but at a much smaller 
magnitude. In this case the EU should make sure that UK-overcapacities (that are 
supported through mechanisms that are unavailable for market participants in the EU27) 
do not undermine investment or dispatch decisions in the EU27. 
 
Table 6:   Which arrangements allow a country to enjoy tariff-free energy 
exchanges and/or joint optimisation of dispatch with the EU? 
 Tariff-free energy exchanges 
Joint optimisation of 
dispatch 
EU Member State  
(e.g. France) 
Yes Yes 
EEA  
(e.g. Norway) 
Yes Yes 
Energy Community  
(e.g. Ukraine) 
Yes Case-by-case 
Bilateral Treaty  
(e.g. Switzerland) 
Yes Case-by-case 
WTO  
(e.g. Morocco) 
Yes No 
Source: Bruegel. 
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CHAPTER 2.  AVAILABILITY OF EU FUNDS FOR ENERGY 
PROJECTS 
KEY FINDINGS 
• Between 2012 and 2017, the European Investment Bank (EIB) provided about EUR 9 
billion for energy projects in which the UK participates. 
• Since 2015, the European Fund for Strategic Investment (EFSI) has signed financing 
worth EUR 1.4 billion for energy projects related to the UK, and approved another EUR 
410 million. 
• Of the current EU projects of common interest (PCIs), 16 are UK-related. These 
projects received funding of EUR 125.6 million from the Connecting Europe Facility, and 
additional funding of EUR 90 million is in the pipeline. 
• The EU Horizon 2020 programme currently funds more than 90 energy-related 
research and innovation projects in which the UK participates, for a total commitment 
of EUR 160 million. 
• The European Energy Programme for Recovery (EEPR) has provided grants to UK-
related energy projects for a total of EUR 330 million.  
• After the withdrawal, the UK might have more limited access to funding from the EFSI, 
CEF, H2020, and EEPR. 
• The details of the UK’s withdrawal from the EIB should be part of a single financial 
settlement between the EU27 and the UK, and should not be treated separately. 
The aim of this chapter is to assess the current status of and potential way forward for the 
availability of EU funds for energy projects in the UK, and most notably for UK-related EU 
Projects of Common Interest (PCIs). 
To do so, the chapter will review the most important EU financing institutions and 
mechanisms: the European Investment Bank (EIB), the European Fund for Strategic 
Investments (EFSI) and the Connecting Europe Facility (CEF), the Horizon 2020 
programme (H2020) and the European Energy Programme for Recovery (EEPR). 
For each of these entities, three levels of analysis will be provided: 
1. An outline of the entity’s mandate and activities; 
2. An outline of the entity’s past, current and planned financing for UK-related energy 
projects; and 
3. An outline of the (eventual) conditions under which non-EU countries can participate 
in the entity.
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2.1  European investment bank 
Founded in 1958 under the Treaty of Rome, the EIB is the EU’s long-term lending 
institution. The shareholders of the EIB are the EU Member States.36 The capital of the 
Bank, EUR 233 billion, is provided by Member States on the basis of their economic weight 
within the EU at the time of their accession. The UK is one of the largest four shareholders 
of the Bank (together with Germany, France and Italy), with a capital subscription of 
almost EUR 39 billion.37 Since 1959, the EIB has provided around EUR 117 billion in 
financial support -i.e. mainly lending- to UK projects, of which about EUR 30 billion has 
been provided for energy projects.38 The Bank’s mandate is to borrow money on capital 
markets and to lend it on favourable terms to projects that support EU objectives.39 The 
EIB provides three main types of products and services: lending, blending and advising. 
Lending represents around 90 percent of the Bank’s total financial commitment, and around 
90 percent of this activity is made within the EU.40 
Energy has traditionally represented an important sector for EIB financing. As the Bank’s 
activities in the field are primarily guided by EU energy and climate policy priorities, EIB’s 
typical focus is on energy efficiency, renewable energy, energy networks, as well as related 
research and innovation. 
Between 1959 and 2011, the EIB provided EUR 19.5 billion of financing support to the UK’s 
energy sector.41 This support scaled up in the recent past, as nearly half of this amount 
(EUR 9 billion) was provided between 2012 and 2017 (Table 7). 
 
Table 7:   EIB financing support to UK energy projects  
(2012-2017) – in billion EUR 
Electricity projects Gas projects Other projects Total 
6.86 1.77 0.40 9.04  
Source: Bruegel based on ‘EIB project list’ (EIB, n.d.-b). 
Note: These amounts do not include EFSI-funded projects. 
 
The Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) states, in its Article 308, that 
‘The members of the European Investment Bank shall be the Member States.’42 Neither the 
TFEU nor the EIB’s Statute have provisions concerning a withdrawal from the EIB or 
provisions concerning the participation of non-EU Member States into the Bank’s activities 
and governance. In the absence of an agreement to the contrary, the UK may cease to be a 
member of the EIB when it ceases to be an EU Member State. This suggests an urgent 
                                           
36  EIB (2017). 
37  EIB (n.d.-a). 
38  The full list of funded projects can be found here: http://www.eib.org/efsi/efsi-
projects/index.htm?c=GB&se=3.  
39  Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union art. 309 (ex. Article 267 TEC), 
2012 O.J. C 326/47 [hereinafter called TFEU]. 
40  EU (n.d.). 
41  The list of energy projects financed by the EIB can be found here: 
http://www.eib.org/projects/loan/list/index.htm?from=1959&region=1&sector=1000&to=2011&country=GB. 
42  TFEU Art. 308 (ex Article 266 TEC), 2012 O.J. C 326/47. 
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need to clarify these arrangements going forward through the Brexit negotiation process so 
as to avoid uncertainties or ambiguities.43 This is consistent with the European Council’s call 
for the EU and UK to “respect the obligations resulting from the whole period of the UK 
membership in the Union [so as to] cover all commitments as well as liabilities, including 
contingent liabilities”.44 The Council called for these issues to be addressed through an 
integrated approach not only for the EIB, but also for the MFF, the European Development 
Fund (EDF) and the European Central Bank (ECB). 
2.2  European fund for strategic investment 
The European Fund for Strategic Investment (EFSI) was launched in 2015 as a joint 
initiative by the EIB Group and the European Commission, with the aim of reversing the 
negative investment trend in the EU. The EFSI is managed by the EIB, and is not a ‘fund’ 
per se. Instead, it is a guarantee instrument allowing the EIB Group to increase its risk 
bearing capacity by lending to commercially viable, yet higher risk, projects.45 The EFSI’s 
mandate is to finance such projects in strategically important sectors for the EU, including: 
• Strategic infrastructure, such as digital, transport and energy; 
• Education, research, development and innovation; 
• Renewable energy and resource efficiency; and 
• Support for small and mid-sized businesses.46 
The EIB Group and the EU have contributed EUR 5 billion and EUR 16 billion respectively to 
the EFSI, implying that a total budget of EUR 21 billion is available. By mid-2018, the EFSI 
aims to have supported investments in its target sectors by at least EUR 315 billion. The 
European Commission has proposed increasing this goal to EUR 500 billion for 2020, 
though this proposal has not been implemented yet.47 
A number of energy projects in the UK are supported by the EFSI. As shown in Table 8, the 
EFSI has signed financing for energy projects that are (at least partly) in the UK worth EUR 
1.4 billion and approved another EUR 410 million of financing.  
The EFSI’s financial support is available to only EU Member States and to cross-border 
investments with EU Member States’ neighbouring countries.48 Hence, after a complete 
withdrawal from the EU, the UK will presumably have no direct access to EFSI funding for 
internal UK projects, but may still receive funding for cross-border projects with EU Member 
States. The status of internal UK projects that have already received a commitment of 
funding will most likely be subject to the Brexit negotiations.  
                                           
43  The EIB recently announced that Brexit may impair the ability of UK infrastructure projects to access finance 
from the EIB. (Financial Times, 2017a). 
44  European Council (2017a). 
45  EU (2016). 
46  EIB (n.d.-c). 
47  EU (2016). 
48  European Commission (2016a). 
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Table 8:   EFSI financing support to UK-related energy projects 
NAME OF PROJECT COUNTRIES 
EFSI FINANCING AMOUNT  
(MILLION EUR) 
Signed energy projects 
Copenhagen Infrastructure Fund II DE, PL, SE, UK 75  
UK Energy Efficiency Investments 
Fund II UK 56  
Smart meters - Project Spark UK 478  
Galloper Offshore Wind UK 314  
Beatrice Offshore UK 292  
QUAERO European Infrastructure 
Fund 
BE, DE, ES, FI, FR, LT, 
UK 
40 (of which 10 percent energy-
related)  
Infracapital Greenfield 
Infrastructure Fund 
BE, DE, FI, FR, IT, PO, 
SK, SE, UK 118  
Calvin Smartmeter Roll-out UK 48  
CUBE Infrastructure Fund II CZ, FR, IE, IT, SE, UK 100 (of which 28 percent energy-related)  
Total: 
 
1,413 
Approved (but unsigned) projects 
London Energy Efficiency 
Cofinancing Facility UK 136  
IMPAX Climate Property Fund II UK 36  
Odewald Renewable Energy 
Infrastructure Fund 
DE, ES, FI, FR, IE, IT, 
UK 80  
Offshore Transmission Network 
Round 4 UK 58  
Fonds Infragreen III DE, DK, EL, ES, FR, HR, IT, PL, UK 50  
Amundi Energy Transition Alba I FR, UK 50  
Total:   410  
Source: Bruegel based on ‘EFSI project list’ (EIB, n.d.-d). 
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2.3  Connecting Europe facility 
The Connecting Europe Facility (CEF) was established in 2013 as an EU funding instrument 
developed specifically to direct investment into Trans-European Transport Networks (TEN-
T), Trans-European Energy Networks (TEN-E), and Broadband and Information and 
Communication Technologies (ICT).49 
The agreed budget for CEF amounts to EUR 30.5 billion for the period 2014-2020, the 
major share of which is allocated to transport projects (EUR 24.1 billion). The budget 
allocated to the energy sector amounts to EUR 5.35 billion, whereas telecom projects have 
been allocated about EUR 1.04 billion.50 
Of the EUR 5.35 billion allocated to energy projects, EUR 4.7 billion is available in the form 
of grants.51 These grants are notably aimed at supporting the development of EU Projects 
of Common Interest (PCIs). These projects have been identified by the European 
Commission as essential for completing the EU internal market, and must: 
• Have a significant impact on two or more EU countries; 
• Improve market integration and the integration of EU countries' networks; 
• Strengthen competition in energy markets by providing alternatives to consumers; 
• Improve security of supply; and 
• Contribute to the EU's energy and climate goals by facilitating the integration of 
energy from variable renewable sources.52  
Table 10 describes the current UK-related PCIs. These projects already received funding for 
EUR 125.6 million from the CEF, while additional funding for EUR 90 million is in the 
pipeline (Table 9). 
Table 9:   CEF’s funding for UK-related Projects of Common Interest 
STATUS ELECTRICITY PROJECTS GAS PROJECTS TOTAL 
Ongoing 85.6  36.7  122.3  
Completed 0.8  2.5  3.3  
Not yet started 90.0  0 90.0  
Source: Bruegel based on ‘Funding for Projects of Common Interest’ (European Commission, n.d.-e), ‘CEF-Energy 
projects: United Kingdom’ (European Commission, n.d.-f), ‘Projects of common interest – Interactive map’ 
(European Commission, n.d.-g), ‘Technical information on Projects of Common Interest’ (European Commission, 
n.d.-h). 
 
                                           
49  European Commission (2017h). 
50  European Commission (2017f). 
51  European Commission (2017f). 
52  European Commission (n.d.-i). 
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Table 10:  UK-related Projects of Common Interest 
NUMBER NAME ACTION TYPE COUNTRIES 
MAXIMUM CEF 
FUNDING 
(MILLION EUR) 
TOTAL 
COST  
(MILLION 
EUR) 
STATUS 
Electricity: Priority Corridor Northern Seas Offshore Grid (‘NSOG’) 
1.1.1 
Interconnection between 
Zeebrugge (BE) and the 
vicinity of Richborough (UK) 
Work BE, UK N/A N/A Ongoing 
1.1.2 
Internal line between the 
vicinity of Richborough and 
Canterbury (UK) 
N/A UK N/A N/A Ongoing* 
1.7.1 
France - United Kingdom 
interconnection between 
Cotentin (FR) and the 
vicinity of Exeter (UK) [‘FAB’ 
project] 
Study FR, UK 7.24  14.47  Ongoing 
1.7.2 
France - United Kingdom 
interconnection between 
Tourbe (FR) and Chilling 
(UK) [‘IFA2’ project] 
Study FR, UK 5.96  11.91  Ongoing 
1.7.3 
France - United Kingdom 
interconnection between 
Coquelles (FR) and 
Folkestone (UK) [‘ElecLink’ 
project] 
Studies FR, UK 0.60  1.20  Completed 
1.7.3 
France - United Kingdom 
interconnection between 
Coquelles (FR) and 
Folkestone (UK) [‘ElecLink’ 
project] 
Studies FR, UK 0.20  0.40  Completed 
1.9.1 
Ireland - United Kingdom 
interconnection between Co. 
Offaly (IE), Pembroke and 
Pentir (UK) [‘Greenlink’] 
Study IE, UK 0.81  1.62  Ongoing 
1.9.2 
Ireland — United Kingdom 
interconnection between 
Coolkeeragh — Coleraine 
hubs (IE) and Hunterston 
station, Islay, Argyll and 
Location C Offshore Wind 
Farms (UK) [‘ISLES’ project] 
Two studies 
have been 
completed. 
Under 
construction 
IE, UK N/A N/A Ongoing 
1.10 Norway - United Kingdom interconnection Studies NO, UK 31.30  62.60  Ongoing 
1.10 B 
Norway - United Kingdom 
interconnection 
[‘NorthConnect’ project] 
Studies UK 10.76  21.51  Ongoing 
1.12 
Compressed air energy 
storage in United Kingdom - 
Larne 
Study UK 8.28  16.56  Ongoing 
1.12 
Compressed air energy 
storage in United Kingdom - 
Larne 
Study UK 6.47  12.31  Ongoing 
1.12 
Compressed air energy 
storage in United Kingdom - 
Larne 
Work UK 90.00  418.41  Not yet started 
1.13 
Interconnection between 
Iceland and United Kingdom 
[‘Ice Link’ project] 
 Study  IC, UK N/A N/A Ongoing 
1.14 Interconnection between 
Revsing (DK) and Bicker Fen 
Study DK, UK 14.82  29.65  Ongoing 
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(UK) [‘Viking Link’ project] 
Electricity: Priority Corridor North-South Electricity Interconnections in Western Europe ('NSI West Electricity') 
2.13.1 
Ireland — United Kingdom 
interconnection between 
Woodland (IE) and 
Turleenan (UK) 
N/A IE, UK N/A N/A Ongoing* 
2.13.2 
Ireland — United Kingdom 
Interconnection between 
Srananagh (IE) and 
Turleenan (UK) 
N/A IE, UK N/A N/A Ongoing** 
Gas: Priority Corridor North-South Gas Interconnections in Western Europe (‘NSI West Gas’) 
5.1.1 
Physical reverse flow at 
Moffat interconnection point 
(IE/UK) 
Study IE, UK 0.93  1.85  Ongoing 
5.1.2 
Upgrade of the SNIP 
(Scotland to Northern 
Ireland) pipeline to 
accommodate physical 
reverse flow between 
Ballylumford and Twynholm 
Studies UK  N/A   N/A  Ongoing*** 
5.1.3 
Development of the 
Islandmagee Underground 
Gas Storage (UGS) facility at 
Larne (Northern Ireland) 
Study UK 4.02  8.05  Ongoing 
5.1.3 
Development of the 
Islandmagee Underground 
Gas Storage (UGS) facility at 
Larne (Northern Ireland) 
Study UK 2.50  5.00  Completed 
Gas: Priority thematic area Smart Grids Deployment 
10.1 
North Atlantic Green Zone 
Project (Ireland, United 
Kingdom/Northern Ireland) 
aims at lowering wind 
curtailment by implementing 
communication 
infrastructure, enhanced 
grid control and 
interconnection and 
establishing (cross-border) 
protocols for Demand Side 
Management 
Specification 
and planning & 
interaction 
with regulatory 
authorities 
IE, UK 31.74  N/A Ongoing 
Source: Bruegel based on ‘Funding for Projects of Common Interest’ (European Commission, n.d.-e), 
‘CEF-Energy projects: United Kingdom’ (European Commission, n.d.-f),  
‘Projects of common interest – Interactive map’ (European Commission, n.d.-g), 
‘Technical information on Projects of Common Interest’ (European Commission, n.d.-h).  
Note: N/A implies that the information was not available in the sources listed above. 
*The project status is ‘Permitting’ and therefore assumed to be ongoing. 
** The project status is ‘Planned, but not yet in permitting’ and therefore assumed to be ongoing. 
*** The project status is ‘Under consideration’ and therefore assumed to be ongoing. 
 
If an infrastructure project is considered as strategic for the interests of the EU, non-EU 
countries can also host PCIs.53 For instance, among the current 195 PCIs, there are also 
                                           
53  European Commission (2017g) 
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projects concerning Norway, Switzerland, Ukraine, Israel and Algeria.54 On this basis, PCIs 
concerning the UK could continue to advance with EU support even after the withdrawal, 
should this be considered by the European Commission to be in the EU interest. 
2.4  Horizon 2020 
Horizon 2020 plays an important role in the EU 2020 strategy aimed at improving Europe’s 
global competitiveness. The programme was launched by the European Commission in 
2014 as a follow-up to the previous Seventh Framework Programme (FP7), with the 
mandate to provide grants to research projects that support economic growth and 
employment creation in Europe.55 Horizon 2020 runs between 2014 and 2020, and has a 
budget of almost EUR 80 billion. 
The programme focuses on funding research and innovation projects in three main 
research areas. The first, called ‘Excellent Science’, targets research in science, while the 
second, ‘Industrial Leadership’, seeks to accelerate the development of technologies and 
innovations that can enable enterprise growth. The third research area, ‘Societal 
challenges’, aims to identify solutions to social and economic problems.56 
Energy projects fall under the domain of ‘Societal challenges’. The funding to these projects 
is managed by the Innovation and Networks Executive Agency (INEA). The funding 
allocation is structured as follows:57 
• Smart, green and integrated transport (EUR 2.9 billion in 2014-2020); 
• Secure, clean and efficient energy (EUR 3.8 billion in 2014-2020); 
• Food security, sustainable agriculture and forestry, marine, maritime and inland 
water research and the bio-economy (EUR 17 million in 2016-2017); 
• Cross-cutting activities (EUR 131.5 million in 2016-2017). 
More than 90 energy-related research and innovation projects in the UK are currently 
benefiting from Horizon 2020 funding.58 As illustrated in Table 11, projects focused on 
renewable energy are the largest recipient, while CCS and grid projects also obtain 
relatively large amounts.
                                           
54  See the following for a full list of PCIs:  
http://ec.europa.eu/energy/en/topics/infrastructure/projects-common-interest  
55  European Commission (2016b). 
56  European Commission (2014b). 
57  European Commission (n.d.-b). 
58  The full list of projects funded by Horizon 2020 can be found here: https://ec.europa.eu/inea/en/horizon-
2020/projects/funded-projects  
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Table 11:  H2020’s funding to UK research parties in the field of energy 
TYPE OF PROJECT FUNDING (TO THE UK PARTY INVOLVED) (MILLION EUR) 
Renewable energy sources 60.16 
Carbon capture storage 27.38 
Grid 21.29 
Shale gas 3.25 
Other 48.38 
Total 160.45 
Source: Bruegel based on ‘funded projects’ https://ec.europa.eu/inea/en/horizon-2020/projects/funded-projects.
 (European Commission, n.d.-c). 
 
Project applicants from non-EU countries are allowed to participate in Horizon 2020 
programmes, but only those that have entered an Association Agreement with Horizon 
2020 are automatically eligible for H2020 funding.59 But applicants from other non-EU 
countries may exceptionally be granted funding provided that certain conditions60 are 
satisfied. Thus, certain projects based in the UK might remain eligible for funding after the 
withdrawal, even in the absence of an Association Agreement.61 
Whether the UK is able to fulfil these conditions is largely discretionary on the part of the 
EU. The conditions are (1) the existence of a bilateral scientific/technological agreement 
between the EU and the third country; (2) a statement in the call for proposals stating that 
their participation is permitted; or (3) a determination that the third country’s participation 
is valuable to a bidder consortium due to outstanding competence/expertise; access to 
research infrastructure, access to particular geographical environments; or access to data. 
The first of these requires a determination on the part of the EU that is not very different 
from the determination of eligibility for an Association Agreement. The second involves 
similar considerations, but is specific to a particular call for proposals. The third implies a 
case by case evaluation.62
                                           
59  European Commission (2017i). 
60  European Commission (2017i). 
61  Association to Horizon 2020 is governed by Regulation (EU) No 1291/2013 of the European Parliament and of 
the Council. 
62  European Commission (2017i). 
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2.5  European energy programme for recovery 
The European Energy Programme for Recovery (EEPR) is a funding mechanism of the 
European Commission. Established in 2009, EEPR provides financial assistance in the form 
of grants to EU energy projects that contribute to stronger economic growth, greater 
security of supply and reduced greenhouse gas emissions. The programme has allocated 
nearly EUR 4 billion to help co-finance projects in three sectors. These include electricity 
and gas interconnection (44 projects), offshore wind energy (9), and carbon capture and 
storage (6).63 By mid-2016, 37 out of the 59 projects had been completed, and around EUR 
2.12 billion had been paid to recipients.64  
A total of EUR 330 million has been assigned to co-finance UK energy projects. All of the 
activities for which the EEPR funds were assigned have already been completed.65 Thus, all 
of the current funding will have been completed by the time of a potential UK exit from the 
EU. 
 
Table 12:  EEPR’s finance support to UK energy projects 
TYPE OF PROJECT FUNDING (MILLION EUR) STATUS 
Carbon capture storage 180 Completed 
Electricity interconnection 110 Completed 
Wind 40 Completed 
Total 330  
Source: Bruegel based on European Commission (n.d.-o). 
Note: A project is denoted ‘completed’ if the activities for which EEPR funding was received are completed 
(according to the source for the table). 
 
Some projects that have been co-financed under the EEFR have involved non-EU Member 
States.66 Thus, it is possible for non-EU Member States to receive funding indirectly, if they 
are one of the states involved in the project. After the withdrawal, the UK could therefore 
theoretically receive funding indirectly from the EEFR.  
 
 
2.6  Critical issues and options 
The future availability of EU funds for UK energy projects is heavily dependent on whatever 
settlement is ultimately negotiated (if any) between the EU27 and the UK. This is 
                                           
63  European Commission (n.d.-e). 
64  Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council On the implementation of the 
European Energy Programme for Recovery and the European Energy Efficiency Fund (COM (2016) 743 final). 
65  Though one wind power project to which EUR 40 million was assigned is not completed, all the activities for 
which EEPR funding was received have been completed. (European Commission, n.d.-o) The project itself is 
expected to be completed in 2018 (Vattenfall, 2016). 
66  For instance, the gas bridge between Asia and Europe (‘Nabucco’) involved Turkey (European Commission, 
n.d.-d). 
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particularly the case for the EIB, given the Bank’s financial and political peculiarities, and 
given the UK’s substantial involvement on its capital. After the withdrawal, the UK may 
presumably have more limited access to funding from the EFSI, CEF (should projects be 
considered strategic by the European Commission), H2020 (should the UK sign a 
corresponding Association Agreement), and EEPR.  
The running programs do not entail extraordinary benefits to EU27 citizens and companies 
that the EU unconditionally needs to protect. The EU should nonetheless seek to keep a 
window open for projects that are to the benefit of EU27 citizens and companies, as it does 
for other third countries. 
 
Table 13:  Which arrangements allow a country access to EU funding 
mechanisms? 
 EIB EFSI CEF H2020 EEPR 
EU Member State 
(e.g. France) Access Access Access Access Access 
EEA  
(e.g. Norway) 
Possible 
access 
Possible 
access 
Possible 
access 
Possible 
access 
Possible 
access 
Energy Community 
(e.g. Ukraine) 
Possible 
access 
Possible 
access 
Possible 
access 
Possible 
access 
Possible 
access 
Bilateral Treaty  
(e.g. Switzerland) 
Possible 
access 
Possible 
access 
Possible 
access 
Possible 
access 
Possible 
access 
WTO  
(e.g. Morocco) 
Possible 
access 
Possible 
access 
Possible 
access 
Possible 
access 
Possible 
access 
Source: Bruegel. 
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CHAPTER 3.  PARTICIPATION IN REGULATORY BODIES 
KEY FINDINGS 
• Regulatory bodies such as ACER, CEER, ENTSO-E and ENTSOG, play an important role in 
the functioning of the EU internal energy market (IEM). 
• The UK withdrawal will have no substantive impact on the voting shares and the 
functioning of these bodies.  
• However, in this field the withdrawal is likely to have a negative impact on the UK. 
Should the UK seek to continue its participation in the IEM, it will have to comply with 
decisions taken by these regulatory bodies, while having little or no influence over them. 
The EU internal energy market (IEM) is shaped by major legislative packages, such as the 
‘Third Energy Package’ which was adopted in 2009 by the European Institutions. However, 
an important role in the implementation of this legislation is played by the following 
regulatory bodies: 
• The Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators (ACER); 
• The Council of European Energy Regulators (CEER); 
• The European Network of Transmission System Operators for Electricity (ENTSO-E); 
• The European Network of Transmission System Operators for Gas (ENTSOG). 
The aim of this chapter is to assess the eventual implications of the UK withdrawal on these 
regulatory bodies. To this end, two levels of analysis are presented for each institution: i) a 
review of its mandate, key activities and membership composition; ii) an insight on the role 
played by the UK in it. 
3.1  The Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators (ACER) 
ACER was established in 2009 in the framework of the ‘Third Energy Package’, with the 
mandate of complementing and coordinating the work of national energy regulators at EU 
level, and to work towards the completion of the IEM. In particular, ACER is responsible for 
the coordination of regional and cross-regional actives that promote European market 
integration. ACER also oversees the monitoring of the European transmission system 
operators and of their network plans.67 
In 2016, ACER completed the implementation of the Regulation on Wholesale Energy 
Market Integrity and Transparency (REMIT). Since then, it has a full picture on the trading 
in wholesale energy products across the EU. This information allows ACER to monitor 
wholesale energy markets to detect and deter market abusive behaviour.68 
ACER’s membership is composed of the national energy regulatory authorities of EU 
Member States. Participation of a third country in ACER is possible, but only if that country 
has concluded agreements with the EU and if it has adopted, and is applying, EU law in the 
field of energy and, if relevant, in the fields of environment and competition. This 
participation would not, however, involve any voting rights. Voting rights are attributed 
                                           
67  ACER (n.d.). 
68  ACER (2016). 
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only to the members. When creating an individual cooperation agreement with a third 
country, ACER must specify the nature, scope and procedural aspects of the involvement of 
the country in the work of the Agency, including provisions relating to financial 
contributions and to staff.69 
Articles 13 and 14 of the ACER Regulation limit membership to ACER’s formal bodies, i.e. 
the Board of Regulators (BoR) and the Administrative Board (AB), to representatives from 
EU Member States. Article 31, however, also opens the possibility for participation of third 
countries in ACER, provided that:  
1. The third country has concluded an agreement with the Union (Article 31(1));  
2. The third country has adopted and is applying Union law in the field of energy and, if 
relevant, in the fields of environment and competition (Article 31(1)); and 
3. An institutional framework has been set up in the agreement referred to under (1) 
to specify, in particular, the nature, scope and procedural aspects of the 
involvement of the third country including provisions relating to financial 
contribution and to staff (Article 31(2)). 
The Commission by letter of 25 March 2015 clarified that the Energy Community Treaty is 
to be considered an ‘agreement’ as referred to in Article 31(1); and that the assessment of 
a third country’s compliance with the second requirement of Article 31(1) is to be carried 
out by the Commission with the support of the Secretariat being welcomed.  
The Commission, however, in the same communication also underlined that the above 
requirements are only relevant for a third country’s participation in the BoR and AB, 
whereas the criteria for and acceptance of their involvement in ACER Working Groups 
remain at the discretion of the Director of ACER. The Director of ACER, by letters of 26 
November 201470 and 24 July 201571, expressed his intention to allow participation of 
National Regulatory Authorities (NRAs) from third countries “as long as their countries are 
assessed as being on track in meeting the requirements of Article 31 and there being an 
expectation that this will be achieved within a reasonable period of time (6 to 12 months)”.  
An outline of ACER’s governance is presented in Table 14.    
                                           
69  Regulation (EC) No 713/2009. 
70  Ref. ACER-AP-FG-ss-2014-647. 
71  Ref. ACER-AP-FG-ss-2015-390. 
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Table 14:  Outline of ACER’s governance 
 FULL MEMBER ASSOCIATE MEMBER OBSERVER MEMBER 
Admission 
criteria: 
Energy NRAs from 
all EU countries. 
In general, not open to non-EU members; 
cooperation possible via individual contracts 
Attendance 
and Voting: 1 vote per member No voting rights foreseen. 
Members: 28 NRAs from EU28 - 
 Decision Rule Voting power of UK 
Voting 
system: 2/3 majority 1 vote out of 28, or 3.6 percent 
Source: Bruegel based on Regulation (EC) No 713/2009. 
 
As UK is an EU Member State, UK’s energy regulator Ofgem (Office of Gas and Electricity 
Markets) is currently a full member of ACER. Therefore, it participates as a member to 
ACER’s Board of Regulators, the body which determines the regulatory policy of ACER and 
which has a substantial influence on the decisions, opinions and recommendations of the 
Agency. In terms of voting system, each member of the Board has one vote, and decisions 
are taken by a 2/3 majority. Hence, each member has a voting power corresponding to 
1/28, or 3.6 percent of the total.  
Furthermore, considering the structure of this governance, a UK withdrawal is not likely to 
have a noteworthy negative impact on ACER (except to the extent that the UK’s 
contributions to dialogue will be missed). On the contrary, should the UK seek to continue 
its participation in the IEM, it would have to comply with decisions taken by ACER, despite 
having no influence over them. Indeed, even if the UK were to remain associated with 
ACER as a third country, it would presumably have no voting rights. Since ACER has not yet 
signed any association agreement with a third country, it is highly uncertain how a possible 
future relation between ACER and the UK might look like. 
Policy Department A: Economic and Scientific Policy 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 46 PE 614.181 
3.2  The Council of European Energy Regulators  
In contrast to ACER, which is an EU body with a legal mandate, CEER is a private 
association of European regulators. As such, it strives to promote the interests of the 
national regulatory agencies (which, for example, includes highlighting issues of 
subsidiarity against the desire of the European Commission to harmonise rules). CEER 
currently consists of 36 national regulatory authorities (NRAs) having two different 
statuses: Members and Observers.72 
All NRAs of the EU and of the European Economic Area (EEA) are eligible to become 
Members of CEER if they comply with the EU directives and regulations relevant to the IEM.  
National regulatory authorities of members of the European Free Trade Association 
(EFTA)73 and of EU accession countries are eligible to participate in CEER’s work as 
Observers. As such, they are required to strive to comply with the EU directives and 
regulations relevant to the IEM.74 
Currently, CEER has 29 members (EU-28 minus Slovakia, plus Norway and Iceland) and 7 
Observers (Bosnia And Herzegovina, FYROM, Georgia, Kosovo, Moldova, Montenegro, and 
Switzerland).75 Observers can participate in the meetings of the General Assembly but do 
not have any voting rights. The General Assembly decides about accession to CEER 
(members and observers).76  
An outline of CEER’s governance is presented in Table 15. 
 
                                           
72  CEER (2015). 
73  With the exception of Switzerland, they are already voting members by virtue of their membership in the EEA. 
74  CEER (2015). 
75  CEER (n.d.). 
76  CEER (2015). 
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Table 15:  Outline of CEER’s governance 
 FULL MEMBER ASSOCIATE MEMBER OBSERVER MEMBER 
Admission 
criteria:  
Energy NRAs of EU 
and European 
Economic Area (EEA) 
countries 
Energy NRAs from EFTA and EU accession 
countries 
Attendance 
and Voting: Weighted votes* Participation in meetings allowed; no voting rights 
Members: 
NRAs from EU-28 
minus Slovakia plus 
Norway, Iceland, and 
Liechtenstein 
NRAs from Bosnia and Herzegovina, FYROM, 
Georgia, Kosovo, Moldova, Montenegro, 
Switzerland 
 Decision Rule Voting power of the UK 
Voting 
system: 2/3 majority 29 votes out of 360, or 8.1 percent 
 
Source: Bruegel based on CEER (2015). 
Note: * Members’ votes will be weighted in accordance with the voting principles of the Council of the European 
Union as foreseen in Article 205 (2) EC-Treaty. 
 
In case the UK will leave the EU without a treaty and is unable to join the EEA, UK’s NRA 
(Ofgem) will not be allowed to be member of CEER, even if UK complies with the rules of 
the IEM. It could remain as a member, if UK joins the EEA and remains compliant with the 
rules of the IEM. UK’s Ofgem could join CEER as Observer, if the UK joins EFTA or if the UK 
would be an accession candidate for the EU (which is currently very unlikely). 
In any case, the UK withdrawal is likely to have no major adverse impact on CEER and its 
activities. 
3.3  ENTSO-E and ENTSOG 
ENTSO-E and ENTSOG play an important role in the functioning of the IEM. The EU gave to 
these institutions the mandate to organise the operation of the EU electricity and gas 
infrastructure and market.77 
On infrastructure, the two institutions organise the work on the Ten-Year Network 
Development Plans (TYNDP) for electricity and gas, which serve not only as the basis for 
determining the European Commission’s PCIs, but also for the coordination of networks and 
generation planning across borders.78 
On market functioning, the two institutions are responsible for the development of network 
codes, i.e. the rules that govern all cross-border electricity and gas market transactions 
                                           
77  For details, see Regulation (EC) 714/2009 (for ENTSO-E) and Regulation (EC) 715/2009 (for ENTSOG). 
78  ENTSO-E (n.d.-a). 
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and system operations. Based on framework guidelines developed by ACER, ENTSO-E and 
ENTSOG draft a series of complex network codes which become (after a policy process 
involving ACER, the European Commission and the Member States) directly applicable 
legislation across the EU. Hence, these network codes deeply influence the organisation of 
national energy systems.79 
The governance of both ENTSO-E and ENTSOG is composed of a General Assembly and 
committees and legal and regulatory working groups. Decisions are taken by the General 
Assembly, whereas the proposals are prepared in the committees as well as in the working 
groups. 
Although ENTSO-E’s and ENTSOG’s governance structures are different, they share some 
common features. The governance of ENTSO-E and ENTSOG foresees three different kinds 
of members: i) Members; ii) Associate members; iii) Observers.  
Members have the right to attend and vote in all bodies (General Assembly, committees, 
groups). In ENTSO-E, both EU and non-EU TSOs can become members. 43 TSOs from 36 
countries are indeed currently members of ENTSO-E, including TSOs from Albania, Bosnia 
and Herzegovina, Iceland, Switzerland, Montenegro, FYR of Macedonia, Norway and 
Serbia.80 However, a non-EU TSO can be member only if its country has entered into an 
agreement with the EU governing its relationship with the IEM.81 ENTSOG currently has 45 
TSOs as members, from 24 EU countries. TSOs from non-EU countries can only participate 
in ENTSOG as Observers.82 
Associate members can attend all bodies, but do not have a right to vote. In ENTSO-E to 
become an associate member, the candidate TSO should show its concrete intention to 
comply with the relevant technical and market rules for the IEM. In ENTSOG, associate 
members are TSOs from EU Member States that derogate from the IEM rules.83 
Observers have very limited rights. Neither in ENTSO-E nor ENTSOG observer member can 
vote and even attendance rights are very limited. In ENTSOG, observer members can only 
attend the general assembly. In ENTSO-E, an observer member cannot attend any meeting 
by default but they may be provided with information and publications of working groups to 
which it was invited to name a representative.  
Both ENTSO-E and ENTSOG have a voting system in which the vote of each member is split 
in two parts. For the first part, every country has one vote ('one country, one vote' 
principle). For the second part, the size of the country (based on the population) matters 
how many votes the corresponding member has.84 85 To adopt a decision, members have a 
voting power based both on their relative size within the country (due to the 'one country, 
one vote' principle broken down among several TSOs) and on the relative size of their 
country (based on the population of the country).  
                                           
79  ENTSO-E (n.d.-b). 
80  ENTSO-E (n.d.-c). 
81  Article 7 of ENTSO-E’s Articles of Association (ENTSO-E, 2014). 
82  ENTSOG (2014). 
83  ENTSOG has created the Associate Member statues so that the TSOs of Estonia and Latvia can work with 
ENTSOG although the country is derogating from the Third Energy Package (ENTSOG, n.d.). 
84  If a country is represented by more than one TSO, the first and the second part of the vote is split between the 
TSOs based on their relative size in that country. 
85  The voting system is inspired by the voting system of the European Council. 
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In the case of ENTSO-E, if the UK continues to be a member, the UK might keep its voting 
rights unchanged, as the internal regulations clarify that ‘[f]or countries that are not EU 
Member States, the voting power shall be defined according to the same mechanism (as if 
these countries were EU Member States)’86. 
A detailed outline of ENTSO-E and ENTSOG governance is presented in Table 16. 
 
Table 16:  Outline of ENTSO-E and ENTSOG governance 
 FULL MEMBER ASSOCIATE MEMBER OBSERVER MEMBER 
ENTSO-E    
Admission 
criteria:  
Full compliance 
with IEM rules 
necessary 
Intention to comply with 
IEM rules. Full unbundling 
required. 
Full unbundling; physical 
link to EU country. 
EU Member State 
or from a country 
that has entered 
into an agreement 
with EU governing 
its relationship 
with the IEM 
Physical link to the IEM 
and relevant to IEM Physical link to the IEM 
Attendance 
and Voting Weighted votes* 
Full attendance rights; no 
voting. 
No attendance rights; no 
voting. 
Members: 
43 TSOs  
(EU28 except 
Malta plus 8 third 
countries) ** 
- TEIAS (Turkey) 
ENTSOG    
Admission 
criteria:  
Full compliance 
with IEM rules. 
TSOs from a EU Member 
State that derogates from 
the IEM rules.  
EU Membership not 
required 
EU Membership not 
required 
EU accession country, 
Energy community, EFTA 
Voting and 
attendance:  Weighted votes* 
Can attend the General 
Assembly and Working 
Groups to the extend 
granted by the Board;  
no voting rights. 
Can attend General 
Assembly; no voting 
rights. 
Members: 
45 TSOs  
(EU28 except 
Estonia and Latvia) 
Elering AS (Estonia) 
Conexus Baltic Grid 
(Latvia) 
GA-MA AD (FYROM) 
Gassco AS (Norway) 
Swissgas AS 
                                           
86  Article 15.6 of ENTSO-E Articles of Association (ENTSO-E, 2014). 
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(Switzerland) 
Ukrtransgaz (Ukraine) 
Modlovatransgaz 
(Moldova) 
 Decision Rule Voting power of the UK 
ENTSO-E  1. Part 2. Part 
Voting 
system: 
Depending on the 
vote; at least 55 
/65 percent 
majority 
12 votes out 
of 432, or 
2.77 percent 
~10.5 percent 
Population based; maximum of 35 
percent 
ENTSOG  1. Part 2. Part 
Voting 
system: 
Depending on the 
vote; at least 
60/60 percent 
majority 
1 vote of 26, 
or 3.85 
percent 
Not entirely disclosed 
Population based, maximum of 10 
percent; remaining votes distributed 
based on cross-border significance 
Source: Bruegel based on ENTSO-E (2014) and ENTSOG (2014). 
Note: * Voting power is (roughly) proportionate to the number of votes that that country has as a EU Member 
State in the Council of the European Union under the voting mechanism defined by the Lisbon Treaty. 
** Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, FYR of Macedonia, Iceland, Montenegro, Norway, Serbia, Switzerland. 
 
The UK’s electricity TSOs (i.e. National Grid Electricity Transmission plc, SONI, SHETL SP, 
Transmission Ltd) are currently members of ENTSO-E, just as the UK’s gas TSOs (i.e. GNI, 
Interconnector Limited, National Grid, Premier Transmission Limited) are members of 
ENTSOG. 
After the withdrawal, the UK’s electricity TSOs could remain members of ENTSO-E, but only 
if the UK enters into an agreement with the EU governing its relationship with the IEM. 
Given the important role of ENTSO-E for the functioning of the EU electricity market, the 
UK’s electricity TSOs have a strong interest in maintaining their membership. Likewise, 
UK’s gas TSOs have an interest in remaining part of ENTSOG even if only as Observers. 
Currently, only EU Member States are members/associates of ENTSOG which would imply 
that UK’s TSOs will no longer be able to have an important role in ENTSOG. However, the 
Articles of Association of ENTSOG do not state that only TSOs from EU countries can 
become members or associated members. Hence, it has to be seen if UK can strike a deal 
so that its gas TSOs can stay as members. Another option would be the observer status if 
UK decides to remain in the Energy Community or join EFTA. 
In case UK’s TSO continue to participate to the IEM without being part of ENTSO-E and 
ENTSOG, they will have to comply with decisions taken by these institutions, albeit having 
no influence over them. 
From an EU27 perspective, the UK withdrawal is not likely to have a noteworthy negative 
impact on ENTSO-E and ENTSOG as these institutions could simply continue their activities 
on a business-as-usual basis without the participation of UK’s TSOs. Yet internally, the 
departure of UK’s TSOs will change the voting shares of the remaining TSOs. TSOs of the 
already population-rich member states would gain more voting shares in absolute terms. 
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3.4  Critical issues and options 
From an EU27 perspective, there seem to be no critical issues emerging from the UK 
withdrawal as far as these regulatory bodies are concerned. By contrast, the UK is likely to 
face a series of critical issues if it withdraws from these regulatory bodies (or is otherwise 
unable to continue to participate). In fact, any non-EU Member States that is part of the EU 
IEM must, by default, accept the decisions of ACER, ENTSO-E and ENTSOG, but holds very 
limited powers to influence them. However, the high level of expertise of UK 
representatives in those bodies will be missed, if they have to leave. 
 
Table 17:  How can countries participate in EU regulatory bodies under different 
arrangements? 
 ACER CEER ENTSO-E ENTSOG 
EU Member State 
(e.g. France) 
Membership 
possible 
Membership 
possible 
Membership 
possible 
Membership 
possible 
EEA  
(e.g. Norway) 
Associate member 
theoretically 
possible, but 
agreement with 
EU necessary* 
Membership 
possible 
Membership 
possible, but 
agreement 
with EU 
necessary 
Membership 
possible, but 
agreement 
with EU 
necessary* 
Energy 
Community  
(e.g. Ukraine) 
Associate member 
theoretically 
possible, but 
agreement with 
EU necessary* 
Associate 
membership 
possible** 
Membership 
possible, but 
agreement 
with EU 
necessary 
Membership 
possible, but 
agreement 
with EU 
necessary* 
Bilateral Treaty  
(e.g. Switzerland) 
Associate member 
theoretically 
possible, but 
agreement with 
EU necessary* 
Associate 
membership 
possible** 
Membership 
possible, but 
agreement 
with EU 
necessary 
Membership 
possible, but 
agreement 
with EU 
necessary* 
WTO  
(e.g. Morocco) 
Associate member 
theoretically 
possible, but 
agreement with 
EU necessary* 
Associate 
membership 
possible** 
Membership 
possible, but 
agreement 
with EU 
necessary 
Membership 
possible, but 
agreement 
with EU 
necessary* 
Source: Bruegel. 
Note: * No such agreement has ever been adopted by the EU with any country; ** Under current rules, this 
would appear to be realistically possible only if the UK were to re-join the EFTA. 
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CHAPTER 4.  REVISITING EU ENERGY AND CLIMATE 
TARGETS 
KEY FINDINGS 
• If the UK accepts that it will continue to adhere to EU energy and climate targets (so as 
to retain access to the internal market), it could possibly be required to participate in 
the new Energy Union governance structure. 
• If the UK cannot commit to EU energy and climate targets, a political decision in the EU 
is needed on how to adjust the EU energy and climate targets after Brexit. 
• We explore three options for readjusting the national and/or EU targets which either 
keep (1) the national ambitions, (2) the EU28 ambition in absolute terms, or (3) the 
EU28 ambition in percentage terms constant. Given that the UK targets were close to 
the EU average, the resulting shifts are not dramatic – but can be still significant for 
individual Member States. 
• If the UK exits the EU Emissions Trading System (ETS) it might cause a short-term 
surplus of allowances, but most likely Brexit will tighten the system in the longer term. 
4.1 The EU energy and climate targets after Brexit 
Over the past decades, the EU has developed a comprehensive framework to reduce the 
environmental impact of the energy system by regulating the emission of greenhouse gases 
and pollutants, as well as by promoting energy efficiency and the roll-out of renewable 
energy sources. The UK has been a front-runner on some of these aspects, but the UK 
withdrawal might allow policy-makers in Westminster to withdraw from some commitments 
in the hope that this would improve the competitiveness of UK businesses. 
Under EU law, the UK is bound by the so-called 2020-targets that require the UK to achieve 
a 15 percent share of renewables in the energy mix and a 16 percent reduction of those 
greenhouse gas emissions not covered by the EU emissions trading system (ETS) compared 
to 2005 levels. Furthermore, 2030 targets were agreed upon by the European Council in 
October 2014, and they were the basis for the EU’s Nationally Determined Contribution for 
the Paris Agreement. To ensure the EU27 meets its targets, the EU27 would either have to 
adapt its own ambition (by taking out the contribution of the UK) or readjust the individual 
Member States’ targets. Hence, Brexit may have important consequences for the EU’s 
climate targets. This section explores various scenarios regarding the impact of the UK’s 
exit on the targets for renewable energy and non-ETS emissions. 
4.1.1.  Impact on the Renewable Energy Share targets 
The Renewable Energy Directive87 stipulates the EU’s target of deriving 20 percent of its 
gross final energy consumption from renewable energy sources (RES) by 2020. The target 
is broken down to specific targets for individual Member States. The national targets range 
                                           
87  Directive (EU) 2009/28 of the European Parliament and of the Council. 
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from 10 percent for Malta to 49 percent for Sweden.88 The UK has agreed to increase its 
share from 1.3 percent in 2005 to 15 percent in 2020. Furthermore, the EU recently 
proposed a target of deriving 27 percent of its energy from renewable sources by 2030 in a 
revised Renewable Energy Directive.89 The revised Directive does not break down the RES 
shares to individual Member States targets. 
Brexit may impact the overall and national RES targets. The following explores three 
possible scenarios for the 2020 targets if the UK left the EU. The scenario analysis applies 
the methodology used in an Impact Assessment90 Report by the European Commission. The 
report calculates similar targets to those stipulated in the Renewable Energy Directive, 
which suggests that its methodology is suitable to replicate. For a detailed overview of the 
methodology and calculations used to conduct the scenario analysis, please see the 
appendix. The change in the overall EU and national targets for each scenario are shown in 
Table 18. 
Scenario 1 – Same national targets.  
In this scenario, the national targets (of the individual Member States) remain unchanged. 
This would increase the EU’s overall RES target by 0.63 percentage points (i.e. from 20 
percent to 20.63 percent). The increase in the overall EU target reflects the relatively low 
RES target of the UK. Omitting the UK thus increases the EU average.  
Scenario 2 - Same overall EU target in absolute terms.  
The existing EU target of achieving a RES of 20 percent implies that the amount of 
renewable energy in the EU would be expected to equal 256.2 million tonnes of oil 
equivalent (mtoe)91 in 2020. If the UK left the EU, the EU27 may want to achieve the same 
level of renewable energy in absolute terms (i.e. 256.2 mtoe in 2020). With the UK 
departure, 11.73 mtoe92 of renewable energy would thus need to be distributed93 across 
the remaining Member States. The national targets would consequently increase for most 
Member States. Furthermore, the overall target for the EU would increase to 22 percent. 
Scenario 3 - Same overall EU target in percentage terms.  
As a third scenario, the EU may want to achieve the same RES target in percentage terms 
(20 percent) without the UK. If the current national targets are retained, the share of 
renewable energy in 2020 of the EU27 would exceed the target of 20 percent. Thus, the 
targets could consequently decrease for some Member States to reflect an EU average of 
20 percent.94 
                                           
88  The national targets are listed in Directive (EU) 2009/28 of the European Parliament and of the Council. 
89  Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the promotion of the use of energy 
from renewable sources (recast) (COM/2016/0767 final). 
90  European Commission (2008). 
91  This figure includes Croatia. See the appendix for an explanation of how the targeted volume of Croatia’s 
renewable energy in 2020 was calculated. 
92  This corresponds to the amount of renewable energy the UK still has to add as of 2015 until 2020 in order to 
meet its target. 
93  See the appendix for a detailed explanation of how the distribution was carried out. 
94  See the appendix for a more detailed explanation of how the targets were calculated.  
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Table 18:  The change in the current RES targets for 2020 in various scenarios 
following a UK departure from the EU 
 COUNTRY 
Scenario 1 – 
Same national 
targets 
Scenario 2 - Same 
overall EU target in 
absolute terms 
Scenario 3 - Same 
overall EU target in 
percentage terms 
  Change in percentage points relative to the current targets 
Belgium 0 1 0 
Bulgaria 0 0 0 
Czech Republic 0 0 -1 
Denmark 0 2 -1 
Germany 0 2 0 
Estonia 0 0 -1 
Ireland 0 2 -1 
Greece 0 1 0 
Spain 0 0 -1 
France 0 1 -1 
Croatia 0 0 0 
Italy 0 1 -1 
Cyprus 0 2 0 
Latvia 0 0 0 
Lithuania 0 1 0 
Luxembourg 0 1 -1 
Hungary 0 0 -1 
Malta 0 1 -1 
Netherlands 0 2 0 
Austria 0 2 0 
Poland 0 1 0 
Portugal 0 0 -1 
Romania 0 0 -1 
Slovenia 0 0 -1 
Slovakia 0 1 0 
Finland 0 1 0 
Sweden 0 2 0 
EU27 0.63 2 0 
Source: Bruegel based on data from European Commission (2008a), Eurostat (2017b) and EEA (2017a). 
Note: In line with the methodology in the Impact Assessment which was used to conduct the scenario analysis for 
the RES targets, the new targets (i.e. ex-post Brexit) were rounded at the end. Subtracting the original targets 
(which are integers) from the new targets therefore gave integers, as shown in the table. Please see the annex for 
a more detailed explanation of the methodology used to calculate the targets. 
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4.1.2  Impact on non-ETS emissions targets 
By 2020, the EU aims to reduce the emissions not covered by the EU Emissions Trading 
System (ETS)95 by 10 percent relative to the 2005 levels.96 By 2030, the reduction target is 
set to 30 percent compared to 2005 levels.97 The EU overall targets (for 2020 and 2030) 
are broken down to national targets. The UK plans to reduce its non-ETS emissions by 16 
percent by 2020 and by 37 percent by 2030, compared to its baseline emissions level of 
414.71 million tonnes of CO2 equivalent (mtCO2e) in 2005.98 The emissions level in 2015 
of the UK was 328.65 mtCO2e, implying that the UK has already achieved its 2020 target.99 
The following scenario analysis will focus on the impact of the UK’s departure on the 2030 
national and overall EU27 targets.  
The same three scenarios as in the previous RES section are used to conduct the analysis. 
The methodology differs, however, and is described in the appendix. The change in the 
emissions reduction targets in each scenario are depicted in Table 19.  
Scenario 1 – Same national targets.  
If the individual targets of the Member States are preserved, the departure of the UK 
implies that the EU’s overall level of ambition will decrease. This is because the UK aimed 
to reduce greenhouse gas emissions by more than the EU28 average.  
Scenario 2 - Same overall EU target in absolute terms.  
If the EU wants to reduce its overall emissions by the same amount in absolute terms, the 
reduction targets for all the Member States (besides Bulgaria100) would increase. The EU28 
currently aims to reduce emissions from 2,848 mtCO2e in 2005 to 1,994 mtCO2e101 by 
2030. Arriving at the same level of emissions in 2030 (1,994 mtCO2e) would imply an 
increase in the majority of national targets, as the UK reduction amount102 would have to 
be distributed103. The overall target for the EU would increase to 31.66 percent.  
Scenario 3 - Same overall EU target in percentage terms.  
The EU may seek to retain its 2030 target of reducing overall emissions by 30 percent. In 
this case, the EU will have to increase its overall reduction amount by 27.02 mtCO2e.104 
This would imply an increase in all of the national reduction targets apart from Bulgaria’s. 
 
                                           
95  See section 4.3 for a discussion of the impact of Brexit on the EU ETS. 
96  European Commission (n.d.-j). 
97  European Commission (n.d.-k). 
98  Eurostat (2017b). 
99  As the UK’s 2020 target is to reduce emissions by 16 percent compared to 2005 level, the targeted 2020 level 
of emissions is 348.36 mtCO2e. 
100  Bulgaria’s 2030 target is to reduce emissions by zero percent compared to 2005, which explains why its target 
does not change. 
101  This amount was calculated by multiplying the 30 percent reduction target with the baseline emissions of 
2,848 mtCO2e. 
102  The UK’s reduction amount corresponds to the difference between the level of emissions in 2015 (328.65 
mtCO2e) and the targeted level in 2030 (261.27 mtCO2e), which corresponds to 67.38 mtCO2e. 
103  See the appendix for a detailed explanation of how the distribution was carried out.  
104  See the appendix for a detailed explanation of how this amount was calculated. 
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Table 19:  The change in the current 2030 non-ETS emissions reduction targets 
in various scenarios following a UK departure from the EU 
 COUNTRY Scenario 1 – Same national targets 
Scenario 2 - Same 
overall EU target in 
absolute terms 
Scenario 3 - Same 
overall EU target in 
percentage terms 
  Change in percentage points relative to the current targets 
Belgium 0 3.35 1.34 
Bulgaria 0 0.00 0.00 
Czech Republic 0 1.34 0.54 
Denmark 0 3.74 1.50 
Germany 0 3.64 1.46 
Estonia 0 1.25 0.50 
Ireland 0 2.88 1.15 
Greece 0 1.53 0.61 
Spain 0 2.49 1.00 
France 0 3.55 1.42 
Croatia 0 0.67 0.27 
Italy 0 3.16 1.27 
Cyprus 0 2.30 0.92 
Latvia 0 0.58 0.23 
Lithuania 0 0.86 0.35 
Luxembourg 0 3.83 1.54 
Hungary 0 0.67 0.27 
Malta 0 1.82 0.73 
Netherlands 0 3.45 1.38 
Austria 0 3.45 1.38 
Poland 0 0.67 0.27 
Portugal 0 1.63 0.65 
Romania 0 0.19 0.08 
Slovenia 0 1.44 0.58 
Slovakia 0 1.15 0.46 
Finland 0 3.74 1.50 
Sweden 0 3.83 1.54 
EU27 -1.19 1.66 0.00 
Source: Bruegel based on Eurostat (2017c) and European Commission (n.d.-p). 
 
Whether a readjustment of the 2020 RES and 2030 non-ETS targets to take account of 
Brexit will tighten or loosen EU policy will depend on the chosen approach. To protect the 
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confidence of all actors on what has been agreed it might be most straightforward to keep 
the national RES and non-ETS targets (i.e., scenario 1) as they are, and try to convince the 
UK to do the same. 
4.2  Non-EU Members in the new energy union governance structure 
On 30 November 2016, the Commission published a proposal105 that integrates and 
replaces the existing Monitoring Mechanism Regulation. It requires Member States to adopt 
National Energy and Climate Plans (NECPs). NECPs will replace existing separate plans for 
renewables and efficiency and help streamline related obligations for planning and 
reporting. Monitoring progress will take place under a new annual cycle in the framework of 
the Energy Union, which is similar to the European Semester. The proposal puts forward 
requirements for the content of the plans, including a detailed and binding template for 
Member States to use. Importantly, it also contains the process for adopting and 
monitoring national energy objectives on renewable energy deployment and energy 
efficiency, as Member State contributions to EU level binding targets in these areas.106 To 
date it is not clear how associate countries (such as EEA or Energy Community), that also 
have energy efficiency and RES targets for 2030, would have to participate in the NECPs, 
but it seems straightforward to assume that they might have to follow a similar procedure. 
If the UK were to seek some sort of an associate status, it is very conceivable that it will 
have to commit to energy efficiency and RES targets for 2030 as well. 
The proposed governance structure would oblige Member States to enter into some form of 
regional co-operation - specifically consulting the draft NECPs with neighbouring Member 
States, but also in terms of implementation. According to the Commission’s proposal, this 
cooperation-requirement only extends to Member States and is largely facultative. But 
especially on RES policy both the neighbouring Member States and the UK might benefit 
from a coordinated approach – especially if the UK choses to maintain targets that are in 
line with EU objectives. 
4.3  Impact of the UK leaving the EU emission trading system 
The UK is a member of the EU Emission Trading System (ETS) that establishes a common 
carbon price in the EU. An exit of the UK from this system would have substantial 
repercussions on the demand and supply of allowances in this system. The implications 
could be significant, as there is a substantial overhang of two billion emission allowances 
(currently worth some EUR 10 billion) owned by different entities. 
Established in 2005, the EU ETS is the EU’s carbon market. The ETS covers around 11,000 
industrial installations and power plants in the 28 EU Member States as well as Iceland, 
Lichtenstein and Norway.107, 108 The participants in the system are required to surrender an 
allowance for every tonne of carbon dioxide or an equivalent amount of other greenhouse 
gases emitted. Allowances are distributed in auctions and in certain cases are provided 
free. A ‘cap’, or limit, is placed on the total number of allowances issued each year. The cap 
is reduced each year. The ETS is currently in its third trading phase (2013-2020), and is 
                                           
105  Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the Governance of the Energy 
Union (COM (2016) 759). 
106  Introduction borrowed from Duwe et al. (2017). 
107  European Commission (2016c). 
108  A separate ETS exists also for the aviation sector in these countries. 
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larger in scope compared to the first phase (2005-2007) and second phase (2008-2012). A 
fourth phase is scheduled for 2021-2030. 
On 29 March 2019, the UK may potentially leave the EU emissions trading system (ETS). 
This section explores the implications of such a departure on the overall ETS market. Three 
possible impacts are discussed. Firstly, the departure may lead to an adjustment of the 
overall level of the ETS cap. This may affect the supply and price of allowances particularly 
in the fourth phase. Secondly, we consider the impact of a UK exit on the short-term supply 
and price of allowances. Finally, the distribution of allowances may change. These potential 
impacts are elaborated on below. 
4.3.1  The potential impact on the emissions cap 
The EU has established two emissions reduction targets. The first, set during the second 
phase of the ETS, is to reduce the emissions covered by the ETS by 21 percent by 2020 
compared to 2005.109 Because the reduction in emissions will exceed the target, the 
emissions cap for 2020 was revised during the third phase of the ETS.110 Throughout the 
third phase, emissions will be reduced annually by 1.74 percent of the average total 
quantity of allowances issued between 2008 and 2012.111 The cap was set at around 1,816 
mtCO2e for 2020.112 This corresponds to a 2020 reduction target of around 23.5 percent113 
relative to 2005 levels. The second target is to reduce overall emissions by 43 percent by 
2030 compared to 2005.114  
In the event of a UK departure, the EU would likely change the level of the ETS cap. 
Though the EU is technically not obliged to do so, leaving the cap unchanged would imply 
an increase in the surplus of allowances and a decrease in the price. A reasonable 
assumption is that the cap would be adjusted such that the emissions reduction targets for 
2020 and 2030 are retained. In order to model the impact of a potential UK departure on 
the cap, we borrow the following methodology from a recent report by Sandbag115.  
• The 2005 baseline emissions116 for the EU28117, EEA and the UK are first adjusted to 
reflect the current scope of the ETS118.  
• The 2005 baseline emissions for the EU27 are thereafter calculated by subtracting 
the 2005 baseline emissions (according to the current scope) for the UK from the 
EU28.  
                                           
109  European Union (2015a). 
110  Sandbag (2017). 
111  Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council - Report on the functioning of the 
European Carbon Market (COM (2017) 48 Final). 
112  Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council - Report on the functioning of the 
European Carbon Market (COM (2017) 48 Final). 
113  The original 2020 reduction target was 21 percent and was set under the second phase scope of the ETS. The 
scope was extended in Phase 3 though. The actual 2020 cap is 1,816 mtCO2e which would translate into a 
reduction target of around 23.46 percent, which can be rounded to 23.5 percent, compared to the 2005 
baseline. 
114  European Commission (n.d.-l).  
115  Sandbag (2017). 
116  The emissions data are acquired from EEA (2017b).  
117  Including Croatia. 
118  The current scope covers more emissions, and is therefore larger than in 2005. 
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• The caps for the EU27 in 2020 and 2030 are finally calculated by multiplying the 
2005 baseline emissions for the EU27 with the current 2020 and 2030 percentage 
emissions reduction targets (23.5 and 43 percent respectively). 
Figure 6 illustrates the results. The emissions in 2005 equalled 2,070 mtCO2e for the EU27. 
The cap for the EU27 would therefore be 1,584 mtCO2e in 2020 and 1,180 mtCO2e in 
2030. By definition, the caps for 2020 and 2030 represent the same percentage reductions 
as for the EU28. 
 
Figure 6:  The cap with and without the UK if the overall emissions reduction 
targets are maintained 
 
Source: Figure replicated and updated by Bruegel from Sandbag (2017). Data obtained from EEA (2017b). 
Note: The scope of the ETS in 2005 is adjusted to reflect the scope in the third phase. 
The numbers in the figure have been rounded, and may therefore not always sum up perfectly. 
 
Whether the cap tightens due to the UK’s departure depends on the change in the 
cumulative allowances relative to cumulative emissions. The reduction in allowances is 
determined by the cap. As Figure 6 shows, the cap in 2020 would have to decrease by 210 
mtCO2e until 2020 and by an additional 157 mtCO2e until 2030 if the UK left the ETS and 
the overall emissions reduction targets were retained.119 Emissions, however, are expected 
to decrease by less. This is because the UK is expected to feature an above-proportionate 
reduction in emissions compared to other EU Member States, i.e., it was expected to 
shoulder a larger reduction burden. Hence, without the UK, the overall cap would tighten by 
an estimated 745 mtCO2e between 2021 and 2030 according to the Sandbag report. 
However, due to the Market Stability Reserve (MSR) - that only absorbs excess allowances 
                                           
119  These amounts correspond to the reduction in the cap required to maintain the overall 2020 and 2030 
emissions reduction targets. They are different from the number of allowances actually allocated to the UK 
which is much smaller. Indeed, the UK has been allocated fewer allowances than what it would have received if 
the number of allocated allowances had been proportional to the country’s share of baseline emissions in 2005. 
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if the system is not too tight – the actual tightening may be significantly less.120 The 
Sandbag report estimates the net tightening (after the MSR) due to Brexit to equal only 
around 230 mtCO2e by the end of the fourth phase. According to the report, a modest 
price increase of ten percent on average across the fourth phase is anticipated, relative to 
the scenario in which the UK remains in the ETS.  
4.3.2  The potential impact of a UK departure in the short-term 
In the period leading up to a UK departure, UK companies may attempt to offload 
allowances that they might not need after Brexit (and which might potentially even be 
cancelled). When these allowances enter the market121 the price may decrease in the short 
term. A recent report by ICIS122 suggests the price reduction may be larger the later the 
exit date is announced by the UK government and the earlier the exit takes place. If the 
exit date is announced late, a large share of allowances of UK utility companies, originally 
bought to hedge against future price risk, may expire when the UK leaves the ETS. These 
companies may thus be forced to offload these allowances in a short period of time. The 
ICIS report highlights the benefits of a long lead time (e.g. slightly more than two years) 
between the announcement date and the exit date, as this would give UK utilities sufficient 
horizon to avoid hedging their positions beyond the exit date. Moreover, a long lead time 
would allow UK industrials to spread the sale of any surplus allowances over a long-time 
period, which may help to avoid a large and sudden price decrease. 
Interestingly, in spite of the anticipated initial price decrease, the ICIS report forecasts an 
overall increase in the price of allowances between mid-2017 and the beginning of 2019, 
regardless of the length of lead time between the announcement and exit date. The price 
increase is attributed to the MSR. Though not discussed in the ICIS report, the surplus of 
allowances in the ETS market may be further reduced by a proposal of the European 
Parliament, which seeks to nullify allowances issued by the UK after 1 January 2018.123 The 
proposal was accepted in October 2017 and could help mitigate a short run increase in the 
supply of allowances.124 Moreover, it could prevent allowances issued in the UK in February 
2019 to be used in the EU27, as they will not be needed in the UK as of April 2019, when 
all installations hand in their allowances for compliance.  
4.3.3  The potential impact of a UK departure on the distribution of allowances 
The UK has achieved a significant reduction in its emissions covered under the ETS (see 
Figure 7 for the reduction to date in the third phase). This is largely due to carbon price 
support policies, which have increased the cost of emissions. The majority of the UK’s 
decarbonisation has been in coal-intensive sectors, where the cost of reducing emissions is 
relatively low.125 In spite of the reduction in emissions, the UK is currently a net buyer of 
allowances. As shown in Figure 7, the UK’s emissions have exceeded allowances in all years 
                                           
120  The MSR will enter into force on 1 January 2019 and will decrease the number of allowances in the ETS if the 
surplus in the previous year exceeds 833m (SWD (2015) 135 final). In contrast, if the market surplus in the 
preceding year is below 400 million allowances, the MSR will release 100 million allowances into the ETS 
(Decision (EU) 2015/1814 of the European Parliament and of the Council). The annual reduction rate is 
expected to equal 24 percent between 2019 and 2023, and thereafter 12 percent (ICIS, 2017). 
121  Some allowances may also be placed in the MSR in order to soften the downward pressure on the price. 
122  ICIS (2017). 
123  IETA (2017).  
124  Reuters (2017) 
125  Sandbag (2017). 
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of the third trading phase. Though the gap is narrowing, the short position of the UK 
reflects the historically low allocation of allowances to this country. As mentioned in section 
4.3.1, the UK’s actual allocation is lower than the number of allowances it would have 
received if the allocation was based on the share of baseline emissions in 2005.  
 
Figure 7:  Total allocated allowances and verified emissions in the UK during 
the third phase of the EU ETS 
 
       Source: Bruegel based on data from EEA (2017b). 
 
The short position of the UK may partly stem from a low share of auctioned allowances. 
Auctioning is the default method of allocating allowances, as 57 percent of allowances will 
be auctioned during the third phase.126 The allocation rules for auctioned allowances are 
stipulated in Box 1. 88 percent of auctioned allowances are allocated based on the share of 
baseline emissions. The remainder, however, is distributed to less wealthy Member States. 
The UK therefore receives a lower amount of allowances than if the allocation were solely 
based on the share of baseline emissions.  
However, according to the Sandbag report, UK emissions have been falling faster than the 
number of allowances allocated to the UK. Hence, the UK may become a net seller of 
allowances at some point between 2017 and 2020. This further suggests that a UK 
departure from the ETS may tighten the system.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                           
126  The remaining allowances are distributed for free. This method is primarily used for sectors characterised by 
carbon leaking (i.e. industries with high costs related to climate policies that would transfer production 
elsewhere if subjected to emission constraints). The departure of the UK from the ETS will likely have a 
minimal impact on the distribution of free allowances. This is because the free allowances are allocated to 
installations, and are therefore not based on relative proportions of Member States. 
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Box 1:  An overview of the rules governing the auctioning of ETS allowances 
 
EU ETS AUCTIONING RULES 
 
During the third trading phase, the following rules determine the allocation of auctioned 
allowances across Member States: 
• 88 percent of allowances are distributed according to the Member States’ share of 
verified emissions from EU ETS installations in 2005 or the average in 2005-2007, 
whichever one is the highest; 
• 10 percent is allocated to the least wealthy Member States; and 
• 2 percent is allocated as a bonus to nine Member States* that by 2005 had reduced 
their emissions by at least 20 percent of their base year levels. 
 
The allocation rules for the fourth trading phase are expected to be: 
• 90 percent of allowances are distributed according to the Member States’ share of 
verified emissions; and 
• 10 percent is allocated to the Member States which GDP per capita did not exceed 90 
percent of the EU average in 2013. 
 
Source: Bruegel based on European Commission (n.d.-m). 
Note: *These countries are Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania and 
Slovakia. 
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Box 2:  The relationship between Switzerland and the EU ETS 
 
SWITZERLAND AND THE EU ETS 
 
Switzerland is not a member of the EU ETS, and operates its own ETS instead. The Swiss 
ETS covers around 10 percent of the country’s GHG emissions and is considerably smaller 
than its EU counterpart. Moreover, prices have historically been higher in the Swiss ETS. 
The Swiss system has a similar design to the EU ETS. They cover the same gases and 
sectors, and decrease the annual amount of allocated allowances by the same rate. The 
methodologies of allocating free and auctioned allowances are also consistent.  
In January 2016, Switzerland and the EU concluded their negotiations on linking the two 
systems. The agreement will enter into force once it has been ratified and signed by both 
parties.* Linking both systems will result in mutual recognition of EU and Swiss 
allowances.127 Furthermore, Switzerland expects the linkage to result in lower costs of 
reducing emissions, enhanced liquidity and greater price stability. Disputes in the linked 
system will be referred to a Joint Committee for resolution. If the Committee is unable to 
settle the dispute within six months, the dispute can be referred to the Permanent Court of 
Arbitration. The European Court of Justice will therefore not be used as a dispute resolution 
mechanism. 
If the UK leaves the EU ETS and implements an independent system, a similar linkage 
arrangement is theoretically possible. However, such a linkage may take a long time to 
enact and may be less efficient than if the UK remained in the EU ETS.   
Given the size of the UK, a similar arrangement would imply a political question on who 
decides on the cap of the UK system. If the cap is restrictive, the UK would be an importer 
of allowances from the EU27, while a too lose cap would make the UK an exporter. 
 
Source: Bruegel based on EEA (2017b) and ICAP (2017) and COM (2017) 427 final128. 
Note: *The agreement may be signed by the end of 2017, though it is not expected to enter into force before 
2019.129, 130 
 
4.4  Industrial emission rules post-Brexit 
The Industrial Emissions Directive (Directive 2010/75/EU) obliges Member States to control 
and reduce the impact of industrial emissions on the environment. Installations are only 
allowed to operate with a permit that specifies the conditions for operation, and they are 
obliged to use the best available techniques. The permit for an installation has to take into 
account the entire environmental performance of the plant (i.e. an ‘integrated approach’). 
This legislation places restrictions on the number of running hours for fossil fuel power 
generation plants with regard to the harmful waste gases that they emit (unless 
investments are made to reduce this impact), and will affect decisions on whether to invest 
in new plants or maintain existing facilities. Hence, a number of (coal-fired) power stations 
                                           
127  European Commission (n.d.-n). 
128  Proposal for a Council Decision on the conclusion, on behalf of the European Union, of an Agreement between 
the European Union and the Swiss Confederation on the Linking of their Greenhouse Gas Emissions Trading 
Systems (COM(2017) 427 final). 
129  European Commission (2017j). 
130  BusinessGreen (2017). 
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will have to close by 2023 or when they have exhausted their allocated 17,500 running 
hours.  
The plants covered by the IED had three options:131 
1.  Opt-in to the IED and satisfy the emissions requirements as of 1 January 2016.  
2.  Opt-in via the Transitional National Plan (TNP) and thereby gradually adjust to the 
new emissions requirements. Plants will be subjected to an emissions allocation 
during the transitional period (between 1 January 2016 and 30 June 2020).132 At the 
end of the period, plans could either opt in to the IED or limit their operating hours 
to 1,500 per year. 
3.  Opt-out from the IED, and thereby limit the running hours to 17,500 between 2016 
and 2023. These plants will be forced to close when the hours are exhausted or by 
the end of 2023, whichever is reached first.  
The UK’s withdrawal could in principle allow the UK government (which expects a capacity 
shortfall in the coming years) to loosen the regulation on industrial emissions, making it 
easier for coal plants to stay online without being modernised. However, the phase-out of 
coal in the UK is largely driven by domestic policies and might hence not be altered by the 
option to renege on the IED-commitments after Brexit. 
4.5  Energy efficiency 
The EU energy efficiency policy prescribes on the one hand a Union-wide energy 
consumption reduction of 20 percent (compared to prior projections) by 2020 that is not 
broken down to binding targets for the individual Member States. On the other hand, it 
entails detailed regulation on a number of specific measures such as obliging energy 
distributors to reduce consumption, renovations of public buildings to make them more 
energy efficient, and improving access to consumption data for customers. For 2030, an 
energy-efficiency target of at least 27 percent has been endorsed by the European Council. 
As the energy efficiency target is defined as a reduction compared to a baseline we suppose 
that each member state is essentially asked to reduce consumption compared to the 
baseline by exactly the same share (e.g., 30%). Hence, Brexit would not imply a change in 
the national contributions to meet the EU-wide energy efficiency target. 
If the UK would seek a “soft” Brexit which allows it to stay inside the internal energy 
market, the EU would likely require the UK to commit to contribute to the EUs energy 
efficiency target, in order to avoid a different treatment of UK companies. Hence, it is 
conceivable that the UK will have to report on its energy efficiency policies to the European 
Commission, which might provide guidance to the UK when it deems the UK efforts 
inappropriate. 
By contrast, a “hard” Brexit could allow the UK government to alter its energy efficiency 
ambitions. Given that most energy efficiency measures have relatively limited cross-border 
consequences, the biggest impact of the UK withdrawal on energy efficiency could arise if 
the UK choses to opt out of EU wide energy efficiency standards (namely Ecodesign and 
Energy Labeling), as this could hamper EU-UK trade in these goods.  
                                           
131  UK Government (2015). 
132  European Commission (2016d). 
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4.6  Critical issues and options 
Brexit will require the EU to reassess its energy and climate targets. The first option would 
be to consider the UK like a Member State and continue to integrate it in the Energy Union 
governance framework. For the EU this would avoid recalculating the targets while the UK 
would not need to explore new ways of committing to energy and climate policies that the 
EU deems compatible (in order to maintain full access to the internal market). 
If the UK and the EU cannot agree on a ‘business as usual’ approach, the EU will have to 
revisit its targets. For the 2020 RES and 2030 non-ETS emissions targets, we see three 
options:  
1. Member States keep their national targets unchanged leading to deviations of the 
resulting EU27 targets from the initially planned EU targets. It would imply that the 
EU total 2020 RES target becomes more ambitious while the EU 2030 non-ETS 
target becomes less ambitious.  
2. Member States adjust their targets so that the EU27 achieves the EU28 targets in 
absolute terms, even if the UK does not deliver. This would imply that the Member 
States 2020 RES targets and 2030 non-ETS targets generally become more 
ambitious.  
3. Member States adjust their targets so that the EU27 targets are the same in 
percentage terms as the initially planned EU28 targets. This will mean that the 
Member States need to do less or the same with respect to increasing the share of 
renewable energy, but more with respect to reducing non-ETS emissions. 
The last two options will also affect the relative burden of the Member States.  
Moreover, Brexit can be expected to lead to an initial increase in the surplus of allowances 
in the EU ETS, as installations attempt to offload their UK allowances before the exit date. 
In the longer term, however, the system is expected to tighten.  
For the EU wide targets that are not broken down to the Member States level (i.e. the 
energy efficiency target and the 2030 RES target), it can be envisaged that the current 
targets are maintained. This would be the easiest solution from a political perspective, and 
likely have little impact on the energy efficiency and RES levels in the EU27. 
Overall, as the UK targets are not too different from the EU average targets, the distortions 
will be limited. 
 
Policy Department A: Economic and Scientific Policy 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 66 PE 614.181 
Table 20:  Possible means to coordinate a countries energy and climate targets 
and emission trading system with the EU’s under different arrangements 
 RES target Non-ETS target ETS membership EE target 
EU Member State 
(e.g. France) 
Joint EU target 
under EU 
governance 
National targets 
under EU law  
Membership 
possible 
Joint EU target 
under EU 
governance 
EEA  
(e.g. Norway) 
Joint EU target, 
possibly under 
EU governance 
National target 
agreed with EU 
Membership 
possible 
National target 
possible 
Energy Community 
(e.g. Ukraine) 
National target 
agreed with EU 
National target 
agreed with EU 
Linking 
possible 
National target 
possible 
Bilateral Treaty 
(e.g. Switzerland) 
National target, 
possibly 
coordinated 
with EU 
National target, 
possibly 
coordinated with 
EU 
Linking 
possible 
National target 
possible 
WTO (e.g. Morocco) 
National target 
not coordinated 
with EU 
National target 
not coordinated 
with EU 
Linking 
possible 
National target 
possible 
Source: Bruegel. 
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CHAPTER 5.  RULES FOR SECURITY OF ELECTRICITY AND 
GAS SUPPLIES 
KEY FINDINGS 
• Pooling energy resources among Member States is essential for the EU to build a 
common and truly integrated internal energy market that is able to withstand external 
shocks. 
• Physical interconnections represent a fundamental prerequisite to enable solidarity in 
both electricity and gas markets. 
• For electricity, the UK benefits considerably from its trade with the EU27. Imported 
electricity (7.5 percent of the total UK’s consumption) helps the UK to keep prices 
down. On its side, the EU27 does not receive any substantive benefit, because its 
electricity exchanges with the UK remain well below 1 percent of its total consumption. 
• For gas, the EU27-UK trade volume is generally rather limited. From a EU27-wide 
perspective, gas trade with the UK is not a relevant issue, also because, given the 
capacity and the underutilisation of its LNG terminals, the EU27 could manage its LNG 
markets even without the UK’s infrastructure. However, gas trade is an important issue 
for Ireland, which imports 56 percent of its consumption from the UK. 
• The EU27’s security of electricity and gas supplies will not be affected by the UK 
withdrawal. It is reasonable to expect the UK’s and neighbouring countries’ 
transmission system operators to continue their long-lasting cooperation on the basis 
of their respective regulatory frameworks. For a discussion of the specific case of 
Ireland, refer to Chapter 8. 
 
Both the Lisbon Treaty and the Energy Union strategy133 emphasise that pooling energy 
resources among Member States is essential for the EU to build a common, integrated, and 
functional internal energy market that can withstand external shocks. With the UK 
withdrawal, the UK will no longer be obliged to comply with this EU solidarity principle. 
To make this solidarity principle work (which to date has never been tested), the EU 
Security of Gas Supply Regulation134 has recently been updated. This legislation introduces 
a solidarity principle (in the event of a severe gas crisis, neighbouring Member States will 
help out to ensure gas supply to households and essential social services), closer regional 
cooperation and greater transparency. As far as electricity is concerned, in 2014 the 
European Council called for all Member States to achieve interconnection of at least 10 
percent of their installed electricity production capacity by 2020 in order to improve 
electricity security of supply.135 
                                           
133  European Commission (2016e). 
134  Regulation (EU) No 994/2010. 
135  European Council (2014). 
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Physical interconnections thus represent a fundamental prerequisite to enable solidarity in 
both electricity and gas markets. Assessing the impact of the UK withdrawal on the EU 
electricity and gas security thus appears to be necessary. To do so, this chapter will: 
• Carry out a background analysis of the current state of interconnection capacity, gas 
and electricity flows between the UK and EU Member States; 
• Assess the potential impact of the UK withdrawal on these interconnections and 
related markets; and 
• Based on the above, identify the issues arising from Brexit that affect EU citizens 
and companies the most, and discuss options on how to address them. 
5.1  Existing electricity interconnectors 
Electricity interconnectors are transmission wires which allow electricity to flow between 
countries, enabling countries to import power at times of shortage and export at times of 
surplus. The UK currently has four of them, linking it to France, Ireland, The Netherlands 
and Northern Ireland, totalling 4 Gigawatts (GW) of capacity (Table 21 - A). This capacity is 
relatively small, as it represents around 5 percent of UK’s total installed electricity 
generating capacity. 
As an island, the UK is connected only through asynchronous interconnectors with the rest 
of the EU. Consequently, in contrast to Continental countries that have developed a joint 
system for allocating cross-border capacities (where flows on the German-French border 
affect flows on the German-Dutch border in a synchronised system), the UK 
interconnectors with France and the Netherlands are individually managed. As merchant 
interconnectors, they also do not fall under the EU regulatory regime. 
Electricity interconnectors generate considerable economic benefit to the UK and its 
citizens. Given that electricity prices are higher in the UK than in neighbouring countries, 
importing lower cost electricity from other parts of Europe enables the UK’s prices to be 
reduced. On this basis, over the last years two new interconnectors projects (to France and 
Belgium) have been advanced, and are currently under construction (Table 21 – B). After 
their completion in 2019, these interconnectors will add 2GW of new capacity. Furthermore, 
six additional new interconnectors have been contracted (Table 21 – C).  
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Table 21:  UK-EU electricity interconnectors 
A – EXISTING INTERCONNECTORS (4 GW TOTAL CAPACITY) 
Project 
Name Developers 
Connecting 
Country 
Capacity 
[MW] 
Starting 
Year 
Interconnexion 
France-
Angleterre 
National Grid Interconnector 
Holdings (NGIH) and RTE France 2000 1986 
Moyle Mutual Energy Northern Ireland 500* 2002 
BritNed NGIH and TenneT Netherlands 1000 2011 
East-West 
Interconnector EirGrid Ireland 500 2012 
B – NEW INTERCONNECTORS UNDER CONSTRUCTION 
Project 
Name Developers 
Connecting 
Country 
Capacity 
[MV] 
Estimated 
Starting 
Year 
ElecLink Star Capital Partners Limited and Groupe Eurotunnel France 1000 2019 
NEMO NGIH and Elia Belgium 1000 2019 
NSN NGIH and Statnett Norway 1400 2020 
IFA2 NGIH and RTE France 1000 2020 
C – PERSPECTIVE INTERCONNECTORS (CONTRACTED, NOT YET UNDER 
CONSTRUCTION) 
FAB Link Transmission Investment and RTE France 1400 2022 
Viking NGIH and Energinet.dk Denmark 1000 2022 
Greenlink Element Power Ireland 500 2021 
Source: Bruegel based on Ofgem (2017a) and Froggatt et al. (2017). 
Note: *Moyle has been operating at around half of its normal 500 MW capacity due to subsea cable faults since 
2012. 
 
Should all of these projects advance, the UK’s total electricity interconnection capacity 
would rise to more than 11GW by 2022. Together, these capacity expansions would not 
only allow the UK to have more access to cheaper sources of electricity and to rely on non-
UK supplies in times of domestic generation scarcity, but it would also make the UK a hub 
for electricity exchanges between the Continent, the Republic of Ireland, and Scandinavia. 
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5.2  Existing gas interconnectors 
Around 45 percent of UK’s gas supplies still come from domestic gas fields located in the 
North Sea. But, due to resource depletion, domestic gas production is rapidly falling (i.e. 
from 80 billion cubic metres (bcm) in 2006 to 41 bcm in 2016), making the UK more reliant 
on gas imports. The country currently imports gas from Norway (i.e. via pipelines directly 
connecting the UK with Norway’s gas fields), and from other European and international 
producers either via pipelines or LNG. 
As far as pipelines are concerned, the UK has 3 links to Norway’s gas fields and 3 
interconnectors linking it to Belgium, the Netherlands and Ireland (Table 22). 
 
Table 22:  UK’s gas interconnectors 
PROJECT NAME CONNECTING COUNTRY 
CAPACITY 
[BCM] 
MAIN 
DIRECTION 
(UK perspective) 
BI-
DIRECTIONAL 
Vesterled pipeline link Norway 14.2 Import no 
Langeled pipeline Norway 26.3 Import no 
Tampen Link Norway 9 Import no 
     
UK-Belgium 
interconnector Belgium 25.5 Import yes 
UK-Netherlands 
pipeline Netherlands 14.2 Import no 
Interconnector 1 and 
Interconnector 2 Ireland 12 Export no 
Source: Bruegel based on Energy UK (2017) and IEA (2012). 
 
The respective national regulatory authorities (Ofgem in the UK, CREG in Belgium, ACM in 
the Netherlands and CER in Ireland) are currently charged with regulating and supervising 
these pipelines under the EU Third Energy Package. 
The UK also has a substantial 52 bcm per year LNG import capacity, based on 3 onshore 
terminals and 1 offshore terminal (Table 23). 
 
Table 23:  UK’s LNG terminals 
LOCATION CAPACITY (BCM/Y) 
Dragon at Milford Haven, Pembrokeshire 7.6 
Isle of Grain, Kent 19.5 
South Hook, Pembrokeshire 21 
Teesside GasPort (offshore) 4.2 
Total 52 
Source: Bruegel based on GIIGNL (2017). 
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The UK has a gas storage capacity of 4.4 bcm (Table 24). Albeit limited, this storage 
capacity is important for the country, as it provides a margin of flexibility particularly useful 
when considering the falling domestic production. 
 
Table 24:  UK’s gas storage facilities 
FACILITY WORKING CAPACITY (BCM) 
WITHDRAWAL 
RATE (MCM PER 
DAY) 
COMPANY 
Rough 3.3 45 Centrica Storage 
Aldbrough 0.2 12 SSE/Statoil 
Hatfield Moor 0.1 2 Scottish Power 
Holehouse Farm 0.06 7 Energy Merchants Gas Storage (EDF) 
Hornsea 0.3 17 SSE Hornsea 
Humbley Grove 0.3 7 Star Energy 
LNG storage 0.08 3 National Grid LNGS 
Source: Bruegel based on IEA (2012). 
 
Covering 70 percent of the country’s total storage capacity, and being able to supply up to 
10 percent of the UK’s daily gas needs, the Rough facility represents an important element 
in the UK’s gas architecture. Following repeated outages, the facility has been permanently 
shut in June 2017, and it will remain so at least up to May 2018.136 This disruption 
highlighted the UK’s rising gas vulnerability, and led to a quick increase in gas prices in the 
order of 5-7 percent. 
5.3  Potential impact of Brexit on interconnections and markets 
The potential impact of Brexit on gas and electricity interconnections and markets seems to 
be rather limited for at least three reasons: 
i) Limited volume of EU-UK electricity and gas trade; 
ii) Specificity of UK’s interconnector regime; 
iii) Limited role of UK’s LNG for the EU gas security of supply. 
 
i) Limited volume of EU-UK electricity and gas trade  
From a general perspective, the EU27-UK electricity and gas trade is rather limited. On 
electricity, the UK certainly depends more on the EU27 than vice-versa, as it imports from 
the EU 7.5 percent of its consumption, while the EU imports from the UK 0.07 percent of its 
consumption (Figure 8). Especially UK imports might increase, when the planned additional 
transmission capacities are commissioned, and hence physical bottlenecks removed. 
 
                                           
136  Financial Times (2017b). 
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Figure 8:  EU27-UK electricity trade (2015) 
 
Source: Bruegel based on IEA (2017). 
 
For gas, the UK imports from the EU27 5 percent of its consumption, while the EU27 
imports from the UK 3 percent of its consumption (Figure 9). However, it is necessary to 
stress that, even if negligible from a EU27-wide perspective, gas trade with the UK does 
represent an important issue for the Republic of Ireland. That country currently imports 56 
percent of its gas consumption from the UK. Given its special position, the case of Ireland is 
separately discussed in Chapter 8. 
 
Figure 9:  EU27-UK gas trade (2015) 
 
Source: Bruegel based on IEA (2017). 
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ii) Specificity of UK’s interconnector regime  
While other EU Member States have tended to look to incumbent transmission system 
operators (TSOs) for the development of interconnectors, the UK interconnector regime is 
unique in that it specifically allows for and encourages merchant interconnectors to be 
developed by private investors. For currently planned interconnectors, the investment 
model on the UK side may not change after Brexit, as it is currently set by UK regulatory 
structures. However, national regulators in EU Member States (and Norway) are also 
involved in negotiating arrangements for their side of the interconnectors. Brexit may then 
result in additional examination of these frameworks, but it is well possible to expect TSOs 
to continue to speak with one another even after Brexit (see Chapter 3). Furthermore, as 
illustrated in Chapter 3, National Grid could even remain a member of the ENTSO-E and 
ENTSOG, which have some non-EU members. So, Brexit does not seem likely to have any 
noteworthy negative impact on either UK or EU electricity energy security. 
 
iii) Limited role of UK’s LNG for the EU gas security of supply 
In 2016, the UK imported 11.84 bcm of LNG, vis-à-vis a total LNG import capacity of 52.3 
bcm. As illustrated in Table 25, this low utilisation rate of LNG terminals does not affect 
only the UK, but all European countries.  
 
Table 25:  European LNG utilisation rates 
COUNTRY CAPACITY IN 2016 (BCM/Y) 
IMPORTS IN 2016 
(BCM/Y) 
UTILISATION RATE 
(percent) 
Spain 69.00 16.10 23  
UK 52.30 11.84 23 
France 34.30 8.79 26 
Italy 15.10 7.27 48 
Netherlands 12.00 0.59 5 
Belgium 9.00 1.25 14 
Portugal 7.60 2.07 27 
Greece 5.00 0.84 17 
Poland 5.00 1.30 26 
Lithuania 4.00 1.58 40 
Sweden 0.60 0.38 63 
Finland 0.10 0.03 32 
Source: Bruegel based on GIIGNL (2017). 
 
In this context, it is difficult to see UK’s LNG infrastructure playing any relevant role in the 
EU’s gas security of supply architecture. That is, having a sizeable and considerably 
underutilised LNG infrastructure, the EU27 could well manage its LNG imports even without 
the UK’s contribution. 
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5.4  Critical Issues and options 
Continued cooperation and coordination on security of energy supply would benefit both 
sides. Given the limited volume of EU27-UK electricity and gas trade, Brexit is not likely to 
cause any critical issues for the EU27’s security of electricity and gas supplies.  
On electricity, the EU27 only gets very limited benefit in terms of security, as its electricity 
exchanges with the UK remain well below 1 percent of its total consumption.  
On gas, the EU27-UK trade volume generally remains rather limited and from a EU27-wide 
perspective it does not represent a relevant issue (for a discussion of the specific case of 
Ireland, refer to Chapter 8), as the UK does not provide access to storages or suppliers to 
which the EU27 would not have access on its own.  
Furthermore, given the capacity and the underutilisation of its LNG terminals, the EU27 
could well manage LNG markets even without the UK’s infrastructure.  
It is also possible to expect the UK’s and neighbouring countries’ transmission system 
operators to continue their long-lasting cooperation, on the basis of their respective 
regulatory frameworks. 
 
 Table 26:  A countries participation in the EU’s energy solidarity  
under different arrangements 
 Participate in EU solidarity 
EU Member State  
(e.g. France) 
Yes 
EEA  
(e.g. Norway) 
Under discussion 
Energy Community  
(e.g. Ukraine) 
Under discussion 
Bilateral Treaty 
(e.g. Switzerland) 
Not formally, but cooperation of TSOs 
WTO  
(e.g. Morocco) 
Not formally, but cooperation of TSOs 
          Source: Bruegel. 
Impact of Brexit on the EU Energy System 
_________________________________________________________________ 
PE 614.181 75  
CHAPTER 6.  FUTURE RELATION WITH EURATOM 
KEY FINDINGS 
• The UK Government has signalled its intention with its Brexit White Paper that when 
invoking Article 50, it “will be leaving Euratom as well as the EU”. 
• From the withdrawal date, the UK will have sole responsibility for ensuring its 
compliance with international treaties and conventions on nuclear energy. 
• Both the EU and the UK recognise the need for setting-out in the Withdrawal 
Agreement clear arrangements on issues like nuclear safety and radioactive waste. 
• On safety, the two parties seem to agree that the Euratom Community should transfer 
ownership to the UK of equipment and other property on its territory related to the 
provision of safeguards. However, the two parties will most likely disagree on the value 
of this property, which might thus be subject to negotiation. 
• On radioactive waste, the two parties seem to agree on the principle that the state in 
which the spent fuel or the radioactive waste was generated should be responsible. 
However, disagreements could well emerge during the negotiations. 
6.1  Future relation with Euratom 
The UK Government signalled its intention with its Brexit White Paper that when invoking 
Article 50, it ‘will be leaving Euratom as well as the EU’.137 The need to distinguish between 
exiting Euratom and exiting the EU arises because Euratom is legally distinct from the EU. 
The UK decided to leave Euratom because, albeit independent, the institution relies for its 
functioning on EU bodies (e.g. the Commission, the Council of Ministers and the Court of 
Justice), staff and budget. 
According to the White Paper, the UK Government considers the nuclear industry of 
strategic importance for the country, and for this reason it ‘will seek alternative 
arrangements’ to continue civil nuclear cooperation, safeguards, safety and trade with 
Europe in the framework of Brexit’s negotiations. 
In this section, we examine the functions of Euratom, its relevance for the UK, the potential 
implications of ‘brexiting’ Euratom for both the UK and for Euratom itself, the positions 
apparently assumed by the EU and the UK on the issue, and the potential way forward. 
6.2  Euratom: what it is and what it does? 
The European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom) was founded by the Treaties of Rome 
of 1957 with the aim of creating a European market for nuclear power. Euratom is legally 
distinct from the EU, while it is governed by EU’s institutions. Its membership is composed 
of EU Member States. Euratom also has cooperation agreements with Switzerland since 
2014, and with eight ‘Third Countries’: US, Japan, Canada, Australia, Kazakhstan, Ukraine, 
Uzbekistan and South Africa. 
                                           
137  UK Government (2017a) 
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The key functions of Euratom are to:  
• Promote research on nuclear energy, and particularly on nuclear fusion – a 
technology that has the potential to provide a sustainable solution for the world’s 
energy needs and could thus be considered to be a global common good; 
• Establish uniform safety standards and ensure that they are applied;  
• Ensure the regular supply of ores and nuclear fuels; 
• Ensure that nuclear materials are not diverted to purposes other than those for 
which they are intended; 
• Ensure free movement of capital for investment in nuclear energy and free 
movement of employment for specialists in the sector. 
Euratom carries out these functions using three key instruments: 
• The Euratom Supplies Agency, which owns and controls the supply of all fissile 
materials in Euratom’s Member States; 
• The European Commission, which develops research programmes to foster research 
on nuclear energy; 
• The Euratom Safeguards Directorate, which ensures that nuclear materials are not 
diverted from their intended uses (non-proliferation). This institution is a part of the 
European Commission (DG Energy). 
6.3  The UK links to Euratom 
Reflecting the key functions of Euratom, the UK’s links with the organisation are fourfold. 
6.3.1  Nuclear fusion research 
Euratom’s flagship project is called ‘International Thermonuclear Experimental Reactor’ 
(ITER)138, the world’s largest planned nuclear fusion experiment. Located in the south of 
France, ITER is designed to produce 500 MW of fusion power from 50 MW of input power, 
i.e. a ten-fold return on energy. It is funded and run by a seven-party consortium 
composed of the EU, India, Japan, China, Russia, South Korea and the US.139 The UK has 
an important role in this project, as it hosts the Joint European Torus (JET)140, the world’s 
largest operational nuclear fusion device. This project is also known as ‘Little ITER’, since 
its experimental design and results serve mainly as a contribution to the ITER’s design. The 
JET project - carried out by a team of 350 scientists - is formally a joint venture used by 
more than 40 EU laboratories. 
6.3.2  Budget for nuclear fusion 
The EU covers the largest share of ITER’s construction costs (45 percent), amounting to 
EUR 2.7 billion over the 2014-2020 period. This is financed through a specific budget line 
within the Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF) of the EU budget. During the forthcoming 
negotiations, the European Commission is expected to claim the UK’s share of this amount 
as a liability towards the EU. In addition, ITER-related research costs are covered through 
                                           
138  ITER (n.d.). 
139  Part of this structure is a European Joint Undertaking (Euratom Chapter 5) of which Switzerland is also a 
member (Fusion for Energy, n.d.). 
140  EUROfusion (n.d.-a). 
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the EU Framework Programme for Research and Innovation (Horizon2020, formerly FP7), 
administered by Euratom. The UK stands to lose these funds. To put it into perspective, 
over the 2014-18 period Euratom has a total research budget of EUR 1.6 billion drawn from 
the H2020 budget, of which EUR 700 million will be distributed to carry out research 
specifically on nuclear fusion.141 EUR 424 million will go to EUROfusion, a Consortium of 
university groups and national labs, mostly for research related to the ITER project. The 
remaining EUR 283 million have been budgeted solely for the Culham Centre, the JET’s 
hosting institute in the UK, operating as a common facility for researchers across Europe. 
JET alone receives around EUR 69 million per year of funding142, 87.5 percent of which is 
provided by the European Commission and the remaining 12.5 percent is funded by the UK. 
6.3.3  Safety, non-proliferation and free movement of capital and labour 
Euratom is not only relevant to the UK for its research component, but also for its 
operational functions. The UK is historically highly dependent on nuclear energy. As of 
2016, nuclear covers around 21 percent of the UK’s electricity generation mix. With its 15 
nuclear reactors in operation, the UK ranks 2nd in the EU by number of nuclear power plants 
(after France) and 4th by nuclear power capacity (after France, Germany and Sweden)143. 
Being a nuclear country, the UK thus relies on Euratom for activities related to safety at 
nuclear power plants, supply of nuclear fuels and non-proliferation. Being part of Euratom, 
the UK is part of an established legislative framework ranging from nuclear safety issues to 
free movement of capital for nuclear investments and free movement of employment for 
nuclear specialists, that facilitate investments in the sector and reduce costs associated 
with nuclear power generation. By ‘brexiting’ Euratom, the UK would then lose this package 
of advantages. All these elements might impact the UK’s operating nuclear power plants, as 
well as the new projects under development, such as the controversial Hinkley Point mega-
project, which was finally approved by the UK Government in September 2016. 
6.3.4  Supply of nuclear fuel 
Under the Euratom Treaty, the Euratom Supplies Agency is endowed with a right of option 
on ores, source materials and special fissile materials produced in the territories of Member 
States and has an exclusive right to conclude contracts relating to the supply of ores, 
source materials and special fissile materials coming from inside the Community or from 
outside. This common purchasing scheme allows the Euratom Community to have more 
bargaining power while negotiating contracts with external suppliers of nuclear fuels, thus 
contributing to the reduction of nuclear power generation costs. By ‘brexiting’ Euratom, the 
UK would also lose this economic advantage. 
 
                                           
141  EUROfusion (n.d.-b). 
142  EUROfusion (2017). 
143  European Nuclear Society (n.d.) 
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Figure 10:  Nuclear capacity and share in electricity mix in EU countries 
 
Source: Bruegel based on Eurostat (2017d). 
 
6.4  ‘Brexiting’ Euratom: potential impacts on the UK’s nuclear sector 
The decision to leave Euratom could, therefore, impact the UK’s nuclear industry under 
several perspectives. 
6.4.1  Nuclear fusion research 
Although the JET program is not likely to be affected before the end of 2018, its 
subsequent status is currently in a legal limbo.144 JET’s experiments may be halted or 
seriously delayed and, as a result, the ITER project could also be slowed down, being highly 
dependent on the JET’s outcomes. 
6.4.2 Safety and non-proliferation 
The UK Government would have to budget additional costs to run an autonomous system 
to guarantee the appropriate safety standards, in particular for nuclear safety inspections. 
By leaving Euratom, the UK would also need to set up the proper framework to comply with 
its nuclear non-proliferation safeguards commitment and to decommission radioactive 
waste. The JET facilities alone, for instance, have produced some 3,000 cubic meters of 
radioactive waste, which will cost about EUR 336 million to decommission, currently done 
through an EU-wide cost-sharing arrangement.145  
                                           
144  Nature (2017). 
145  Financial Times (2016). 
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6.4.3  Free movement of capital and labour 
The Brexit announcement caught the scientific community unprepared and caused large 
disquiet, with researchers now considering leaving the UK. According to Prof. Steve Cowley, 
former CEO of the UK Atomic Energy Authority, the perspective of losing EU funding puts at 
risk more than 1,000 clean-energy exploration jobs, and loss of expertise well beyond that 
at the Culham Centre, related to the research and tertiary education sector at large.146 
Labour movement and trade restrictions may also have implications for the construction 
costs and schedule of new projects. Long negotiations could impose severe delays to the 
advancement of new facilities, such as Hinkley Point C, increase general nuclear costs and 
also the risk of not fulfilling the UK’s targets for reducing greenhouse gas emissions. 
6.4.4  Supply of nuclear fuels 
Currently the Euratom Supply Agency guarantees equal access to nuclear raw materials 
between Member States.147 By pulling out of Euratom, the UK will have to re-negotiate 
commercial contracts to ensure the provision of nuclear fuel, ores and fissile materials. 
Once it is outside of the EU, it is debatable whether the UK will have similar bargaining 
capacity to negotiate with others, a fact that may lead to higher costs for nuclear power 
generation in the UK. 
6.4.5  Other legal issues 
Euratom currently has about 20 nuclear cooperation agreements with third countries 
around the world, which the UK will have to re-negotiate. Of crucial importance are those 
with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the world's intergovernmental body 
for co-operation in the nuclear field, and with the US, from which the UK is a substantial 
importer of technology and fuel for its nuclear reactors. 
6.5  Future relation with Euratom: the options on the table 
Looking into the future, this section outlines the possible scenarios for the post-Brexit UK-
Euratom relationship that could be taken into consideration during the forthcoming 
negotiations. 
6.5.1  UK out of Euratom 
In this scenario, the UK Government would have neither obligations nor rights towards 
Euratom. As a result, the UK might ultimately see increasing costs for its nuclear power 
generation, due to the additional operational costs and supply costs deriving from being 
outside the established framework of Euratom. 
Furthermore, new projects such as Hinkley Point might be delayed, not only as a direct 
consequence but also due to the volatile investment climate that this scenario could 
generate. As far as the EU is concerned, this scenario would not necessarily imply any 
noteworthy additional costs, but only a potential delay in the nuclear fusion research at 
ITER due to the potential end of the JET project. 
                                           
146  BBC (2016b). 
147  European Commission (2014c). 
Policy Department A: Economic and Scientific Policy 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 80 PE 614.181 
6.5.2  UK collaborating with Euratom on specific areas as Third Country 
According to Article 101 of the Euratom Treaty148, ‘The Community may, within the limits of 
its powers and jurisdiction, enter into obligations by concluding agreements or contracts 
with a third State, an international organisation or a national of a third State’.  
By acquiring the status of Third Country, the UK might join countries such as China and 
Russia, with which Euratom has established a ‘structured dialogue to identify a common set 
of research topics of mutual interest in which cooperation can take place on a shared-cost 
basis’. 
6.5.3  UK collaborating with Euratom on specific areas through an association 
agreement 
According to Article 206 of the Euratom Treaty, ‘The Community may conclude with one or 
more States or international organisations agreements establishing an association involving 
reciprocal rights and obligations, common action and special procedures’. 
This article does not imply the possibility of an associated membership to Euratom. It only 
implies the possibility of establishing association agreements to cooperate on specific 
activities with Euratom. 
As Johnston (2017) outlines, most commonly such agreements involve Chapter 1 research 
programmes. Such collaborations are not the same as membership or associate 
membership and do not usually include in their scope activities under other chapters such 
as safety (Chapter 3), supplies (Chapter 6) and safeguards (Chapter 7).149 
The typical example of a country linked to Euratom with an association agreement is 
Switzerland. The country participates with in several Euratom-focused research 
programmes under the Horizon 2020 programme. However, these kinds of cooperative 
arrangements do not represent a full-fledged associate membership in Euratom. 
6.6  The EU position 
With the ‘Position paper on nuclear materials and safeguard equipment (Euratom)’150 
published on July 13, 2017, the European Commission outlined the EU position on the issue 
– focusing on four points: 
6.6.1  Safeguards obligations 
On the date of the withdrawal, the UK will have to ensure that all nuclear materials present 
on UK territory will be handled in accordance with applicable international treaties and 
conventions on nuclear safety, safeguards, non-proliferation and physical protection of 
nuclear materials. The UK will have to have in place safeguards agreements with the IAEA, 
and will have to operate a domestic nuclear safeguards system. 
6.6.2  Equipment used to provide safeguards 
On the date of the withdrawal, the (Euratom) Community should transfer ownership to the 
UK of equipment and other property related to the provision of safeguards located on UK 
                                           
148  Consolidated version of the Treaty establishing the European Atomic Energy Community (2010/C 84/01). 
149  Johnston (2017). 
150  European Commission (2017l). 
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territory. The UK should reimburse the Community for this transfer, on the basis of the 
value assigned to this property in the consolidated accounts of the Union.  
6.6.3  Special fissile material 
On the date of the withdrawal, the Community should be able to require that special fissile 
material present on UK territory, and the right of use of which is with an EU27 Member 
State or with persons or undertakings established in the EU27, be deposited with the 
Euratom Supply Agency or in other stores which are or can be supervised by the 
Commission.  
Likewise, on the date of the withdrawal, the Community should transfer to the UK any 
special fissile material present on EU27 territory, and the right of use of which is with a 
natural or legal person established in the UK. 
6.6.4  Spent fuel and radioactive waste 
Spent fuel and radioactive waste generated in the UK, and present on EU27 territory on the 
date of withdrawal, should remain the responsibility of the UK. 
6.7  The UK position 
With the ‘Position paper on nuclear materials and safeguards issues’151 published on July 
13, 2017, the UK Government outlined its position on the issue – focusing on five points. 
6.7.1  Safeguards arrangements 
The UK commits to take responsibility for meeting safeguards obligations, as agreed with 
the IAEA. 
6.7.2  Safeguards equipment 
The UK commits to ensure that all necessary safeguards equipment is in place to comply 
with its IAEA obligations. It remains open on the possibility of taking ownership of existing 
Euratom-owned equipment, if rooted in a common understanding of fair value and 
liabilities. 
6.7.3  Special fissile material 
According to the UK Government, ownership of special fissile material that is currently with 
the Euratom Community and which is present on UK territory on the date of withdrawal 
should transfer to the persons or undertakings with the right of use, whether these are 
established in the UK, EU or non-EU states. Vice-versa, the ownership of special fissile 
material that is currently with the Community, which is present on Euratom territory on the 
date of withdrawal, and which belongs to a natural or legal person in the UK, should be 
transferred to the UK. 
                                           
151  UK Government (2017c). 
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6.7.4  Existing contracts for the supply of nuclear material 
According to the UK Government, contracts for the supply of nuclear material between 
operators in the UK and Euratom, which have been approved by the Euratom Supply 
Agency and EC, should remain valid and not require any further approvals. 
6.7.5  Spent fuel and radioactive waste 
According to the UK Government, it should be ensured that spent fuel and radioactive 
waste remain the responsibility of the state in which it was generated. This should apply to 
spent fuel and radioactive waste generated in both the UK and Euratom Community. 
6.8  Critical issues and options 
From the two Euratom position papers, it clearly emerges that the EU and the UK do have 
similar views on some issues, while they have different views on others. In sum: 
Both the EU and the UK recognise that from the withdrawal date, the UK will have sole 
responsibility for ensuring its compliance with international treaties and conventions. 
Both the EU and the UK recognise the need for setting-out in the Withdrawal Agreement 
clear arrangements on issues like special fissile materials, safeguards equipment and 
radioactive waste. 
On safeguards obligations, the two parties agree that on the date of the withdrawal the UK 
will have to have in place safeguards agreements with the IAEA. 
On safeguards equipment, the two parties seem to agree that the Euratom Community 
should transfer ownership to the UK of equipment and other property related to the 
provision of safeguards located on UK territory. However, the two parties will most likely 
disagree on the value, as the EC assumes the value assigned to this property in the 
consolidated accounts of the Union, while the UK claims the need to negotiate a ‘fair value’. 
This point can thus be expected to be a subject of intense negotiation. 
On the issue of ownership of special fissile material, the two parties seem to be aligned. 
On the issue of spent fuel and radioactive waste, the two parties agree on the principle that 
responsibility should go to the state in which the spent fuel or the radioactive waste was 
generated. However, disagreements could well emerge during the negotiations. This could 
particularly be the case of the UK's Sellafield nuclear reprocessing site, the world’s largest 
civilian stockpile, which stores around 130 tonnes of plutonium, about a fifth of which 
stems from imported nuclear waste.152 Any disagreement on this issue will presumably be 
subject to negotiation. 
Considering the highly technical nature of these issues, there have been calls for the UK to 
remain with Euratom. However, even if Euratom is legally governed by a separate treaty, 
its functioning is based on EU institutions. For this reason, Euratom could not be considered 
separately from the wider Brexit dossier. 
 
                                           
152  Financial Times (2017c). 
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Table 27:  Possibility of UK membership in Euratom and the IAEA under various 
scenarios 
 Euratom-member IAEA 
EU Member State  
(e.g. France) 
Membership possible Membership possible 
EEA  
(e.g. Norway) 
Membership possible Membership possible 
Energy Community  
(e.g. Ukraine) 
Association membership possible Membership possible 
Bilateral Treaty 
(e.g. Switzerland) 
Association membership possible Membership possible 
WTO  
(e.g. Morocco) 
Association membership possible Membership possible 
Source: Bruegel. 
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CHAPTER 7  IMPACT ON ENERGY MARKETS FOR UK AND 
EU COMPANIES 
KEY FINDINGS 
• Many European companies are active on the UK gas and electricity markets and hold 
significant market shares. They would be subject to regulatory risks in a post-Brexit 
environment if the UK is no longer bound by EU rules. 
• The UK has traditionally been a leader in market liberalisation and its gas trading hub 
remains one of the largest and most important in Europe, only overtaken by the Dutch 
Title Transfer Facility (TTF). Unless this approach is reversed by protectionist policies, 
we believe the UK gas trading NBP can retain its status. However, Continental trading 
hubs could gain market shares because of the uniform regulatory environment, 
safeguarded by the EU combined with no currency risks.  
• London as a venue for arbitration cases will most likely not be affected. This is a 
consequence of the New York Convention on the recognition and enforcement of 
foreign arbitral awards. For place-of-jurisdiction clauses, EU27 companies might decide 
to abandon London in favour of Continental competitors. Enforceability currently 
enshrined in the Brussels Convention will no longer be automatic, but it is not under 
threat. However, burdensome recognition procedures could increase the costs of 
enforcement of UK court rulings. 
 
The subsequent chapter focuses on the impact of Brexit on the EU and UK energy markets 
and companies. Firstly, we assess the risk for European companies that are active in the UK 
energy market and evaluate what is at stake for them. Secondly, we analyse which 
consequences for energy markets could arise if UK is no longer bound to EU financial 
regulations. Thirdly, we identify the impact on the European energy trading hubs and 
finally, we address the future of the UK as legal venue for arbitration and contracts. 
7.1  Member State electricity and gas companies in the UK market 
European energy markets are typically characterised by a strong dominance of national 
energy utilities; the presence of foreign companies is limited. The UK energy market is an 
exception as companies from the Continent are very active on the UK electricity and gas 
market, both in the retail and wholesale sectors. 
In case the UK would leave the EU without any agreement ruling the future relations, the 
UK would no longer be bound by EU rules, thus imposing a regulatory risk on Continental 
European energy companies doing business in the UK. Thus, the level of activity of EU27 
energy companies in the UK market is highly relevant in the upcoming Brexit negotiations. 
7.1.1  EU electricity and gas companies and the UK energy market 
In contrast to most European energy markets, the British Energy market is highly 
penetrated by non-UK companies. Table 28 gives an overview of the market shares of EU27 
energy companies in the UK market. As shown, Continental European energy companies 
are very active on the UK market both in electricity and gas, in wholesale as well as retail. 
EU27 companies hold market shares of 50 percent in the electricity retail market and 56 
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percent in the electricity wholesale market. The gas and electricity networks (transmission 
and distribution) are mainly not owned by EU27 companies.153 
 
Table 28:  EU 27 electricity and gas companies active in the UK market 
MARKET SEGMENT ELECTRICITY GAS 
Wholesale Market 
(market shares in 
brackets, 2016) 
EDF (24 percent), RWE (16 
percent), Uniper (6 percent), 
ScottishPower* (4 percent) 
No data  
Retail Market 
(market shares in 
brackets, Q1 2017) 
EDF (12 percent), E.ON (14 
percent), RWE npower (9 
percent), ScottishPower* (11 
percent) 
EDF (8 percent), E.ON (10 
percent), RWE npower (8 
percent), ScottishPower* (9 
percent) 
Transmission 
Networks No activity No activity 
Distribution 
Networks No activity No activity 
Source: Bruegel based on Ofgem (n.d.) and Le Fevre (2015). 
Note: *Scottish Power is part of Iberdrola; market shares are calculated based on the number of meter points. 
7.1.2  State aid after Brexit 
Competition policy is crucial in oligopolistic and strategic sectors such as energy. Currently, 
UK must comply to EU state aid rules which limit measures of states to distort competition 
in the EU market. Competition issues (namely antitrust, cartels, mergers, and state aid) 
involving parties of multiple Member States are ultimately settled at the European Court of 
Justice. After the UK withdrawal, the competitive environment in UK might be shaped by 
possible arrangements between UK and EU and by English competition law.  
Without being in the European Union and bound to EU legislation, the UK would have 
extended (even discriminating) possibilities to enact regulation that impacts the 
competitive structure and the revenues of the energy sector.154,155 
• Retail market: For instance, the energy retail price freeze discussed during the 2017 
general election campaign156 would not face effective opposition from European 
institutions. Such a freeze would impact the revenues of energy retail companies. 
• Wholesale market: The UK could also have more flexibility to incentivise 
investments in new generation facilities. The ‘Contract for Difference’ remuneration 
                                           
153  Several networks in the UK are owned by foreign investors. For example, the electricity networks in London 
and other parts of England are owned by Cheung Kong Group and NationalGrid (whose major shareholders are 
investment funds) plans to sell its gas distribution business to another group of Asian investors. 
154  For a more general discussion see Petropoulos (2016) and Craig (2016). 
155  It is estimated that ‘re-regulation’ will cost energy suppliers operating in the UK £2.6 billion. The cost for EU 
companies operating in the UK would be almost £1.3 billion. (Mammadov, 2017) 
156  Telegraph (2017). 
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scheme for the Hinkley Point C nuclear plant had to be designed in such a way as to 
comply with EU state aid rules.157 Follow-up projects could receive more direct state 
support, thus creating artificial competition and thereby reduce the revenues of 
existing plants of which many are owned by companies from the EU27.  
Post-Brexit, the UK would not be bound to EU state aid rules (unless for instance the UK 
joins the EEA), and UK courts will presumably interpret British rules on state aid. Hence, EU 
companies would have to challenge aid given by the UK government to UK competitors in a 
UK court. The same presumably holds for merger decisions. Anecdotal158 and empirical159 
evidence suggests some (strategic) ‘home bias’ of competition authorities. Hence, after 
Brexit, EU companies might need some safeguards against an uneven playing field. 
Even without an explicit EU27-UK treaty defining future state aid rules, the UK would 
remain bound by WTO rules.160 Yet, the EU state aid rules exhibit a wider scope than WTO 
subsidy rules and are applied differently. In contrast to the EU state aid framework, the 
WTO framework works in an ex-post manner. The Dispute Settlement Body of the WTO can 
declare certain subsidies to be unlawful under WTO agreements. By contrast, state aid 
measures in the European Union must be notified and approved beforehand by the 
European Commission.161 
In addition, the UK will remain a signatory of the Energy Charter – an investment 
protection treaty. This treaty has in the past been used to shield foreign investors against 
detrimental policy change. But again, the limited number of past cases and the ex post 
nature of related settlements do not establish legal certainty equivalent to the current 
institutional system. 
7.2  Future of the UK as a place of energy trading hub 
The UK has historically been one of the major global energy trading points. According to 
Public Eye (2017) about a quarter of global oil trading is conducted in London. Besides oil 
and coal trading, the UK hosts one of the most liquid gas and electricity markets in the EU.  
The UK thereby not only offers physical trading, but the most liquid market of energy-
derivatives trading in the EU as well as clearing services. The London based 
InterContinental Exchange (ICE) is one of the leading global energy exchanges and a main 
trading place for European energy futures.162 Consequently, essential reference prices such 
as ‘Brent oil’ and ‘NBP gas’ are determined in the UK.163 With the UK potentially dropping 
out of EU financial market regulations, the conditions under which the UK might still be able 
to maintain its leading role in energy trading will depend on the Brexit negotiations and on 
                                           
157  For more information see European Commission (2014d) and UK (2014). 
158  For example, when Germany granted an exemption for the E.ON-Ruhrgas merger in 2002, or when Spain 
blocked E.ON from buying Endesa in July 2006. 
159  For example, Schinkel et al. (2010) find that the chance of success for appeal against competition decisions of 
the European Commission is significantly higher in cases with non-European companies than it is in purely 
European cases. 
160  Nctm (2016). Note however that while the UK is a WTO member, many post-Brexit aspects of the UK’s WTO 
arrangements are not yet clear. 
161  Oxera (2016). 
162  The ICE Holding is based in London, but main subsidiaries are US-based. ICE Futures Europe and ICE Clear 
Europe, Ltd. Are based in the United Kingdom, while the European Climate Exchange Limited is based in 
Dublin. Job announcements suggest that the Dublin office is growing. 
163  Platts (n.d.). 
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the willingness of the UK to implement EU-compatible regulations. For energy trading there 
are at least four most relevant regulations: 
MiFID II (Regulation (EU) No 2014/65/EU) will enter into force from January 2018 thus 
before the expected date of the UK’s exit. In conjunction with EMIR and MIFIR, MIFID II 
implies that for specific transactions traders need to comply with detailed rules on position 
limits, capital requirements, market surveillance, and so on.  
Commodities and energy trading firms will be impacted by MiFID II if their trading volume 
exceeds the thresholds, qualifying for an exemption for example, as provided by MIFID II. 
If the UK will not join the EEA (or alternatively that a specific EU-UK regime cannot be 
negotiated), companies that only have a UK regulated entity will not be able to offer their 
services throughout the EU, as they will lose the MiFID II passport. However, the EU has 
introduced a specific regime for non-EU investment firms which provide cross-border 
services to clients in the EU. Obviously, companies could also decide to open a new 
company branch in the EU27 and thus be regulated under MiFID II.164 In case the UK 
decides to transpose MiFID II into UK law, the EU could recognise UK laws as ‘equivalent’ 
which would extend the scope of MiFID II to UK.165 As the MiFID equivalence regime has 
not been used up to now, the outcome is highly unclear and a possible transition deal is 
crucial.166 
REMIT (Regulation (EU) No 1227/2011/EU) is the Regulation on Wholesale Energy Market 
Integrity and Transparency and has the objective to identify and prevent the use of insider 
information and other forms of market abuse. Monitoring under this EU regulation is 
undertaken by the Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators (ACER) together with 
national regulatory authority. In practise, any contract related to the supply of gas and 
power in the EU must be reported to ACER. Anyone entering into any transaction on EU 
wholesale energy markets in wholesale energy products, whether EU or non-EU domiciled, 
is bound by this regulation. After the UK’s withdrawal, any power or gas delivered by a UK-
based supplier will no longer be in the EU and reporting to ACER will not be needed. This is 
already the case for transactions at Swiss delivery points which are not reported to ACER. 
Broadly speaking, two main parties will likely be affected: 
• Market Participants: Any (legal) person including transmission system operators that 
enters into transactions, including the placing of orders to trade, in one or more 
wholesale energy markets;  
• Organised Market Places (OMPs): ACER has published a list of OMPs which includes 
energy exchanges and other trading venues as defined under the Markets in 
Financial Instruments and Regulation (MiFIR).  
We can expect that the UK government will preserve essential parts of REMIT, as UK has 
been one of the first countries to implement REMIT and is currently strengthening its 
framework.167 A British version of REMIT is also expected to be introduced within the ‘Great 
Repeal Bill’ which will transpose existing EU laws into British laws. Of course, after Brexit 
the UK is free to change these formerly EU based laws and can create its own legal 
framework. 
                                           
164  Maycock (2016). 
165  Bean, Croxon, & Stone (2016). 
166  Stafford (2017). 
167  Galbraith, Davies, & Wright (2016) 
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After a complete dropout of the UK out of the EU (without agreement), UK-based market 
participants will still be bound to REMIT when operating in the EU. Even if UK would comply 
with REMIT, it would be regarded as a third country and carve-out rules would not be 
applicable any more. This means that electricity and gas trading settled in the UK would be 
treated as financial instruments implying higher capital requirements and hence a 
disincentive to trade in UK-settled production. In addition, data exchange between UK and 
EU will not be possible after Brexit unless EU and UK decide on a new regime of data 
exchange.168 However, the UK government could decide to lower administrative burden for 
solely UK-based market participants compared to the current regime creating a less 
regulated competitive environment.169 
EMIR (Regulation (EU) No 648/2012) was designed to regulate the trade of over-the-
counter derivative transactions. Although EMIR is based on EU legislation, it is expected 
that the UK government will adopt a legislation like EMIR into British law.170 The question is 
however how the guidance of ESMA on the application of EMIR be respected by the UK. 
CRR/CRD IV (Regulation (EU) No 575/2013) defines minimal standards for capital 
requirements as well as minimum regulatory capital. It is expected that CRR will be 
preserved even in a post-Brexit environment since its source is the Basel 3 Accord. 
Regarding CRD IV, future UK legislation might depart from certain regulations that stem 
from EU policies (and not from Basel 3).171 
In any case, given the uncertainties around the future of cross-border regulatory issues, it 
can be assumed that the UK withdrawal will accelerate the rise of Continental trading 
places as we have experienced for gas with the rise of Title Transfer Facility (TTF). 
For the EU it is important to make sure that after Brexit UK energy trading is subject to 
rigorous financial market and transparency rules to preclude any loopholes that could 
enable market manipulation and tax evasion. 
7.3  Energy trading hubs and the role of the UK in the European gas market 
For the European gas market, trading hubs constitute places where demand and supply are 
balanced, and where regular trades are processed. Liberalised markets and predictable 
rules are required for trading hubs so that wholesale traders and energy suppliers join the 
trading at the hub for portfolio and risk management.172 
Trading hubs are associated with certain market areas. In the UK, the energy trading hub 
for gas is the NBP (National Balancing Point) which was created in 1996, one year after the 
liberalisation of the British gas sector.173 The NBP quickly became the largest trading point 
and was used by traders from all over Europe to balance their systems on a daily basis. 
Other trading points, such as the Italian PSV, the German Gaspool and NCG, and the 
biggest hub TTF, were modelled after the NBP.174 The largest gas hubs in the EU, TTF and 
NBP, are virtual trading hubs and the prices of contracts traded at NBP and TTF are mainly 
                                           
 
168  Willis (2017). 
169  Galbraith, Davies, & Wright (2016). 
170  Stretch, Bielkowicz, & Parker (2016). 
171  Gray (2016). 
172  Heather (2015). 
173  Avis (2016). 
174  Heather (2015). 
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determined in over-the-counter transactions.175 Some trading volume occurs at the 
InterContinental Exchange (ICE).176  
For most of the time in the last 20 years, NBP has been the largest and most liquid trading 
hub in Europe. Yet, TTF has recently accomplished to overtake NBP in terms of volume 
traded (Figure 11).  
 
Figure 11:  Traded volumes at the TTF and NBP 
   
Source: Bruegel based on Heather & Petrovich (2017). 
 
As long as the UK keeps a liberalised and open market (which guarantees liquidity), NBP 
will most probably remain one of the major energy trading hubs in Europe. However, the 
exit of the UK could further strengthen the importance of TTF and other Continental trading 
hubs at the expense of NBP. This is underpinned by an exchange rate risk and a reduced 
liquidity at the NBP which could lead to higher volatility compared to the TTF reducing the 
overall attractiveness of NBP.177 
                                           
175  ACER (2015). 
176  Avis (2016). 
177  Bros (2017b). 
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7.4  Future of the UK as a legal venue for the EU 
7.4.1  Arbitration 
London is chosen in many energy contracts as the seat of arbitration, which is particularly 
true for contracts concluded between parties from weak legal systems. The UK withdrawal 
is unlikely to affect the good reputation of English courts and law. The UK Arbitration Act of 
1996 will continue to be regarded as accessible, user-friendly and modern as before, and 
the immense body of English law especially in the commercial field will ensure 
predictability.178 
As the UK and all EU Member States are parties to the Convention on the Recognition and 
Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (also known as the New York Convention) of 
1958179, arbitration awards issued by tribunals are enforceable in any of the 158 states that 
are party to the New York Convention and awards issued by an arbitration tribunal seated 
in any of the other EU Member States will still be enforceable in the UK. Thus, the 
withdrawal of the UK from the EU is unlikely to affect London’s position as seat of 
arbitration. 
7.4.2  Place of Jurisdiction 
Beyond arbitration, English courts are often chosen as place of jurisdiction (combined with 
a choice of English law) in commercial contracts.180 The Brussels Regime181 generally allows 
jurisdiction clauses in contracts, which preserves the right of parties to reach agreement at 
the time of contracting as to which court should be (exclusively) competent to decide 
should govern any dispute. It also ensures the automatic recognition and easy 
enforceability of UK court rulings in all EU Member States. Regarding judgments by courts 
from third countries (such as the UK after Brexit), the national law of each member state 
will govern the recognition and enforceability of English judgments which will, in principle, 
lead to somewhat more procedures and a more restricted enforceability depending on the 
relevant state law in which enforcement is sought.182 
In case the UK decides to join EFTA, it would gain the possibility to accede the Lugano 
Convention183 of 2007 which governs issues of jurisdiction and enforcement of judgments 
between the EU Member States and the EFTA members.  
The UK may also decide to join the Hague Convention184 on (exclusive) Choice-of-Court 
Agreements of 2005 to which the EU, but not the Member States, is a party. This would 
lead to a far-reaching (but nor automatic) recognition of judgments of English courts, 
based on an exclusive choice-of-court agreement, in the Member States of the EU. These 
judgments would also be enforceable. However, national (perhaps burdensome) procedures 
on the recognition of judgments would still be applicable. To this extent, London may 
somewhat suffer as a place of jurisdiction at the expense of other EU jurisdictions. 
                                           
178  Ambrose & Naish (2016). 
179  New York Convention (n.d.). 
180  Batsaikhan & Schoenmaker (2017). 
181  Regulation (EU) No 1215/2012. 
182  The applicability of the Brussels Convention of 1968 to guarantee enforceability is disputed. 
183  Official Journal of the European Union, L 339, 21 December 2007 
184  Hague Conference on Private International Law (2005) 
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7.4.3  Applicable Law 
The so-called Rome I Regulation185, deals with the applicable law concerning international 
contracts. Under Rome I the contracting parties have the freedom to decide the law under 
which contracts are governed. All courts in the EU apply Rome I, and, therefore, respect a 
choice-of-law clause by the parties.  
After Brexit, EU Member State courts will continue to respect choice-of-law clauses in 
contracts to which UK companies and persons are partners. English law may be chosen, 
and, if chosen, courts of the Member States will apply English law in the same manner as 
they do at present. In contrast, UK courts will no longer be able to apply the Rome I 
Regulation where the choice-of-law is to an EU Member State. However, although the Rome 
I Regulation is exclusive to EU Member States, the Parliament of England may ‘incorporate’ 
Rome I as English law (on a 1:1 basis), thereby acknowledging the freedom of the parties 
to choose the applicable law. If this does not happen (in the foreseeable future), it can be 
expected with near certainty that English courts will turn back to traditional rules of English 
private international law, thereby accepting choice-of-law clauses just in the same way as 
under Rome I. 
In the end, parties will be able to choose English law for their contracts, and this choice will 
be respected by courts in England and in the Member States of the EU. 
7.4.4  Conclusion 
The UK could decide to join the Hague Convention to achieve mutual recognition of court 
decisions. Yet, it is argued that joining this agreement might not be sufficient to calm 
businesses' concerns, as timing as well as details are uncertain. However, the same 
problems would arise in case the UK decides to negotiate a bilateral treaty with the EU to 
clarify mutual recognition of court decisions. In consequence, the UK (and hence London) 
could suffer as place of jurisdiction in expense of other European countries as enforceability 
of UK court rulings will to some extent more burdensome after the UK has left the EU. 
Several Continental EU countries (and cities) have already started to build up legal 
capacities and adopted English speaking procedures to increase their chance to be chosen 
as a place of jurisdiction. However, the UK withdrawal could also lead to an increased use 
of arbitration clauses in private contracts strengthening London as legal venue in the end. 
7.5  Critical issues and options 
Several European energy companies are severely exposed to regulatory changes in the UK 
energy market. As future UK legislation is not bound to EU state aid regulations (and WTO 
rules are less strict), future revenues could be impacted by special UK state aid rules. 
Potential home bias of UK regulatory decisions and competition policy could pose another 
threat to EU companies. They should also consider that enforcement of prospective UK 
court rulings might be more burdensome. 
Regarding energy trading, we expect that Continental trading hubs might gain an 
advantage from Brexit as liquidity might shift. Even if UK decides to retain the status quo, 
(short-term) legal uncertainty could increase trading business on the Continent.  
The same holds true for UK as a legal venue. Continental venues could benefit when 
companies decide to move place of jurisdiction to Continental sites. 
                                           
185  Regulation (EC) No 593/2008. 
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Table 29:  Rules applicable to energy companies in countries under different 
arrangements 
 Market rules Financial regulation of energy trading 
Legal jurisdiction 
and enforceability 
EU Member State  
(e.g. France) 
EU IEM legislation  
+ EU state aid rules EU legislation 
Full enforceability  
(Brussels Regime) 
Full choice of law 
(Rome I) 
EEA 
(e.g. Norway) 
EU IEM legislation  
+ EU equivalent state 
aid/competition rules 
‘Passport’ clauses for 
certain regulations 
‘Equivalence’ clauses for 
certain regulations 
(+ International rules) 
Enforceability 
possible 
(Lugano Convention) 
Energy 
Community 
(e.g. Ukraine) 
EU IEM legislation  
+ UK state aid rules 
+ WTO subsidy rules 
‘Equivalence’ clauses for 
certain regulations 
(+ International rules) 
Bilateral and 
international treaties 
(The Hague 
Convention possible) 
Bilateral Treaty 
(e.g. Switzerland) 
national state aid rules  
+ WTO subsidy rules 
‘Equivalence’ clauses for 
certain regulations 
(+ international rules) 
Enforceability 
possible* 
(Lugano Convention) 
WTO 
(e.g. Morocco) 
national state aid rules 
+ WTO subsidy rules 
‘Equivalence’ clauses for 
certain regulations 
(+international rules) 
Bilateral and 
international treaties 
(The Hague 
Convention possible) 
Source: Bruegel. 
Note: * If the UK joins the EFTA and chooses to join the Lugano Convention. 
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CHAPTER 8.  IMPACT OF THE UK WITHDRAWAL FOR 
IRELAND 
KEY FINDINGS 
• The energy system of the Republic of Ireland (ROI) could be significantly affected by 
Brexit because the ROI operates a joint electricity market with Northern Ireland (NI), 
trades electricity with Great Britain (GB) and buys a significant amount of gas from GB.  
• For the ROI, the first best solution is if the UK remains inside the internal energy 
market; the second-best option is if NI remains inside the internal energy market; and 
the worst option is if only the ROI remains inside the internal energy market.  
• Ensuring that the SEM continues to function efficiently and that a level playing field is 
maintained in the SEM will be important following Brexit.  
• It is uncertain whether the ROI may be exempted from certain provisions of EU energy 
regulation. It seems questionable though that the ROI would qualify as an ‘energy 
island’. 
• The case of the ROI may offer both the EU27 and the UK an opportunity to advocate 
increased energy market integration after Brexit. The EU may argue that accepting full 
internal market membership of the UK is the price to pay for allowing the ROI to fully 
benefit from the EU internal energy market. The UK, on the other hand, may argue 
that accepting a certain loss of sovereignty from participating in the EU energy market 
framework is the price to pay for Northern Ireland.  
The following chapter evaluates the potential impact of Brexit on the energy system of the 
Republic of Ireland (ROI). The first part focusses on the electricity sector of the ROI. In 
particular, the impact of Brexit on the island of Ireland’s joint electricity market and future 
integration with the rest of Europe is discussed. The second part deals with possible 
efficiency and security of supply issues in the gas sector of the ROI. A discussion on 
whether the ROI may become exempted from certain provisions of EU energy law is 
furthermore included. 
8.1  Electricity market 
8.1.1  Current situation 
The Single Electricity Market (SEM), founded on 1 November 2007, comprises the 
wholesale electricity markets of the ROI and Northern Ireland (NI). The SEM is a gross 
mandatory pool market into which all electricity produced on and imported to the island of 
Ireland must be sold, and from which all wholesale electricity for consumption on or export 
from the island must be purchased.186 The SEM is underpinned by national legislation in 
ROI and NI and a legally non-binding Memorandum of Understanding between the UK and 
the ROI. The rules governing the SEM can therefore remain after Brexit. Based on 
legislation in NI and the ROI, the Single Electricity Market Committee has been established 
                                           
186  SEM Committee (n.d.). 
Policy Department A: Economic and Scientific Policy 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 94 PE 614.181 
as the decision-making authority, and comprises members from the Commission for 
Regulation of Utilities (CUR) (formerly the Commission for Energy Regulation), Utility 
Regulator of Northern Ireland (UR), an independent member, and a deputy independent 
member. The decisions of the committee are binding for the regulatory authorities in NI 
and the ROI. 
The SEM is currently being redesigned to comply with the EU’s vision of the EU Target 
Model.187 The new wholesale market, called the Integrated Single Electricity Market (I-
SEM), will replace the SEM by May 2018.188 The I-SEM is considered a key step to further 
integrate the electricity market of the ROI and NI, improve its efficiency and make it 
compatible with the other EU electricity markets in order to complete the internal energy 
market. It will, inter alia, entail the creation of cross-zonal day-ahead and intraday 
markets. This may imply that an increase in intermittent wind generation on the island of 
Ireland might be used to reduce fossil generation in Germany – if sufficient transmission 
capacity is available. With a ‘hard’ Brexit, the EU’s vision of a deeply integrated internal 
energy market will still be feasible on the Continent, but more difficult to achieve for the 
ROI (see Chapter 1). 
The level of interconnectivity of the SEM (and ultimately also of the I-SEM) with the rest of 
Europe is limited. Two interconnectors to GB exist: (1) the 500 MW Moyle Interconnector 
between Scotland and NI, and (2) the 500 MW East–West Interconnector between the ROI 
and North Wales. In case of a separation of the SEM, the ROI would still have the East-
West Interconnector to Wales and three interconnectors189 between the ROI and NI 
(although only one of these three allows for mass flow of electricity).190  
Several Projects of Common Interest (PCIs),191 intended to increase the transmission 
capacity with other European electricity markets, are ongoing.192 The most important is the 
second North-South interconnector for which planning approval has been achieved in the 
ROI and is awaited in NI. Delivery of this project will remove the current restriction on 
flows across the existing interconnector (limited to 300 MW for system security purposes) 
which amounts to approximately 30 percent of the effective economic flow that would occur 
were this limit not in place.  Another notable PCI is the construction of a 700 MW high-
voltage direct current (HVDC) cable (known as the ‘Celtic Interconnector’) between the SEM 
and France. A preliminary feasibility study was completed in August 2016 and the project is 
now undergoing a two-year design phase. An additional PCI seeks to add a 500-700 MW 
interconnector (known as the Greenwire Interconnector, or ‘Greenlink’) between the SEM 
and Wales.193  
                                           
187  The EU Target Model was introduced in the 2009 Third Energy Package and essentially promotes an integrated 
energy market in the EU. 
188  SEM Committee (2016). 
189  There are three electricity interconnectors between the ROI and NI: (1) Tandragee-Louth, (2) Strabane/Tyrone 
– Letterkenny/Donegal, and (3) Enniskillen/Fermanagh-Corraclassy/Cavan. Only (1) is used for electricity 
trading while (2) and (3) are standby interconnectors used for technical assistance and facilitating local 
networks stability. 
190  Department for the Economy (n.d.). 
191  See Chapter two for more on PCIs. 
192  The full list of PCIs relating to the ROI and NI can be found here: https://ec.europa.eu/inea/en/connecting-
europe-facility/cef-energy/projects-by-country/ (European Commission, 2017k). 
193  Two studies have also been completed on the ‘ISLES’ interconnection between the SEM and Scotland. The 
project is currently under consideration. (European Commission, 2016f) 
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Most electricity on the island of Ireland is produced domestically. More recently, the SEM 
area has become a net exporter of electricity to GB (see  Figure 12). The net export trend 
has continued in 2017. 
 
 Figure 12:  Electricity imports to and exports from the Republic of 
Ireland 2012 – 2016 
 
 Source: Bruegel based on UK Government (2017d). 
 
Electricity trading between the SEM and GB (the only market to which the SEM is 
connected) is important for the SEM to balance its system more efficiently and 
economically. In windy hours the island of Ireland can produce up to 4,000 MWh of 
electricity from wind, while in windless hours this drops to virtually zero. The 1,000 MW of 
electricity interconnectors to GB serve as a crucial buffer for wind production and demand 
fluctuations that will become more important as the share of wind power increases in the 
Irish fuel mix. 
Electricity flows between the Continent and the ROI via GB. The flows are largely 
determined by the price differentials between the Continent and GB as well as between the 
SEM and GB. In the first half of 2017, in 37.3 percent of the hours, GB imported electricity 
from the Continent and at the same time exported to the island of Ireland (Table 30). In 
7.5 percent of the hours, GB served as a transit country in the other direction. 
 
Table 30:  Electricity transit through GB - Number of hours  
  (January to June 2017) 
 
IMPORTS FROM 
IRELAND EXPORTS TO IRELAND 
IMPORTS FROM THE 
CONTINENT 2,225 1,622 
EXPORTS TO THE 
CONTINENT 325 172 
Source: Bruegel based on Gridwatch (2017). 
Note: The total number of trading hours in the first half of 2017 were 4344. 
Import 
Export 
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Overall, in the first half of 2017, 160 GWh flowed from the SEM to the Continent and 2,490 
GWh flowed from the Continent to the island of Ireland via GB. The island of Ireland’s 
electricity supply is currently also dependent on natural gas imports from GB (see section 
8.2 for more on the gas sector in the ROI).  
The departure of the UK from the EU might have major implications for the functional 
operability of the SEM. In addition, it might become more advantageous for the ROI to 
establish interconnectivity with other electricity markets. The following will discuss these 
issues further. 
8.1.2  Implications for the SEM/I-SEM  
Brexit could, at least in theory, constrain the development of the I-SEM. When the UK 
leaves the EU, it will no longer be obliged to comply with the EU Target Model.194 If the UK 
decides not to comply, agreeing on a common set of rules underpinning the I-SEM may 
become more difficult. Alternative market arrangements, such as integrating NI with the 
electricity market of GB, may then be necessary.195 Although this scenario is theoretically 
possible, the withdrawal of NI from the SEM (and in the future, the I-SEM) would be 
irrational. Both NI and the ROI derive great benefits from the market integration, and both 
sides remain committed to maintaining the integrated market structure. As significant 
volumes of electricity also flow between (mainly from) the ROI and (to) NI, NI may be 
negatively affected by a less integrated market.196 
The efficiency of the SEM may worsen due to Brexit. The impact will likely be limited if the 
current regulatory environment is preserved. If, however, changes occur, the costs for 
market operators and regulatory authorities may increase. Whether the legal framework is 
disrupted may depend on NI and GB remaining in the EU internal energy market (IEM). The 
three key scenarios, from the most to the least desirable from an ROI perspective, which 
might unfold following Brexit are:  
1. The UK remaining in the IEM.  
2. NI remaining in and GB leaving the IEM.  
3. Both GB and NI leaving the IEM.  
In the first scenario, in which both GB and NI remain in the IEM, the impact of Brexit might 
be limited. The EU network codes and guidelines would likely continue to apply, implying 
that the efficiency of the SEM may be largely unaffected.  
In the second scenario, there would be more uncertainty about the extent to which the 
efficiency of the SEM may be impacted. In particular, it is unclear whether the existing 
network codes and guidelines would continue to apply to the cross-border trade between 
the island of Ireland and GB. Whether NI can remain in the IEM without GB may depend on 
both the participation requirements in the IEM set by the EU and on the willingness of GB 
to devolve some authority to NI.  
The third scenario would be the worst outcome for the ROI, especially if it leads to a 
change to or termination of the SEM arrangement. A withdrawal of the UK from the EU and 
the IEM means NI will no longer be obliged to accept the European Court of Justice (ECJ) as 
a final court of appeal in the event of disputes. Should NI reject the ECJ, there will be a 
                                           
194  Higgins & Costello (2016). 
195  Higgins & Costello (2016). 
196  Higgins & Costello (2016). 
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need for an alternate dispute resolution mechanism.197 If the regulatory structures diverge 
between the NI and ROI jurisdictions, it may furthermore be more difficult to ensure that 
all participants in the SEM are exposed to a common set of rules and a level playing field.  
However, it is uncertain whether the regulation underpinning the SEM would change due to 
Brexit. The development of the I-SEM demonstrates the ROI’s and NI’s efforts to harmonise 
the regulation of the joint market with EU network codes and guidelines. Moreover, as both 
NI and the ROI derive great benefits from the joint market structure, it is in their dual 
interest to ensure that the functional operability of the SEM is not worsened by Brexit.  
8.1.3  Implications for electricity market integration  
Brexit could have significant implications for the integration of the SEM with the broader EU 
electricity market. A higher level of integration would enable the ROI to better manage the 
increasing domestic supply of intermittent power sources (most notably wind). One option 
is to increase the transmission capacity with GB. As discussed in section 8.1.1, several PCIs 
aimed at doing this are ongoing. The progress of these projects may be slowed down, 
however, by Brexit. Specifically, Brexit has resulted in increased market uncertainty and 
investor insecurity, which may deter investment in infrastructure projects in GB.198 It is 
also unclear to what degree the UK will be eligible to access EU funds for cross-border 
energy infrastructure projects (see Chapter 2) after leaving the EU. This may expose future 
interconnection projects between GB and the SEM to financial obstacles.  
Instead of increasing integration with GB, the ROI may seek closer ties with Continental 
Europe. Currently, all of the Irish island’s imported electricity is either directly bought from 
or transited through GB. This renders the island vulnerable to disruptions in the GB system. 
Increased integration with Continental Europe would diversify risk and reduce dependence 
on a third country like the UK. More transmission capacity to the Continent would thus 
enhance security of supply. From an efficiency point of view, however, the picture is less 
clear. It might be costlier to link the SEM to Continental Europe than to GB. Moreover, the 
value of building an interconnection to the Continent would depend on the future level of 
interconnectivity between GB and the Continent.199 Electricity prices in GB remain relatively 
decoupled from Continental prices because of transmission constraints. However, if GB 
adds interconnection capacity with Europe as planned, prices on the GB market would 
increasingly align with those on European markets.200, 201 The value for the ROI of directly 
linking to the EU would thereby diminish.  
In essence, increased integration with the electricity markets of Continental Europe would 
enhance security of supply and might increase the efficiency of the SEM. The outcome of 
the latter would depend on GB’s efforts to integrate its own market with the Continent. 
                                           
197  Higgins & Costello (2016). 
198  The value of all infrastructure contracts in the UK in July 2016 (the first full month following the Brexit 
referendum) and September 2016 were 20 percent and 44.5 percent lower respectively compared to the same 
months in 2015 (Higgins & Costello, 2016). 
199  Barrett et al. (2015). 
200  Barrett et al. (2015). 
201  The UK is currently building an interconnector to Norway, a country which is integrated with the Nordic and 
Baltic countries through the Nord Pool market. 
Policy Department A: Economic and Scientific Policy 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 98 PE 614.181 
8.2  Gas market 
8.2.1  Current situation 
In contrast to the electricity sector, the gas markets of the ROI and NI are separate. Gas 
plays a crucial role in the energy sector in the ROI. More than 46 percent of the electricity 
was generated from natural gas in the ROI in 2014. All of the imported gas is either 
supplied from or transited through the UK. The ROI is heavily reliant on these imports, as 
illustrated in Figure 13. Until 2015, almost the entire gas supply consisted of imports. At 
the end of 2015, however, a domestic gas field (the Corrib Gas Field) became operational. 
This led to a large increase in domestic production and a decrease in imports. The ROI 
currently imports around 40 percent of its gas from the UK. However, the supply of 
domestic gas is only expected to last for at most twenty more years, after which the ROI 
may become increasingly dependent on UK imports again.202 
 
Figure 13:   The ROI’s gas production and imports 
 
Source: Bruegel based on Irish Central Statistics Office and BP Statistical Review 2017. 
 
The ROI currently does not possess a liquefied natural gas (LNG) terminal. However, the 
ROI’s 2016 imports of two bcm through the Moffat Interconnector could be replaced by 
currently-discussed LNG projects (i.e. the Shannon and Cork LNG projects would exceed 
the ROI’s entire import demand.203 However, it is unclear whether the Shannon project will 
be completed.204  
 
                                           
202  Higgins & Costello (2016). 
203  See Platts (2017) and Business Irish (2017) for more on these projects. 
204  The Shannon project has been designated PCI status and could therefore be eligible for funding from the 
Connecting Europe Facility, but it is unclear if the project is commercially viable, as it may require a premium 
above the price of natural gas imported from the UK in order to be profitable. 
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Figure 14:  The ROI’s gas imports from the UK and UK imports from the EU27 
(June 2016 - June 2017) 
 
 Source: Bruegel based on IEA (2017). 
 
Brexit can be expected to raise two primary concerns for the gas sector of the ROI. Firstly, 
the departure of the UK might, in theory, increase the price of the gas traded on the UK’s 
gas exchange. Thus, it is possible that imports from the UK become costlier in the future. 
Secondly, the ROI will be dependent on a third country (the UK) for its gas imports after 
Brexit which may raise security of supply concerns. Both the possible efficiency and 
security of supply issues are evaluated in the following sections. 
8.2.2  Implications for future gas exchange 
A report by the Oxford Institute for Energy Studies205 suggests that the spread between the 
NBP and TTF may rise after the UK’s departure from the EU. This could happen if the NBP 
becomes a smaller hub, with a lower volume of trades, because of financial services moving 
away from the UK. Moreover, the price of UK gas might also increase if European countries 
impose stricter regulations on pipelines to the UK, in order to make the EU more 
competitive. This would increase the cost of importing gas for the UK, which in turn could 
spill-over to the ROI’s gas market. The base case, however, is that the NBP-TTF spread 
might not significantly increase because the UK market remains well connected to Norway 
and the Continent.  
The efficiency of importing gas from the UK could, in theory, also be affected by changes in 
the regulation of gas pipelines between the UK and the ROI. Current rules are based on 
bilateral agreements. It is possible that the EU could impose a single legal framework for all 
pipelines206 linked to the UK.207 The single EU-UK framework could replace the current 
bilateral agreement between the ROI and the UK. It is currently unclear whether the rules 
                                           
205  Bros (2017a). 
206  The UK has three international gas pipelines: Moffat with the ROI, Interconnector UK with Belgium and the 
Balgzand Bacton Line with the Netherlands (Bros, 2017). 
207  Bros (2017a). 
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governing these pipelines will change. However, this might be of limited concern, since the 
current bilateral regulations are largely based on EU principles. The legal framework might 
therefore not change much after Brexit.  
8.2.3  Implications for the security of gas supply 
Because the ROI derives a significant share of its gas from the UK, the ROI is vulnerable to 
supply disruptions in the UK market, even if the UK remained in the EU. Moreover, as the 
UK itself is a net importer of gas, the ROI is indirectly exposed to potential gas system 
problems in the countries exporting to the UK.  
The impact of Brexit on the security of supply for the ROI is ambiguous. On the one hand, 
the ROI could no longer rely on the EU’s Solidarity Principle in the event of a major 
domestic gas disruption, since it would lack direct access to EU gas markets.208 Prior to 
Brexit, the UK, as a Member State, would be obliged to help the ROI in the event of a gas 
crisis by providing gas to essential social services and households.209 Brexit would remove 
this EU obligation, which could potentially leave the ROI more vulnerable to energy crises. 
On the other hand, Gas Networks Ireland (GNI)210 noted the following in a statement in 
June 2017: “within the framework of existing intergovernmental agreements in place since 
1993 between Ireland and the UK concerning Ireland’s two gas interconnectors, Gas 
Networks Ireland and National Grid have agreed a voluntary protocol for dealing with gas 
emergencies affecting GB and Ireland. We see no reason for these arrangements to change 
post Brexit.”211  
This suggests that Brexit might ultimately have a limited effect on the issue of security of 
gas supply for the ROI. 
                                           
208  Barrett et al. (2015). 
209  European Commission (2017m). 
210  Gas Networks Ireland (GNI) is the state-owned entity that owns and operates the natural gas network in the 
ROI. 
211  Houses of the Oireachtas (2017). 
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Box 3:  Irish eligibility for derogations from EU energy legislation 
IRISH ELIGIBILITY FOR DEROGATIONS FROM EU ENERGY LEGISLATION  
 
After Brexit, the ROI’s energy market might become more isolated from the rest of the EU. 
The ROI could therefore, in theory, be more likely to qualify for certain derogations from EU 
energy law. It is theoretically possible that the ROI becomes increasingly compared to 
‘energy islands’. These are isolated and/or emergent energy systems that enjoy a 
privileged status in EU legislation.212 They can derogate from the requirements on energy 
market design and on the regulatory framework stipulated in EU energy law.213 A country 
can obtain derogations for either its electricity or gas sector, or both. The ROI will likely not 
qualify as an ‘electricity island’ as it is too large to meet the threshold.214 With respect to 
the ROI’s gas sector, the legal text is somewhat more ambiguous and it is therefore less 
clear whether the ROI could qualify as a ‘gas island’. However, as the ROI’s gas market is 
sufficiently competitive, we deem it unlikely to meet the criteria to become exempted from 
EU gas market rules.215 
A UK departure from the EU may imply that the ROI would, at least temporarily, no longer 
be directly physically connected to the electricity systems of other Member States. It is 
unclear whether this may theoretically exempt the ROI from some EU network codes and 
guidelines. In particular, certain provisions state that they only apply to Member States 
which are connected with other transmission systems. For instance, Article 1(2) of the 
Guideline on Capacity Allocation and Congestion Management (CACM) says:  
“This Regulation shall apply to all transmission systems and interconnections in the Union 
except the transmission systems on islands which are not connected with other 
transmission systems via interconnections.” 216 
 
It is unclear though whether the ROI can obtain derogations from only some of the 
provisions of EU network codes and guidelines. Moreover, there is some ambiguity as to 
whether “connected with other transmission systems” refers to transmission systems of 
other Member States, or also to those outside the EU. Whether the ROI can derogate from 
some provisions of EU energy law without becoming an energy island is furthermore not 
evident. 
Source: Bruegel. 
                                           
212  De Hauteclocque & Ahner (2012). 
213  More specifically, the Third Energy Package allows EU energy islands to be derogated from the common rules 
governing the Member States’ energy systems for electricity and gas contained in Directive 2009/72/EC and 
Directive 2009/73/EC respectively. 
214  Derogations in electricity are possible for ‘small isolated systems’, which are defined as having a consumption 
of less than 3,000 GWh in the reference year 1996, where less than five percent of the annual consumption is 
obtained through interconnections with other systems. The electricity consumption in the ROI in 1996 was 
15,847 GWh (based on Eurostat (2017b)) which is much higher than the consumption threshold. 
215  The ROI can obtain derogations as a so-called ‘isolated gas market’ if its gas system is not connected to the 
system of another Member State and if it has only one main external supplier. A ‘main supplier’ is defined as a 
supplier with a market share of more than 75 percent. (Directive 2009/73/EC) As the market share of the 
largest retail gas supplier in the ROI is only around 50 percent in the first quarter of 2017 (in terms of both 
customer numbers and GWhs supplied), it seems unlikely that the ROI would qualify as a ‘gas island’ (CRU, 
2017). 
216  Commission Regulation (EU) 2015/1222. 
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8.3  Critical issues and options 
Both the EU27 and the UK have an interest in an increasingly integrated energy market. 
But both face matters of principle that make it difficult to agree on this first-best solution. 
The UK seeks to repeal European rules that infringe on its sovereignty. The EU, on the 
other hand, does not want to allow the UK to ‘cherry-pick’ parts of the existing acquis in 
the negotiations. 
The complex case of the Republic of Ireland might offer both sides an opportunity to 
achieve a first-best solution. The EU might argue that accepting full internal market 
membership of the UK is the price to pay for allowing the Republic of Ireland to fully benefit 
from the EU internal energy market. At the same time, the UK – which anyway benefits 
from the internal energy market – can argue that accepting a certain loss of sovereignty 
from participating in the EU energy market framework (possibly without being able to play 
a full role in the institutions) is the price to pay for Northern Ireland. This mutual 
dependency can be a credibility device for both sides (and it might also help convince 
investors of the stability of the arrangement). 
Ultimately, ensuring that the SEM (and in future the I-SEM) continues to function efficiently 
is key for the ROI (and NI). The regulatory framework of the SEM should furthermore 
facilitate a level playing field on the island of Ireland. 
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CHAPTER 9.  FINDINGS 
A tacit assumption in all of our findings is that the UK will in fact withdraw from the EU. 
9.1  The future of UK access to the European energy market 
The UK imports electricity and gas from the EU27 and the EEA. It also serves as a transit 
country for electricity and gas between Ireland and the EU26 (EU 27 minus Ireland), as well 
as a transit country for gas between Norway (an EEA country that is not an EU Member 
State) and the EU27.  
More than 80 percent of the value in EU27/UK electricity and gas trade in 2015 (some EUR 
6 billion) was for natural gas. The UK imported natural gas worth an additional EUR 10 
billion from Norway. 
The EU is in the process of creating a single energy market for electricity. For the UK to 
fully participate, it would need to adhere to changing EU energy market rules and to accept 
the authority of the relevant EU institutions to enforce those rules. In the absence of an 
agreement to do so, the UK would be limited to conducting tariff-free export and import of 
bulk electricity, as do Russia and Morocco. If the UK were to take this route, it would 
sacrifice the long term efficiencies that come with the joint optimisation of the linked 
systems. The negative impact would disproportionally fall on the UK (and Ireland), as the 
Continental market is much larger and already better integrated. 
In principle, the same also holds for the internal gas market. But as natural gas is storable 
the benefits of a jointly optimised system are slightly less prevalent and hence the relative 
impact of Brexit might be somewhat less significant than for the electricity exchanges 
between the EU27 and the UK. 
Brexit is unlikely to have any direct impact on UK energy taxes. 
9.2  Availability of EU funds for energy projects  
After Brexit, the UK might have more limited access to funding from the European 
Investment Bank (EIB), the European Fund for Strategic Investment (EFSI), the European 
Energy Programme for Recovery (EEPR), the Connecting Europe Facility (CEF) and Horizon 
2020 (H2020). The impact on the UK could be substantial in light of the level of funding 
currently committed for energy projects in which the UK participates. 
• The EIB provided about EUR 9 billion between 2012 and 2017. 
• The EFSI has signed financing worth EUR 1.4 billion since 2015, and approved 
another EUR 410 million. 
• The EEPR has provided grants for a total of EUR 330 million.  
• The CEF has funded EUR 125.6 million, and additional funding of EUR 90 million 
is in the pipeline. Of the current EU projects of common interest (PCIs), 16 are 
UK-related. 
• The H2020 programme currently funds more than 90 projects, for a total 
commitment of EUR 160 million. 
The details of the UK’s withdrawal from the EIB should be part of a single financial 
settlement between the EU27 and the UK, and should not be treated separately. 
9.3  PARTICIPATION IN REGULATORY BODIES 
The UK withdrawal will have no substantive impact on the voting shares and the functioning 
of the EU regulatory bodies that oversee the functioning of the EU internal energy market, 
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such as ACER, ENTSO-E and ENTSOG. Should the UK seek however to continue its 
participation in the internal energy market, it will have to comply with decisions taken by 
these regulatory bodies while having little or no influence over them. 
9.4  Revisiting EU energy and climate targets 
If the UK accepts that it will continue to adhere to EU energy and climate targets (so as to 
retain access to the internal market), it could possibly be required to report on its 
corresponding policies to the European Commission and receive guidance on its 
corresponding policies in order to allow the EU to achieve its union-wide targets. 
If the UK does not adhere to its current commitments regarding EU energy and climate 
targets, a political decision in the EU will be needed on how to adjust the EU27 energy and 
climate targets after Brexit. We explore three options for readjusting the national and/or EU 
targets which keep constant either (1) the national ambitions, (2) the EU28 ambition in 
absolute terms, or (3) the EU28 ambition in percentage terms. Given that the UK targets 
were close to the EU average, the resulting shifts are not dramatic, but they might still be 
significant for individual Member States. 
If the UK were to exit the EU Emissions Trading System (ETS), it might cause a short-term 
surplus of allowances, but most likely Brexit will tighten the system in the longer term. 
9.5  Rules for security of electricity and gas supplies 
Pooling energy resources among Member States is essential for the EU to build a common 
and truly integrated internal energy market that is able to withstand external shocks. 
Physical interconnections represent a fundamental prerequisite to enable solidarity and 
stability in both electricity and gas markets. Pooling benefits both the EU27 and the UK. 
For electricity, the UK benefits considerably from its trade with the EU27. Imported 
electricity (7.5 percent of the total UK’s consumption) helps the UK to keep prices down. 
The EU27 receives relatively little substantive benefit, however, because its electricity 
exchanges with the UK remain well below 1 percent of its total consumption. 
For gas, the trade volume between the EU26 (EU27 minus Ireland) and the UK is generally 
rather limited. From an EU26-wide perspective, gas trade with the UK plays a minimal role. 
Further, given the capacity and the underutilisation of its LNG terminals, the EU26 could 
manage its LNG markets even without the UK’s infrastructure. However, gas trade is an 
important issue for Ireland, which imports 56 percent of its consumption from the UK. 
The security of the EU26’s electricity and gas supplies is not likely to be affected by the UK 
withdrawal. It is reasonable to expect the UK’s and neighbouring countries’ transmission 
system operators to continue their long-lasting cooperation on the basis of their respective 
regulatory frameworks. For a discussion of the specific case of Ireland, refer to Section 9.8. 
9.6  Future relation with Euratom 
The UK Government has signalled its intention to leave not only the EU, but also Euratom. 
If it does so, the UK will have sole responsibility for ensuring its compliance with 
international treaties and conventions on nuclear energy from the withdrawal date. 
Both the EU and the UK recognise the need for setting out clear arrangements on issues 
like nuclear safety and radioactive waste in the Withdrawal Agreement. 
On safety, the two parties seem to agree that the Euratom Community should transfer 
ownership to the UK of equipment and other property on its territory related to the 
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provision of safeguards. However, the two parties will most likely disagree on the value of 
this property, which might thus be subject to negotiation. 
On radioactive waste, the two parties seem to agree on the principle that the state in which 
the spent fuel or the radioactive waste was generated should be responsible. However, 
disagreements could well emerge during the negotiations. 
9.7  Impact on energy markets for UK and EU companies 
Many European companies are active on the UK gas and electricity markets and hold 
significant market shares. They would be subject to regulatory risks in a post-Brexit 
environment if the UK is no longer bound by EU rules. 
The UK has traditionally been a leader in market liberalisation and its gas trading hub 
remains one of the largest and most important in Europe. However, Continental trading 
hubs could gain market shares because of the uniform regulatory environment, 
safeguarded by the EU combined with the absence of currency risks. London is one of the 
most important trading hubs for electricity, gas, oil and emission rights in the world. For 
the EU it is important to make sure that UK energy traders active in the EU will have to 
follow at least as rigorous financial market and transparency rules as their EU counterparts.  
London as a venue for arbitration cases will most likely not be affected. This is a 
consequence of the New York Convention on the recognition and enforcement of foreign 
arbitral awards. For place-of-jurisdiction clauses, EU27 companies might decide to abandon 
London in favour of Continental competitors. Enforceability currently enshrined in the 
Brussels Convention will no longer be automatic, but it is not under threat. However, 
burdensome recognition procedures could increase the costs of enforcement of UK court 
rulings. 
9.8  Impact of the UK withdrawal for Ireland 
The energy system of the Republic of Ireland (ROI) could be significantly affected by Brexit 
because the ROI operates a joint electricity market with Northern Ireland (NI), trades 
electricity with Great Britain (GB) and buys a significant amount of gas from GB. Ensuring 
that the Irish Single Energy Market (SEM) continues to function efficiently and that a level 
playing field is maintained in the SEM will be important following Brexit. 
For the ROI, the first best solution is if the UK remains inside the internal energy market; 
the second-best option is if NI remains inside the internal energy market; and the worst 
option is if only the ROI remains inside the internal energy market.  
It is uncertain whether the ROI might be exempted from certain provisions of EU energy 
regulation. It seems questionable, however, that the ROI would qualify as an ‘energy 
island’. 
The case of the ROI may offer both the EU27 and the UK an opportunity to advocate 
increased energy market integration after Brexit. The EU might perhaps argue that 
accepting full internal market membership of the UK is the price to pay for allowing the ROI 
to fully benefit from the EU internal energy market. The UK, might want to accept a certain 
loss of sovereignty from participating in the EU energy market framework, also, as the 
price to pay for energy security in Northern Ireland. 
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APPENDIX 
Detailed calculations of renewable energy share targets 
The following details the methodology underpinning the analysis of how the RES targets 
may change due to Brexit in scenarios two and three.217 
The analysis is conducted on the basis of the methodology stipulated in an Impact 
Assessment report from the European Commission.218 The targets derived in the Impact 
Assessment yields the current RES targets that are stipulated in the Renewable Energy 
Directive (except for Latvia219) (see column A in Table 31 for the official targets per 
Member State). This methodology is therefore considered suitable for calculating the new 
targets. 
Scenario 2 – Same overall EU target in absolute terms  
If the EU27 wants to attain the same overall volume of RES in 2020 (256.2 mtoe)220, the 
remaining RES of the UK as of 2015 (11.73 mtoe)221 would be distributed across the EU27 
Member States. Applying the methodology of the Impact Assessment222, the distribution is 
calculated as follows: 
1.) The GDP/capita of each Member State in 2016 is divided by the EU27 average in 
2016.223 The resulting index is shown in column B in Table 31. 
2.) The index is multiplied by a ‘residual effort per citizen’ value which is defined as follows: 
                                           
217  For scenario one, the individual national targets remain unchanged. This changes the EU-wide target. This 
change is calculated by subtracting the UK’s forecasted gross final energy consumption in 2020 and renewable 
energy volume in 2020 (assuming it meets its RES target) from the EU totals, and thereby calculating the 
EU27’s share of renewable energy in forecasted gross final energy consumption in 2020. 
218  European Commission (2008a). 
219  The RES target derived in the Impact Assessment (42 percent) is slightly different from that stipulated in the 
Renewable Energy Directive (40 percent) for Latvia. This is taken into account in the scenario analysis, as 
explained later. 
220  According to the Impact Assessment, meeting the 2020 RES targets implies that the volume of renewable 
energy in the EU28 minus Croatia (Croatia was not a Member State at the time when the Impact Assessment 
was written) would be 254.1 mtoe by 2020. The anticipated amount of renewable energy in Croatia by 2020 
was calculated manually by multiplying its forecasted final energy consumption in 2020 (10.6 mtoe - obtained 
from EEA (2017b)) with its RES target of 20 percent. The resulting 2.1 mtoe was added to the 254.1 mtoe to 
give the amount of renewable energy which the EU28 is expected to attain by 2020 (256.2 mtoe). 
 It should be noted that data were only available for the forecasted final energy consumption for Croatia, and 
not for forecasted gross final energy consumption. The difference between the two is likely small though. 
221  The 11.73 mtoe was calculated as follows. First, the amount of renewable energy already attained by the UK 
was derived by multiplying the share of renewable energy in 2015 (8.2 percent - obtained from Eurostat 
(2017b)) with the final energy consumption in this year (131,370 mtoe - obtained from Eurostat (2017b)). 
This gives a renewable energy amount of 10.77 mtoe in 2015. Subtracting this from the amount of renewable 
energy the UK is expected to add by 2020 in order to meet its 15 percent target (i.e. 22.5 mtoe – obtained 
from the Impact Assessment report) gives the volume of renewable energy which the UK still needs to add by 
2020 (equal to 11.73 mtoe). 
 Unfortunately, data on gross final energy consumption in 2015 were unavailable. This should not change the 
results signficiantly though. 
222  It should be noted that the 2020 targets are calculated in two main steps in the Impact Assessment. Firstly, 
the RES share of each Member States in 2005 is increased by 5.5 percentage points. Secondly, an index is 
calculated in order to assign the remaining renewable energy needed to attain the 20 percent EU-wide RES 
target by 2020. We ignore the first step in this report and only replicate the second step. This is primarily done 
in order to simplify the analysis.  
223  The GDP and population data were acquired from Eurostat (2017b). 
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Where UK RES is the remaining amount of renewable energy the UK would have to add 
from 2015 onward to meet its current 2020 target, and Pop EU27 is the EU27 
population in 2016. The ‘residual effort per citizen’ value, equal to 0.026 in this 
scenario, indicates the additional renewable energy (in toe) required per citizen in the 
EU27 due to the UK’s departure. Multiplying this value with the index in column B gives 
an updated index (column C)  
3.) In order to obtain the total amount of additional renewable energy per Member State, 
the index in column C is multiplied by the population of the respective Member State in 
2016, and then converted from toe to mtoe by dividing by one million. This gives the 
additional amount of renewable energy (in mtoe) that each Member State has to add 
due to the UK’s departure (column D).  
4.) The additional amount of renewable energy is added to the current targeted volumes of 
renewable energy for 2020 for each Member State.224 This gives the new overall 
quantity of renewable energy which each Member State seeks to attain by 2020. 
(column E) 
5.) Dividing the new RES targeted volumes with the forecasted gross final energy 
consumption in 2020 (acquired from the Impact Assessment) gives the new RES targets 
in percentage terms (column F). 
6.) The RES targets are rounded and thereafter further adjusted for Sweden and Latvia. 
Specifically, the target for Sweden is adjusted downward by one percentage point in line 
with the methodology in the Impact Assessment.225 The Latvian target is adjusted 
downward by two percentage points in order to account for the discrepancy between 
the current targets stipulated in the Impact Assessment and the Renewable Energy 
Directive.226  
7.) The current targets are subtracted from the new targets (column G) to give the 
difference between the new and old targets (column H). 
 
Table 31: Calculating the new RES targets for scenario 2 
 
(A) 
Original 
targets 
(in 
Renewabl
e Energy 
Directive) 
(percent) 
(B) 
GDP/
capita 
index 
(C) 
GDP/cap
ita index 
multiplie
d by a 
'residual 
effort 
per 
citizen' 
(D) 
Residual 
effort 
per MS 
(mtoe) 
(E) RES 
needed 
in 2020 
(mtoe) 
(F) New 
2020 
target 
(percent) 
(G) New 
2020 RES 
target 
(rounded 
and 
adjusted) 
(percent) 
(H) New vs 
old target 
(percentage 
points) 
                                           
224  The current targeted volumes of renewable energy for 2020 for each Member State are stipulated in the 
Impact Assessment. 
225  This was done in the Impact Assessment in order to ensure that Sweden’s RES target is below 50 percent (i.e. 
it was adjusted down from 50 percent to 49 percent). Though Sweden’s target will exceed 50 percent in this 
scenario, we maintain some consistency with the methodology in the Impact Assessment by adjusting this 
country’s target by the same number of percentage points. 
226  The Latvian RES target was 42 percent in the Impact Assessment and 40 percent in the Renewable Energy 
Directive. As the latter target is the official one, we account for the discrepancy by reducing the new target by 
two percentage points. 
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Belgium 13 1.33 0.04 0.40 5.35 14.29 14 1 
Bulgaria 16 0.24 0.01 0.04 2.02 16.46 16 0 
Czech 
Republic 13 0.60 0.02 0.17 4.01 13.26 13 0 
Denmark 30 1.73 0.05 0.26 4.96 31.80 32 2 
Germany 18 1.36 0.04 2.95 43.28 19.67 20 2 
Estonia 25 0.57 0.01 0.02 0.93 25.13 25 0 
Ireland 16 2.08 0.05 0.26 2.56 18.28 18 2 
Greece 18 0.58 0.02 0.17 4.56 18.67 19 1 
Spain 20 0.85 0.02 1.05 23.68 20.45 20 0 
France 23 1.19 0.03 2.09 39.88 24.23 24 1 
Croatia 20 0.39 0.01 0.04 2.16 20.41 20 0 
Italy 17 0.98 0.03 1.57 27.88 18.06 18 1 
Cyprus 13 0.75 0.02 0.02 0.28 14.57 15 2 
Latvia 40 0.45 0.01 0.02 2.50 42.43 40 0 
Lithuania 23 0.48 0.01 0.04 1.44 23.55 24 1 
Luxembo
urg 11 3.35 0.09 0.05 0.55 11.72 12 1 
Hungary 13 0.41 0.01 0.11 2.75 13.26 13 0 
Malta 10 0.81 0.02 0.01 0.08 11.33 11 1 
Netherlan
ds 14 1.47 0.04 0.66 8.37 15.73 16 2 
Austria 34 1.43 0.04 0.33 10.51 35.62 36 2 
Poland 15 0.40 0.01 0.40 11.17 15.60 16 1 
Portugal 31 0.64 0.02 0.17 6.80 31.50 31 0 
Romania 24 0.31 0.01 0.16 8.40 24.07 24 0 
Slovenia 25 0.69 0.02 0.04 1.59 25.20 25 0 
Slovakia 14 0.53 0.01 0.08 1.90 14.81 15 1 
Finland 38 1.40 0.04 0.20 10.02 39.00 39 1 
Sweden 49 1.67 0.04 0.43 17.78 51.55 51 2 
EU27 20 N/A N/A 11.73 245.40* 21.66 22 2 
Source: Bruegel based on data from European Commission (2008a), Eurostat (2017b) and EEA (2017a). 
Note: *The sum of this figure (245.40 mtoe) and the renewable energy already added by the UK by 2015 (10.77 
mtoe) equals the EU28 total (256.2 mtoe). 
 
Scenario 3 - Same overall EU target in percentage terms.  
In this scenario, the forecasted gross final energy consumption of the EU27 in 2020 is first 
derived. This is calculated by subtracting the forecasted consumption for the UK from that 
of the EU28.227 20 percent of this amount corresponds to the new target volume of 
                                           
227  Both consumption figures are obtained from the Impact Assessment. 
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renewable energy for the EU27 for 2020. The new target equals 226.6 mtoe of renewable 
energy.  
If the individual Member State RES targets were not adjusted from the current ones, the 
EU27 would be expected to produce a total of 233.7 mtoe by 2020. This amount exceeds 
the new target volume of 226.6 mtoe. Thus, if the EU wants to retain its 20 percent target 
(and thereby produce 226.6 mtoe), the EU27 will have to reduce its current production 
level. Specifically, the EU27 will have to reduce RES production by 7.1 mtoe (i.e. 233.7-
226.6). This reflects the fact that the UK has a relatively large share of the EU28’s total 
energy consumption, while its RES percentage target (15 percent) is relatively low.  
The reduction in the national targets is distributed according to the same methodology 
explained in the previous scenario. The only difference is that the ‘effort per citizen value’ 
has changed from 0.026 toe to -0.016 toe (as an overall reduction of 7.1 mtoe across the 
EU27 occurs in the third scenario). Applying the same methodology as in the previous 
scenario228 gives the results in Table 32:
                                           
228  Including the downward adjustment for Sweden and Latvia by one and two percentage points respectively. 
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Table 32: Calculating the new RES targets for scenario 3 
 
(A) 
Original 
targets 
(in 
Renewabl
e Energy 
Directive) 
(percent) 
(B) 
GDP/
capita 
index 
(C) 
GDP/cap
ita index 
multiplie
d by a 
'residual 
effort 
per 
citizen' 
(D) 
Residual 
effort 
per MS 
(mtoe) 
(E) RES 
needed 
in 2020 
(mtoe) 
(F) New 
2020 
target 
(percent) 
(G) New 
2020 RES 
target 
(rounded 
and 
adjusted) 
(percent) 
(H) New vs 
old target 
(percentage 
points) 
Belgium 13 1.33 0.02 0.24 4.71 12.59 13 0 
Bulgaria 16 0.24 0.00 0.03 1.95 15.88 16 0 
Czech 
Republic 13 0.60 0.01 0.10 3.74 12.38 12 -1 
Denmark 30 1.73 0.03 0.16 4.54 29.12 29 -1 
Germany 18 1.36 0.02 1.79 38.54 17.52 18 0 
Estonia 25 0.57 0.01 0.01 0.90 24.27 24 -1 
Ireland 16 2.08 0.03 0.16 2.14 15.31 15 -1 
Greece 18 0.58 0.01 0.10 4.29 17.58 18 0 
Spain 20 0.85 0.01 0.63 22.00 19.00 19 -1 
France 23 1.19 0.02 1.27 36.52 22.19 22 -1 
Croatia 20 0.39 0.01 0.03 2.09 19.75 20 0 
Italy 17 0.98 0.02 0.95 25.36 16.42 16 -1 
Cyprus 13 0.75 0.01 0.01 0.25 13.15 13 0 
Latvia 40 0.45 0.01 0.01 2.47 41.79 40 0 
Lithuania 23 0.48 0.01 0.02 1.38 22.59 23 0 
Luxembo
urg 11 3.35 0.05 0.03 0.47 9.98 10 -1 
Hungary 13 0.41 0.01 0.06 2.58 12.44 12 -1 
Malta 10 0.81 0.01 0.01 0.06 9.20 9 -1 
Netherlan
ds 14 1.47 0.02 0.40 7.31 13.74 14 0 
Austria 34 1.43 0.02 0.20 9.98 33.84 34 0 
Poland 15 0.40 0.01 0.24 10.53 14.70 15 0 
Portugal 31 0.64 0.01 0.11 6.52 30.21 30 -1 
Romania 24 0.31 0.00 0.10 8.14 23.33 23 -1 
Slovenia 25 0.69 0.01 0.02 1.53 24.24 24 -1 
Slovakia 14 0.53 0.01 0.05 1.77 13.86 14 0 
Finland 38 1.40 0.02 0.12 9.70 37.73 38 0 
Sweden 49 1.67 0.03 0.26 17.09 49.53 49 0 
EU27 20 N/A N/A 7.10 226.57* 20.00 20 0 
Source: Bruegel based on data from European Commission (2008a), Eurostat (2017b) and EEA (2017a). 
Note: * This amount excludes both the UK’s actual and planned increase in renewable energy as of 2015. 
 
Policy Department A: Economic and Scientific Policy 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 122 PE 614.181 
Detailed calculations of non-ETS emissions reduction targets 
The following details the methodology underpinning the analysis in scenario two and three 
of how the non-ETS emissions reduction targets may change due to Brexit.229  
Scenario 2 - Same overall EU target in absolute terms.  
If the EU27 wants to reduce its overall emissions by the same amount in absolute terms, 
the EU27 would have to take into account the UK’s remaining emissions reduction. Between 
2005 and 2030, the UK seeks to reduce emissions by 153.44 mtCO2e230. By 2015, the UK 
had reduced emissions by 86.06 mtCO2e.231 The remaining emissions (67.38 mtCO2e) 
would have to be reduced by the remaining EU27 Member States in this scenario. 
The 67.38 mtCO2e was distributed according to an index of the Member States’ reduction 
targets in absolute terms. Countries that aim to reduce their emissions by a large amount 
will thus be allocated a larger share of the UK’s emissions. This methodology was deemed 
more suitable than weighting based on the reduction amounts in percentage terms since 
the latter would have led to some small countries with high percentage reduction targets 
(e.g. Luxembourg) being allocated a large share of the UK’s emissions. 
Table 33 breaks down the methodology. Applying the current emissions reduction targets 
(column A) to the 2005 baseline emissions (column B) yields the current reduction volumes 
between 2005 and 2030 (column C). An index is calculated on the basis of the reduction 
volumes in column C. Specifically, each Member State is assigned a weight equal to the 
percentage of its reduction volume relative to the EU27 amount. These weights are shown 
in column D. Multiplying the weights with the residual emissions reduction amount of the 
UK as of 2015 (i.e. 67.38 mtCO2e) gives the new reduction amounts in mtCO2e between 
2005 and 2030 (column E). The new percentage reduction targets, relative to the 2005 
baseline emissions, are calculated (column F) and the difference between the new and old 
targets is shown in column G.
                                           
229  For scenario one, the individual targets are assumed to remain unchanged. The only change is in the EU-wide 
target. This change is calculated by firstly subtracting the UK’s baseline emissions in 2005 from those of the 
EU28. The level of emissions in the EU27 by 2030 is thereafter calculated by subtracting the UK’s targeted 
volume of emissions in 2030 from that of the EU28. The EU27’s targeted 2030 emissions level is thereafter 
divided by the EU27 baseline. Subtracting one from this amount gives the new overall EU27 emissions 
reduction target. 
230  This amount was calculated by multiplying the UK’s 37 percent reduction target with the baseline emissions of 
414.71 mtCO2e. 
231  Using data from Eurostat (2017c), the 86.06 mtCO2e was calculated by subtracting the UK’s emissions in 2015 
from those in 2005. 
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Table 33: Calculating the new non-ETS emissions reduction targets for scenario 2 
 
(A) 
Original 
2030 
reduction 
targets 
(percent) 
(B) 2005 
GHG level 
(mtCO2e) 
(C) 
Current 
reduction 
2005-
2030 
(mtCO2e) 
(D) 
Index of 
weights 
(E) New 
reduction 
amount 
(mtCO2e) 
(F) New 
targets 
(percent) 
(G) New vs 
old target 
(percentage 
points) 
Austria 36 56.67 20.40 0.03 22.35 39.45 3.45 
Belgium 35 78.20 27.37 0.04 29.99 38.35 3.35 
Bulgaria 0 24.57 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Croatia 7 16.82 1.18 0.00 1.29 7.67 0.67 
Cyprus 24 4.18 1.00 0.00 1.10 26.30 2.30 
Czech 
Republic 14 62.55 8.76 0.01 9.60 15.34 1.34 
Denmark 39 40.08 15.63 0.02 17.13 42.74 3.74 
Estonia 13 5.43 0.71 0.00 0.77 14.25 1.25 
Finland 39 33.60 13.11 0.02 14.36 42.74 3.74 
France 37 395.59 146.37 0.21 160.40 40.55 3.55 
Germany 38 468.44 178.01 0.25 195.06 41.64 3.64 
Greece 16 61.78 9.88 0.01 10.83 17.53 1.53 
Hungary 7 46.38 3.25 0.00 3.56 7.67 0.67 
Ireland 30 47.52 14.26 0.02 15.62 32.88 2.88 
Italy 33 329.14 108.62 0.15 119.02 36.16 3.16 
Latvia 6 8.52 0.51 0.00 0.56 6.58 0.58 
Lithuania 9 10.78 0.97 0.00 1.06 9.86 0.86 
Luxembourg 40 10.13 4.05 0.01 4.44 43.83 3.83 
Malta 19 1.03 0.19 0.00 0.21 20.82 1.82 
Netherlands 36 122.88 44.24 0.06 48.48 39.45 3.45 
Poland 7 176.01 12.32 0.02 13.50 7.67 0.67 
Portugal 17 49.53 8.42 0.01 9.23 18.63 1.63 
Romania 2 73.03 1.46 0.00 1.60 2.19 0.19 
Slovakia 12 22.30 2.68 0.00 2.93 13.15 1.15 
Slovenia 15 11.85 1.78 0.00 1.95 16.44 1.44 
Spain 26 233.84 60.80 0.09 66.62 28.49 2.49 
Sweden 40 42.90 17.16 0.02 18.80 43.83 3.83 
EU27 30 2,433.72 856.54* N/A 770.48** 31.66*** 1.66 
Source: Bruegel based on Eurostat (2017c) and European Commission (n.d.-p). 
Note: *This is the combined amount of reduced emissions of the EU27 and the UK (the latter is 153.44 mtCO2e).  
**This amount does not include the emissions already reduced by the UK by 2015. Adding the latter (86 mtCO2e) 
to the 770.48 mtCO2e gives the EU27 reduction amount in column C though. 
***Using the EU27 emissions in 2005 as a baseline. 
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Scenario 3 - Same overall EU target in percentage terms.  
If the EU27 seeks to retain its overall 30 percent reduction target, the EU27 baseline 
emissions in 2005 are first calculated by subtracting the UK’s 2005 emissions from those of 
the EU28. The EU27 emissions in 2005 thus equal 2,433.72 mtCO2e. 30 percent of this 
amount is 730.12 mtoCO2e, which is the new target reduction quantity. If the Member 
States achieve their current reduction targets, the cumulative EU27 reduction amount is 
703.10 mtCO2e. The difference (730.12-703.10=27.02) would need to be distributed 
across the EU27 Member States. The positive difference reflects the ambitious emissions 
reduction target of the UK.  
The distribution of the 27.02 mtCO2e was carried out using the same methodology as in 
the second scenario. The results are shown in Table 34. Columns A-B are the same as in 
the second scenario. In column C, the national amounts are the same as in second 
scenario, though the EU27’s overall amount differs. The latter reflects the fact that the 
emissions already reduced by the UK (up until 2015) are excluded from this scenario. As 
the UK’s emissions in 2005 was removed from the baseline to calculate the new absolute 
reduction targets in this scenario, it makes sense to also remove all of the UK’s planned 
emissions reduction volume between 2005 and 2030 from the EU28 total when calculating 
what the EU27 will achieve if it maintains its current national targets. Column D contains 
the same weights as in the second scenario, while column E illustrates the new reduction 
amounts after the 27.02 mtCO2e have been distributed. The new targets are shown in 
column F and column G depicts the change in the targets.
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Table 34: Calculating the new non-ETS emissions reduction targets for scenario 3 
 
(A) 
Original 
2030 
reduction 
targets 
(percent) 
(B) 2005 
GHG level 
(mtCO2e) 
(C) 
Current 
reduction 
2005-2030 
(mtCO2e) 
(D) 
Index 
of 
weights 
(E) New 
reduction 
amount 
(mtCO2e) 
(F) New 
targets 
(percent) 
(G) New vs 
old target 
(percentage 
points) 
Austria 36 56.67 20.40 0.03 21.18 37.38 1.38 
Belgium 35 78.20 27.37 0.04 28.42 36.34 1.34 
Bulgaria 0 24.57 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Croatia 7 16.82 1.18 0.00 1.22 7.27 0.27 
Cyprus 24 4.18 1.00 0.00 1.04 24.92 0.92 
Czech 
Republic 14 62.55 8.76 0.01 9.09 14.54 0.54 
Denmark 39 40.08 15.63 0.02 16.23 40.50 1.50 
Estonia 13 5.43 0.71 0.00 0.73 13.50 0.50 
Finland 39 33.60 13.11 0.02 13.61 40.50 1.50 
France 37 395.59 146.37 0.21 151.99 38.42 1.42 
Germany 38 468.44 178.01 0.25 184.85 39.46 1.46 
Greece 16 61.78 9.88 0.01 10.26 16.61 0.61 
Hungary 7 46.38 3.25 0.00 3.37 7.27 0.27 
Ireland 30 47.52 14.26 0.02 14.80 31.15 1.15 
Italy 33 329.14 108.62 0.15 112.79 34.27 1.27 
Latvia 6 8.52 0.51 0.00 0.53 6.23 0.23 
Lithuania 9 10.78 0.97 0.00 1.01 9.35 0.35 
Luxembourg 40 10.13 4.05 0.01 4.21 41.54 1.54 
Malta 19 1.03 0.19 0.00 0.20 19.73 0.73 
Netherlands 36 122.88 44.24 0.06 45.94 37.38 1.38 
Poland 7 176.01 12.32 0.02 12.79 7.27 0.27 
Portugal 17 49.53 8.42 0.01 8.74 17.65 0.65 
Romania 2 73.03 1.46 0.00 1.52 2.08 0.08 
Slovakia 12 22.30 2.68 0.00 2.78 12.46 0.46 
Slovenia 15 11.85 1.78 0.00 1.85 15.58 0.58 
Spain 26 233.84 60.80 0.09 63.13 27.00 1.00 
Sweden 40 42.90 17.16 0.02 17.82 41.54 1.54 
EU27 30 2,433.72 703.10* N/A 730.12* 30.00 0.00 
Source: Bruegel based on Eurostat (2017c) and European Commission (n.d.-p). 
Note: *This amount excludes all of the planned and already achieved emission abatement of the UK. 
 

